A Critical Examination of Private Conservation Areas on Campesino Community Lands in Peru by Barnhart, Megan
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
2015 
A Critical Examination of Private Conservation Areas on 
Campesino Community Lands in Peru 
Megan Barnhart 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
 Part of the Environmental Policy Commons, Environmental Studies Commons, Forest Management 
Commons, International Relations Commons, and the Latin American Studies Commons 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Barnhart, Megan, "A Critical Examination of Private Conservation Areas on Campesino Community Lands 
in Peru" (2015). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 4556. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/4556 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF PRIVATE CONSERVATION AREAS ON CAMPESINO 
COMMUNITY LANDS IN PERU 
By 
MEGAN MARIE BARNHART 
Bachelor of Science, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan, 2009 
Thesis 
Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of  
 
Master of Science 
In Resource Conservation, International Conservation and Development 
 
The University of Montana 
Missoula, MT 
 
Fall 2015 
Approved by: 
Dr. Sandy Ross, Dean of the Graduate School 
Dr. Jill M. Belsky, Chair 
Department of Society and Conservation 
 
Dr. Laurie Yung 
Department of Society and Conservation 
 
Dr. Kimber H. McKay 
Department of Anthropology 
  
ii 
 
Barnhart, Megan, M.S., Fall 2015                           Resource Conservation 
A Critical Examination of Private Conservation Areas on Campesino Community Lands in Peru 
 
Chairperson: Dr. Jill M. Belsky  
 
Abstract 
Community-owned private reserves are emerging around the world as an alternative to 
government-run resource management and as a way to more directly involve citizens as stewards 
of their local natural resources. Despite their recent proliferation globally, voluntary efforts by 
communities to include their land in protected area systems, and the motivations and 
expectations of their legal recognition remain largely unknown. This thesis examines 
community-owned private conservation areas in Northern Peru locally known as Áreas de 
Conservación Privadas (ACPs) which are voluntary and legally recognized by the Peruvian State. 
The study investigates the rationales and outcomes of the application of ACPs in campesino 
(peasant) communities, and how both are shaped by socio- political, economic, historical, 
cultural, and legal contexts at multiple (nested) scales. The field work of this research 
investigated the creation and management of two case study campesino community-owned ACPs 
in the Amazonas region of Peru: Molinopampa and Tilacancha. Field research was conducted 
from December 2012 to Febuary 2015 during my service as a Peace Corps volunteer in the 
region where the study took place. The field research included largely qualitative methods 
including participant observation, in-depth interviews with government officials at the national 
level, regional NGOs and governmental agencies, and community leaders, and household 
surveys in the community-owned ACPs. The research found that the implementation and 
outcomes of ACPs in Peru are shaped by interests, policies and discourses at national and 
international levels, and their interactions with local communities. Although labeled as 
“community-owned” the ACPs were being used to increase the amount of land in conservation 
according to the dominant paradigm involving strict protection and restricted use in designated 
areas; it even involved displacement in some cases. The case study demonstrated that the local 
communities examined were excluded from making decisions in regards to what constitutes 
appropriate land uses for their land, both in national decentralized land planning policies and in 
the creation of the ACPs. These findings provide for a more nuanced understanding of the 
inclusion of Indigenous and Community Conserved Areas (ICCAs) in legal frameworks. The 
alignment of community land rights recognition with conservation initiatives as determined by 
the outside entities led to many negative outcomes for the communities, including less control 
over their lands, distrust for outside entities, and a growing resistance to conservation as defined 
by the ACP management plan. This study revealed it is important to understand how new 
political and economic discourses and actions surrounding nature play into regionally or locally 
specific histories of environments, land use, and governance and agrarian relations.  
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MINAM Ministry of Environment (Spanish Acronym) 
SERNANP National Service for Natural Protected Areas (Spanish Acronym) 
PROFANANPE Peruvian Trust Fund for National Parks and Protected Areas (Spanish 
Acronym) 
SINANPE Peruvian State National Protected Area System (Spanish Acronym) 
ZEE Economic and Ecological Zoning (Spanish Acronym) 
ARA Regional Environmental Authorities (Spanish Acronym) 
APECO Peruvian Association for the Conservation of Nature (Spanish Acronym) 
NCI Nature and Culture International 
SPDA Peruvian Society for Environmental Law 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION  
Peru provides an important setting for learning more about the experience of community-
based private conservation. It is particularly relevant to understand issues related to its recent 
institutionalization and state recognition of “Indigenous and Community Conserved Areas” 
(ICCAs). The concept of ICCAs was a product of the 2003 International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) World Parks Conference, and is defined as natural areas under 
community governance, self-initiated by local, mobile, or indigenous communities (IUCN, 2008). 
The recognition and inclusion of ICCAs in national protected area systems are being promoted 
by and included as a theme in the action plans of the United Nations Environmental Program, the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and IUCN. Community conserved areas often lack 
formal recognition and can be threatened by agro-development schemes and resource extraction 
projects, such as mining.  The growing understanding of ICCAs and their potential contribution 
to the contemporary conservation framework has led to the integration of ICCAs within 
governmental conservation plans and policies (Kellert et al., 2000).  In Peru the main possibility 
for indigenous and peasant (campesino) titled communities to request the government to 
recognize their land as formal conservation areas is through Private Conservation Areas (ACPs-
Spanish acronym). In Peru there are 83 legally recognized ACPs covering 280,199 hectares of 
land. The ACPs are declared by both individual landowners and communities with land titles; 
this study focuses on the issues related to the declaration and implementation of ACPs by 
campesino communities.  
 Three important elements coincide in Peru to enable the rise in legally documented 
community-based private protected areas owned by campesino communities. First, campesino 
communities are legally recognized in Peru as autonomous governing organizations with 
historical ties to their land and hold self-governing rights over their land, which is considered 
private land, not public. Second, the country initiated a national decentralization agenda which 
has devolved land management planning to the regional and local level. And, third, there are new 
regional land planning efforts and legal frameworks that call for the increased use of landscape-
level environmental conservation management which relies on voluntary efforts on privately-
owned lands and financial incentives. The example of how the Peruvian state is engaging private 
land owners and campesino communities in the country’s protected area system through the legal 
recognition of voluntary conservation efforts elucidates the nuanced ways in which recognition 
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of peasant land rights, and land planning by regional level governance institutions and authorities, 
are negotiated to meet the objective of landscape conservation. These negotiations are important 
to the social and environmental aspects of conservation in the biodiverse countries of the 
Amazon, as well as the current academic debates regarding institutionalizing private community-
based conservation in accordance with what has been called rights-based conservation (Campese 
et al., 2009).  
This study examines the perspectives and experiences of the multiple actors involved 
with the application of the legal and institutional framework that has boosted conservation efforts 
on private land in Peru, especially on campesino community-titled lands. Using a nested 
multiscale approach the study analyzes the movement in Peru to give state recognition to 
“voluntary” conservation efforts on campesino community-titled lands at the global, national, 
regional, and local levels. The research reveals how factors at one level impact the next and how 
the different scales interact, paying particular attention to power relations and historical and 
political contexts.  The research draws on three areas of literature: community-based 
conservation, indigenous and community conserved areas policy developments, and incentive-
based conservation and the contention in the academic literature over the growth and 
management of their applications critiquing their ability to conserve biodiversity (Hutton et al, 
2005; Kellert et al., 2000; Oates, 1999) as well as their capacity to achieve sustainable 
development for local populations (Barrett & Arcese, 1995; Wainwright & Wehrmeyer, 1998; 
West, 2006). It examines the recent increased use of voluntary private community-owned 
conservation areas in international conservation policy and discourses, and how these same 
arguments may apply or be overcome through their application. 
 The  literature on indigenous and community-conserved areas advocates for the 
international and national recognition of Indigenous and Community Conserved Areas (ICCAs) 
by acknowledging local management systems that are consistent with “conventional 
conservation” and are seen by the IUCN to contribute to non-local conservation objectives and 
goals (CENESTA, 2009; IUCN, 2011). Despite the rise in the recognition of ICCAs by 
governments across the globe, little is known about the contexts that can lead to a positive 
collaboration between indigenous or peasant communities and the state. Also, even with the 
recent proliferation of government recognized private protected areas and the rise of their use as 
a conservation tool by international organizations, there has been little documentation of the 
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areas; especially absent has been research on the motivating forces behind the creation of the 
areas and their inclusion in state systems – such research has been called “non-existent” 
(Langholz & Lassoie, 2001).  
Although small scale, locally-initiated conservation efforts are becoming common 
globally, their management and the rationale behind their implementation, as well as why certain 
land uses are accepted as “conserving” over others is rarely described in literature (Fletcher, 
2010) . This lack of research is in contrast to the wider literature on community- based natural 
resource management and the impacts of these interventions on resource conservation and the 
socioeconomic conditions of rural populations (Berkes F. , 2009; Dressler & Pulhin, 2009; 
Kellert, Mehta, Ebbin, & Lichtenfeld, 2000), as well as the wider literature on connections 
between rural people and their natural environments (Li, 2002; Sheil, 2004; Western, 1994). As 
programs such as REDD+ and Payments for Ecosystem Services increase there is an increasing 
number of studies including critiques of how they relate to neoliberal economic policies and their 
negative impact on conservation and rural livelihoods (Fairhead et al., 2012; Corbera et al., 
2007). Though there is a growing base of knowledge on these subjects, there has been a lack of 
attempt to bring these areas of research together and understand the interaction between external 
conservation agencies and voluntary local environmental conservation initiatives (Shanee, 2013). 
Understanding areas of disagreement as well as agreement on private conservation areas by rural 
residents living in biodiversity hotspots as well as by mainstream conservation practitioners 
responsible for implementing them can help to inform how these new conservation areas are 
operating. Perhaps they can even identify important conservation opportunities that allow local 
people the political will and recognition to lead conservation projects and initiatives.  
 Over the last decade, Peru has developed legal mechanisms for both private conservation 
areas and payments for ecosystem services schemes, and has given the legal recognition of 
private conservation area (ACP) to several campesino communities. The institutionalization of 
the ACPs is making it necessary for interaction among conventional conservation NGOs who are 
helping with legal documentation of private conservation areas, the state who grants legal 
recognitions, and the campesino communities, and for these groups to find ways to resolve 
conflicts over land use and management. The country’s decentralization process and regional 
level land planning have led to a suite of different forms of conservation mechanisms in the 
country’s protected area system (SINANPE) including state-run national protected areas, 
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regional conservation areas, private protected areas, and conservation and ecotourism 
concessions. Many communities across Peru hold the legal status of campesino communities 
dating back to the countries agricultural reforms in the 1970s that granted collective land tenure 
to the communities that practiced agriculture on the lands. Although the communities have, at 
least on paper, autonomy to manage their own land, land planning in Peru has been complicated 
and multi-leveled, with different ministries in charge of different aspects of landscape planning. 
The signing of a free trade agreement with the United States in 2007 and the passing of an 
economic stimulus package in 2014 favor economic development and resource extraction and 
have created tension and contradiction for campesino and native community land rights and 
environmental protection. This has led to an overlap in jurisdiction over lands, and it is becoming 
common (and problematic) that mining concession or large scale agriculture projects are 
superimposed on campesino and indigenous community lands (Kovacevic, 2014). Nonetheless, 
internationally ICCAs are being seen as mechanisms for the recognition of local rights and 
protection against external threats (Alcorn, 2005; IUCN, 2011). 
The Amazonas region of Peru, where this research took place, is in Northeastern Peru and 
a central part of the ‘Tropical Andes Biodiversity Hotspot.’  This area is considered one of the 
most biodiverse areas on earth (Myers, 2003). The high biodiversity and acute threats perceived 
by the Peruvian government and others to important habitats have led to Northeastern Peru being 
considered a global conservation priority. The Amazonas region suffers from one of the highest 
rates of deforestation in Peru, fueled by a large and rapid influx of immigrants and a lack of 
government intervention (Gobierno Regional de Amazonas; Instituto de Investigaciones de la 
Amazonía Peruana, 2010).  
The people of the Amazonas region come from a mix of indigenous and European origin. 
The rural, campesino communities reflect this mix and consist of mostly impoverished farmers 
who suffer from the deterioration of natural resources and land insecurity due to high rates of in-
migration, competition from mining, and a lack of state acknowledgement; as well as corrupt 
decision making processes (Shanee, 2013). They rely on mostly subsistence agricultural crops 
production based on a combination of corn, beans, and tubers for home use, supplemented by a 
small income from commercial production of cattle, coffee, and cacao; the combination depends 
on the area. There is a growing number of migrants from the country’s northern highlands, 
mainly from the region Cajamarca, where an increase in population together with an increase in 
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mining operations have led to a lack of affordable fertile land. The migrants often settle in areas 
that have communal land laws which do not provide private land titles recognized by the 
regional government but “titles of position” awarded by local governing bodies. Titles of 
position are not registered through the regional government. Many of the migrants do not register 
legally within the region. Due to the ecological differences between the regions, migrants use 
farming methods poorly adapted to their new areas, such as the intensive clearing of forest to 
create pasture lands using species of grasses and cattle not suited to the areas. This is a large 
reason for current local land degradation and has led to large forest clearing, uncontrollable 
burning, and illegal use of resources; as well as conflicts between long-established populations 
and the immigrant settlers (Shanee, 2013).  
In response to the lack of state recognition and state assistance, and through a push from 
international NGOs teaming with regional government institutions, locally-run conservation 
initiatives in the Amazonas region are increasing in number and include the creation of 
campesino community run ACPs. Despite the explosion of their application in regional 
conservation, research is lacking regarding the initiation of the movement to create the 
“voluntary” community-based private protected areas.  Currently there are 14 ACPs throughout 
the region of Amazonas, 8 of which are on campesino community land and managed by 
campesino communities. The ACPs add 107,489 hectares to the regional conservation system 
and encompass a diverse range of microclimates and ecosystems. There are currently more 
individuals and campesino communities that are in the legal process of declaring their land as 
ACPs. Below is the most recent map of the ACPs in the region. 
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Figure 1. Map of ACPs in the Amazonas Region 
 
The ACP initiatives in Amazonas follow a concept promoted by both global and national 
conservation agents, depending upon external markets and grants. Schemes for Payments for 
ecosystem services, REDD+, ecotourism, and integrated conservation and development 
programs are in their beginning stages of implementation in the ACPs, and are a common topic 
discussed at regional level environmental meetings. The private conservation areas are partly 
justified by environmental agents inspired by incentive-based conservation and payment for 
ecosystem service schemes, as such ACPs are presented to communities as an opportunity for 
raising income and mitigating poverty. The region includes considerable land with opportunity 
for mining, both for petroleum and metals, and the ACPs are also being viewed by communities 
and conservation NGOs as a way to protect community land rights against industrial mining. 
Mining is negatively viewed in the area due to a 2009 violent interaction between the 
government and petroleum mining companies, and a native community in the region. Fairhead, 
Leach, and Scones (2012) along with other scholars (Bebbington, 2011; Berkes F. , 2004; Dove, 
1993; Dressler & Pulhin, 2009; Li, 2002) have noted that rural campesino communities around 
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the world are vulnerable to appropriation by more powerful state and corporate entities for 
environmental or resource extraction (Fairhead et al., 2012). ACPs may have the ability to 
devolve land rights, control, and management decisions to communities where historically socio- 
economic and political factors have favored elite capture and loss of communal lands. 
This research examines the actual experience of developing ACPs in two campesino 
communities in Peru to document why actors at the local, regional and national level pursued 
developing ACPs, how they were implemented and ultimately whom they actually benefit. My 
analysis is particularly directed at understanding how community-based natural resource 
management actually operated within the two case study ACPs as compared to what has been 
assumed about ICCAs in Peru as well as in the academic literature. As will be shown below, the 
thesis demonstrates that the legal inclusion of community-owned and managed ICCAs in 
Peruvian protected area frameworks while seemingly progressive and in line with community 
interests is considerably more complex than documented. 
Research Questions 
 Building on the above background, this research examines the history and outcomes of 
the development and use of community- based ACPs as a conservation tool in the Amazonas 
region of Peru. The project more specifically seeks to examine: 
1) Why did the movement for the creation of ACPs on campesino community-owned land 
come about, and what were the justifications and motivations behind the creation of the 
ACPs? To explain the origin of the motivations I ask further: who was involved in the 
formation of the ACPs, what were the roles of the different actors involved in the creation 
of the ACP, and who started the initiative to create the legally documented conservation 
areas? 
 
2) How were the campesino community conservation areas established and based on what 
form of community ownership of, or inclusion in the planning processes? I am 
particularly interested in who was included and who was left out of the process of 
deciding upon declaring the community land as a conservation area and in creating the 
zoning and use plans for the conservation area.  
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3) In order to evaluate the outcomes of the implementation of the ACPs, I examined the 
views of different groups involved in developing the legal and material basis of the ACPs 
including what does the national government, regional NGOs and agencies, and local 
community members feel they are achieving, or not, through creating an ACP? In 
pursuing this question I was very careful to identify and differentiate where need be as to 
the criteria used by the different groups to define success or challenges with the ACPs.  
 
Organization of the Thesis  
The thesis is organized into five chapters followed by references and appendices. Chapter 
2 covers the literature on community-based conservation, Indigenous and Community Conserved 
Areas (ICCAs), and incentive-based conservation. The literature review places the three topics in 
the context of Peru and the nation’s current decentralization process.  
Chapter 3 first examines the prominent characterizations of campesino communities that the 
community-based private conservation areas are intended to benefit in Peru, delving into the 
history of the country’s agricultural reforms that led to the titling and the governing of lands 
within the campesino territories. The chapter then describes the socio-political dynamics in the 
region where the two case study ACPs are located, and how these underlying forces have 
interacted with Peru’s decentralization policies to create regional governments and devolve 
responsibility of land management planning to the regional level. Chapter 4 presents the 
methodology used in this research to examine the motivations of the creation of the ACPs and 
the outcomes of their implementation from national, regional, and campesino community 
perspectives. Chapter 5 presents the results from the study. Finally, Chapter 6 provides a 
summary of the principal findings, recommendations for improving the implementation and legal 
recognition of ACPs in campesino communities, shortcomings of the thesis, and topics for future 
research.  
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW   
Introduction  
 
The studies of decentralization, community-based natural resource management, private 
protected areas, local participation, and incentive-based conservation have an extensive literature. 
Thus, my review will focus on literature revealing contention and disagreement over the impacts 
and effectiveness of natural resource governance. More specifically, in this chapter I review sites 
of contention regarding the opportunities and constraints of decentralization methods of natural 
resource management and role of local users in resource governance, and especially where they 
are related to the inclusion of indigenous and private protected areas in legal conservation 
frameworks, and involve incentive-based conservation schemes. I then place these issues within 
the Peruvian context. I discuss broader historical and political processes of decentralization of 
natural resource governance and management at the national level, as well as the subsequent 
regional land use planning laws that have been implemented. I do this because this historical 
context is necessary to understand different motivations and experiences with the emergence of 
community-based private protected areas in Peru. The final section introduces the region where 
the case study sites are located, and provides socio-political background to provide detail on the 
dynamic contexts in which the new private forms of community-based conservation were applied.  
Community-Based Natural Resource Management  
Since the 1970s variations of what can be collectively termed community-based natural 
resource management (CBNRM) methods have exerted significant impacts on the governance of 
natural resource management. The term often refers to the design and implementation of 
programs and policies involving devolution and decentralization of natural resource management 
in many developing as well as developed countries across the globe. It also can refer to 
community-based governance and management of indigenous systems and livelihoods. The 
literature review here pertains largely to those systems involving a change in policy from a top-
down, state controlled management approach to the community level. This policy change has 
been fueled by the recognition of the limits of government agencies in managing resources at the 
local level, which has often created a vacuum resulting in degradation of natural resources and 
peoples’ livelihood systems (Bocking, 2004). The debate about the linkage between poverty and 
conservation has become sophisticated and complex, and it is recognized that they are dynamic 
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and context specific, reflecting particular social, political, historical, and ecological factors 
(Brosius et al., 1998; Farmer, 2003; West, 2006). A prominent objective of CBNRM is the 
improvement of social and economic conditions in rural areas and local empowerment, 
participation, and property rights of marginalized, rural populations (Kellert, Mahta, Ebbin, & 
Lichtenfeld, 2000).  
CBNRM aims to empower local resource management and conservation, especially in 
situations where governments have undermined local authority (Alcorn, 2005). The idea of 
CBNRM is to devolve management decisions to local communities. Ideally this is based on 
supporting local practices and initiatives which support both local economies and ecologies, 
while providing the communities with national or in some cases international recognition for 
their efforts and approaches they have been employing in some cases for many generations 
(Berkes, et. al, 2000). CBNRM has been celebrated as an improvement over top-down 
centralized approaches to natural resource management because in theory CBMRM utilizes local 
knowledge and participation to empower communities, while addressing the socio-economic 
needs of the marginalized resource users (Berkes F. , 2003; Drew, 2005; Kellert, Mehta, Ebbin, 
& Lichtenfeld, 2000). 
Critiques of Community-Based Conservation as Implemented by External NGOs 
Despite the theorized potential benefits, CBNRM projects as designed and implemented 
by outsiders have also come under a great deal of criticism. The most common argument against 
them is the tendency of outside implementers, funders and advocates to simplify “community”, 
and approach community generically as an ideal entity that is homogeneous and well defined 
rather than work from real situations which differ by context and history (Brosius et al., 1998). 
Outside organizations design programs with profound implications for communities with 
imperfect ethnographic and historical knowledge, finite resources, and a diverse scope of 
interests they wish to implement (Scott, et al., 2013). Belsky, 1999 argues that rather than assist 
communities in these situations, otherwise well-intentioned CBNRM projects can lead to greater 
local socioeconomic differentiation and conflict among local populations. 
The subjects of CBNRM are usually described as resource dependent communities that 
are in pursuit of improved and sustainable livelihoods. Li (2002) argues the founding assumption 
of CBNRM is that targeted communities have livelihoods that are natural resource dependent 
and therefore already have, or can be encouraged to adopt “sustainable” resource management 
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practices. The implementation of the projects often fails to distinguish whether communities 
identify with these practices, or if they are instead practices conceived of by outsiders and 
promoted through incentives. Michael Dove (1993) debates that the search for new incomes 
under conservation agendas ignores historic and even current livelihoods and that effort may be 
better placed in identifying current resource use and management and institutional forces that 
restrict ownership and productive use of resources already in use by marginalized communities. 
He draws attention to power relations associated with outside conservation agendas, and the fact 
that impoverished, marginal rural people are expected to conserve rather than exploit for profit, a 
burden from which those with power are exempt.  
These critiques all come from the argument that local communities in externally-
generated projects are never truly empowered to decide what uses are appropriate for the 
“conservation” projects. Lynch and Talbott (1995) state that a resource management system is 
only “community-based” if the rules for resource allocation and management are set primarily by 
the communities themselves. Rather the projects are introduced as part of what Brockington et al. 
(2008) define as mainstream conservation, or the dominant global conservation paradigm. These 
schemes are based on what the international NGOs view as the local environmental history and 
the causes of degradation as well as their solutions or “sustainable livelihoods” which are often 
in conflict with local views and have come to represent dominant narratives or discourses 
(Fairhead & Leach, 2003). In the dominant discourses local populations are viewed as a threat to 
biodiversity conservation, rather than acknowledging the way local people have interacted with 
and shaped the landscapes into multifunctional landscapes, where people and biodiversity have 
co-existed (Igoe & Brockington, 2007; Siebert & Belsky, 2014). The mainstream conservation 
discourse views capacity building as involving new skills and livelihoods rather than building on 
historic ones where they existed, and privileges market-based livelihoods such as in efforts to 
provide economic valuation of nature; these efforts undermine local knowledge, livelihoods and 
connection with the local landscapes; and can actually contribute to cultural devaluation of 
nature (Dressler & Roth, 2011; Shanee, 2013). The use of state-sponsored community-based 
conservation management to empower people, reduce poverty, and protect natural resources has 
in many cases failed in practice, and it can be argued that many central states’ use of community-
based forest management and conservation is a form of control and can push for agrarian and 
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economic changes that don’t necessarily benefit land holders in the conserved area (Dressler & 
Pulhin, 2009). 
In summary, while at higher levels conservation approaches since the 1970s have 
increased attention to the role of communities and local participation in conservation there has 
been tremendous disconnect between theory and practice. Rather than truly devolve decision-
making and governance, NGO-led CBNRM projects have failed to enable local stakeholders to 
base new governance systems and livelihoods on their understanding of environmental change in 
their areas and what they prioritize as ways forwards. They are critiqued for having failed to 
actually implement environmental conservation, as well as to achieve sustainable development. 
The failure of CBNRM to meet its goals bolsters mainstream discourse which dismisses local 
knowledge and local populations and perceives them as a threat to biodiversity rather than a 
potential collaborator. Thus, the efforts have failed to be truly “bottom-up” and the relationships 
are enlaced with power conflicts. They are particularly nasty when they entail new land and 
resource-use regulations on already disenfranchised marginalized groups.  
Indigenous and Community Conserved Areas and Private Conservation 
Despite concerns with CBNRM projects, there remains sufficient belief in the values of 
devolution and in indigenous rights to seek governance models which can more effectively 
embrace this approach. An example of this is the rapidly developing idea of Indigenous and 
Community Conserved Areas (ICCAs) in protected area systems (Berkes F. , 2009; IUCN, 2008; 
Massey, Bhagwat, & Porodong, 2011). The IUCN defines ICCAs as: 
Natural and/or modified ecosystems including significant biodiversity values, 
ecological benefits, and cultural values voluntarily conserved by indigenous and 
local communities, both sedentary and mobile, through customary laws or other 
effective means (Borrini-Feyerabend, et al., 2013, p. 40). 
Berkes, 2009 defines three important features of ICCAs: 
First, ICCAs involve a community (or communities) closely connected to the 
ecosystem culturally and/or because of livelihood needs. Second, management 
decisions of the community effectively lead to conservation, even though 
conservation may not be the primary objective. Third, the community is the major 
decision maker, and community institutions have the capability to enforce 
regulations. (p.19) 
 
Including ICCAs in protected area systems aims to recognize the contribution of community 
resource management to non-local conservation objectives and goals (CENESTA, 2009). This 
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notion came largely through the IUCNs Fifth World Parks Congress in 2003, where it was 
decided that the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) should recognize diverse protected 
area approaches, such as community-based conservation areas, indigenous conservation areas, 
and private protected areas (Berkes, 2009). ICCAs are defined as “natural and/ or modified 
ecosystems containing significant biodiversity values, ecological services, and cultural values, 
voluntarily conserved by indigenous, mobile, and local communities through customary laws and 
other effective means” (IUCN, 2008). Berkes (2009) describes that the fundamental difference 
between formal protected areas and ICCAs is that the former is solely about biodiversity 
conservation, where the latter are established also for livelihoods and the well-being of local 
inhabitants, such as for the provision of water or cultural reasons. The inhabitants in the ICCAs 
organize their governance and management not around external biodiversity discourse, but 
locally-meaningful activities and concepts emphasizing productive and ecologically healthy 
landscapes and waterscapes, ones which can also provide what conservation literature has termed 
“ecosystem services” (Berkes F. , 2009; IUCN, 2008; Shanee, 2013; CENESTA, 2009).  
ICCAs are receiving attention because they are promoted as a means to both expand 
conservation results while also securing local communities livelihoods and rights (Oviedo, 2003). 
IUCN describes the outcomes of the discussions that took place at the Fifth World Parks 
Congress as the following:  
The participants at the Fifth World Parks Congress (WPC, Sept. 2003) 
recommended that national and international recognition of ICCAs is an urgent 
necessity. In its Message to the CBD, this largest ever gathering of 
conservationists suggested to “recognize the diversity of protected area 
governance approaches, such as community conserved areas, indigenous 
conservation areas and private protected areas, and encourage parties to support 
this diversity”. The Durban Accord further “urged commitment to recognize, 
strengthen, protect and support community conserved areas” (IUCN, 2011). 
 
The growing understanding of ICCAs and their potential contribution to the 
contemporary conservation framework has led to the integration of ICCAs within governmental 
conservation plans and policies (Kellert et al, 2000). Since 2003, International conservation 
agents, including multilateral organizations and NGOs have promoted legal and financial 
mechanisms to institutionalize ICCAs and legitimize local conservation efforts; again these 
differ from state-managed or otherwise externally driven protected areas (Reyes-Garcia, et al., 
2012). Bohman et al. (2008) view the institutionalization of ICCAs as a way to also create a 
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union between the state, conservation NGOs, and local communities and argues that this union 
and state recognition allow local communities to be empowered to defend their own lands from 
newly arrived land “invaders”. 
The expansion of the range of actors involved in conservation is part of a broader 
international trend to grow the constituency of conservation, making “conservation” more 
multicultural and diverse (Brown, 2002; Berkes, 2004). Voluntary community-owned private 
conservation areas, which fall under the IUCN ICCA category, have been growing in number 
and according to Stolton et al. (2014) private reserves are strong in Latin America, with Peru 
holding the largest area of privately protected land (Monteferri & Coll, 2009). Despite the 
international interest in using different governance schemes to expand protected area coverage, 
little is known about situations that can lead to positive collaboration between the communities 
and protected area managers when self-governing rights are acknowledged by the state.  
The Paradox of ICCA Inclusion in State Protected Area Systems 
State recognition and support of ICCAs may help retain conservation and provide legal 
status against land uses not desired by community members (such as mining concessions or 
conversion to large scale agriculture for example palm oil). However, even with ICCA’s there is 
risk of imposing mainstream conservation agendas on local communities who conserve as an 
externality of cultural practices, values, or beliefs (Alcorn, 2005). Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 
(2004) and Kothari (2006) along with other scholars have questioned how the ICCAs are 
identified for inclusion in national frameworks; are they selected by conservation agencies or by 
the request of the concerned community and with prior community consent? There is a concern 
that the institutionalization of private community-based protected areas and indigenous cultural 
reserves and integration of local people into national and international protected area agendas 
may negatively affect local people’s perceptions of and interactions with their local 
environments (Reyes-Garcia, et al., 2012).  
The inclusion of ICCAs in protected area systems has been advocated as an alternative 
for conserving the world’s remaining biodiversity from development. A great share of the global 
biodiversity occurs on private lands, including ones owned by communities (Langholz & Krug, 
2004). While recognition of the areas may increase the area of land under conservation status, 
the influence of global biodiversity conservation discourse continues to raise questions for 
private community conserved areas. Berkes (2009) argues that policy implications will arise with 
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the inclusion of the communities in protected area systems such as: lack of capacity to assess the 
ability of the areas to provide real conservation benefits, methods for integrating traditional 
knowledge with protected area management, and the right mix of governance authorities to 
manage areas. He argues that although the strengthening of resource tenure and payments for 
ecosystem service schemes provide incentives for communities to join the national system of 
protected areas, many rural groups associate “protected areas” with “land disposition” and may 
view legal recognition of conservation as a loss of land control (Berkes F. , 2009). The 
promotion of state recognition of ICCAs as a rights based and conservation-through use 
approach to conservation overlooks the fact that the classification of ICCAs remain part of the 
international conservation apparatus, and may further entrench the idea that indigenous or rural, 
marginalized groups should remain “traditional” based on subsistence-oriented livelihoods.  
There remains limited information concerning the expectations of communities included 
in legally recognized ICCAs despite official calls to include them in establishing the areas. The 
synthesis document “Community Conserved Areas: A Review of Status and Needs” by the 
IUCN group “Theme on Indigenous Peoples, Local Communities, Equity and Protected Areas” 
(TILCEPA, 2008) states key factors for ICCAs and provides recommendations for the support 
and recognition of ICCAs. The document recommends to require that ICCAs must identify their 
conservation role, articulating what they are conserving and why, and that the evaluation of the 
conservation outcomes should rely on indicators jointly agreed upon between local communities 
and the NGO or government agencies aiding in their legal recognition. Assessing a community’s 
capacity to achieve “conservation” depends on the collective expectations of community 
members on the desired outcomes for their territories, and the chosen model of development and 
resource use within the communities (Riascos et al., 2008). Not all collective territories desire or 
prioritize conservation outcomes per se, rather they care about sustainable use which depends on 
the visions community members have for the self-development of their territories. The report by 
Riasco et al. (2008) highlights the need to look at the governance types in operation in 
communities, and points out that overlapping jurisdictions with different landscape management 
objectives pose great challenge. For example, while a collective territory may seek to meet their 
livelihood needs through market integration, protected area and conservation objectives may be 
limited to the protection of natural systems. The requirement for ICCAs to identify their role in 
the “conservation” of biodiversity and the need to articulate what, how, and why the area is 
16 
 
conserving relies on technical criteria (TILCEPA, 2008). This may risk the exclusion of local 
knowledge and local plans for development, and present the problem of conflicting meanings of 
“conservation” at different scales. The limited power of indigenous communities means they 
may not have the capacity to challenge the environmental understandings and approach to 
conservation by more powerful authorities. 
Traditional practices of local communities, such as using fire and rotation of crops, have 
created ecological diversity and multifuntional landscapes, which has been acknowledged by 
ecologists to promote biodiversity conservation (Alcorn, 2005; Berkes et al, 2000). Many 
observers have noted the compatibility of these practices with conservation agendas despite the 
unwillingness of governments and others to recognize their value (Dressler & Pulhin, 2009; 
Siebert & Belsky, 2014). Furthermore, the application of incentive-based conservation in the 
community-based conservation plans and ICCAs suggests that there is compromise in play, in 
that the communities are expected to give up practices deemed unsuitable by authorities in 
exchange for the proposed alternative incomes.  
In summary, despite good intentions the official recognition of ICCAs could still risk 
losing local autonomy, control of property and decision making authority over natural resources 
in their areas. If this is the case, there is a dilema faced by communities. In the application for 
inclusion of their land in a states’ protected area system the community faces the threat of the 
loss of some autonomy in land use decision making, but if they do not apply for the inclusion of 
their land for conservation, the land could be declared as an area for mining, logging, or large 
scale agricultural schemes. The ICCAs are recognized by states and conservation organizations 
for the protection of biodiversity, whereas for the communities the declaration of the areas might 
be to safeguard their livelihood in their ancestral homelands through receiving possible 
protection against intruders and new income generating opportunities. The cross-cultural 
communication required for the creation and legal recognation of the ICCAs and different 
priorities and expectations at the local, instution, and national level could also produce conflict. 
Although the formalization and legal recognition of ICCAs may seem promising, it does also 
raise the question of how the new arrangement will influence the adaptive dynamics of local 
management systems.  
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Incentive-Based Conservation 
 Some ICCAs seem to be new protected areas encouraged by payments for ecosystem 
services schemes (Berkes F. , 2009; Shanee, 2013). Participants in the 3
rd
 World Conservation 
Congress, in Bangkok, Thailand in 2004 recommended that in strengthening the legal framework 
for privately-owned protected areas there should be policies and programs that strengthen the 
economic incentives for private and community land owners to adopt modern conservation 
practices including: tax exemptions, payments for the environmental services provided by 
conserved lands, and development of new markets for local environmental goods and services 
(Langholz & Krug, 2004). The congress also stated that if not already established, governments 
should create trust fund, with support from international aid, and authorize that these funds be 
used to support the establishment and operation of privately-owned protected areas (Langholz & 
Krug, 2004).  
In Peru the application of payment for ecosystem services schemes in the ACPs is already 
developing and the passing of a law in June of 2014 indicates that the development of such 
projects will proceed. Peru also has a land trust fund, The Peruvian Trust Fund for National 
Parks and Protected Areas (PROFONANPE), which has been designed to capture, manage, and 
channel local and international funds. The fund was born as a result of negotiations by the 
government of Peru, a team of local NGOs devoted to environmental conservation, and the 
Global Environmental Facility (GEF) of the World Bank (Paniagua, 2003). PROFONANPE has 
helped to create some ACPs and has been helping the ACPs with funds to help with sustainable 
agricultural production and tourism projects. But along with opportunities there are potential 
constraints relating to incentive-based conservation in community-based conservation.  
 Payment for ecosystem services (PES) is a particular type of incentive-based 
conservation tool that is often defined as a voluntary transaction between one or more service 
buyers and service providers for a well-defined ecosystem service (or use-practices to secure its 
service) (Wunder, 2005). PES is intended to improve environmental outcomes while at the same 
time support local livelihoods by  providing the sellers with secure access to financial resources; 
buyers are provided with the ensured integrity or provision of ecosystem services. Ecosystem 
services for which payment schemes have been employed include forests, watersheds, 
biodiversity, and carbon sequestration (Rodriguez et al., 2011).  
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Critiques of Incentive-Based Conservation 
Although PES schemes are being applied around the world, some environmental experts 
caution against them because they involve contradictory and incompatible goals and methods 
(Corbera, Kosoy, & Martinez Tuna, 2007; McAfee & Shapiro, 2010). Cobera et al. (2007) 
argued that PES programs often emerge from top-down processes in Latin American countries 
which can reinforce asymmetrical power relationships that dismiss local level governance. As 
discussed, there are uncertainties about what drives the action of ICCAs to be recognized by a 
state. Developing financial incentives can alter individual and group decision making 
significantly (Bowles, 2008). PES schemes hold the risk of conflating intrinsic and cultural 
motivations to conserve and can promote land trafficking and corruption (Corbera et al., 2007; 
Fairhead et al., 2012).  
Dressler and Roth (2011) argue that the logic of the market economy is increasingly 
informing the motives, designs, and outcomes of conservation policy and practice in the 
developing world. They state:  
International donors, governments, and NGOs have supposedly moved on from 
coercive conservation to identify and fund community-based initiatives that offer 
“win-win” market based solutions for livelihood support and forest 
conservation…. The logic of the market economy increasingly informs the 
motives, design, and outcomes of conservation policy and practice near protected 
areas in the developing world. ….. Recent research has begun to show, however, 
that rather than replacing coercive forms of conservation, emerging forms of 
devolved neoliberal conservation have rearticulated older modes of governance, 
incorporating farmers into livelihood programs that have them intensify to 
produce more commodities with fewer resources. 
 
The use of market-based schemes to encourage community conservation often promote market-
oriented projects with the funds that are generated from the payment schemes, such as 
ecotourism and high value agriculture, which create economic reliance on the conservation of the 
ecosystems. They promote market strategies to cope with the reduction of land associated with 
traditional livelihood practices, such as swidden agriculture (Dressler & Roth, 2011). The 
application of payment schemes that specify what land uses are acceptable and what uses should 
be restricted raises many questions about the motivations behind the “voluntary” conservation 
efforts of ICCAs. Peru provides a unique opportunity to examine so called locally-driven 
conservation through private communal conservation where PES schemes are being developed 
19 
 
and implemented. The research could contribute to a better understanding of the process of 
developing private community conservation areas and for whom they actually benefit or not. 
ICCAs in Peru 
 Conservation deals with institutions at various social organizational levels, from the local 
to the regional, the national, and the global (Berkes, 2007). Higher level institutions and multi-
scale drivers of change such as the market economy, migration and population change, land 
tenure, agriculture reforms, and changing government regimes may have widespread impacts on 
local-level institutions (MEA, 2005). The inclusion of ICCAs in state systems requires 
interactions across different levels of organization as well as functional partnerships between the 
levels and legal recognition. In order to understand the motivation for and the outcomes of 
including community-based private conservation areas in Peru’s protected areas system it is 
important to understand the national socio-political context and the institutional arrangements 
that drove the legal recognition of the areas.  
Conservation in Peru 
 At the institutional level, implementing conservation programs in Peru is very recent. It 
was only in 2008 that protected areas, formerly part of the ministry of agriculture’s portfolio, 
were placed under the authority of a newly created Ministry of the Environment (Ministerio del 
Ambiente- MINAM). Within this ministry, the National Service for Protected Areas (El Servicio 
Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas por el Estado- SERNANP) was also established in 2008 
(Solano, 2009). The creation of MINAM and SERNANP was seen as a major opportunity to 
strengthen a system which has always faced a number of threats: mining, illegal logging, 
commercial agriculture, livestock, and encroachment by migrant settlements (Solano, 2009). 
Significant factors contributed to the creation of MINAM, including: a growing awareness in the 
public and private sector of increasing environmental issues, pressure within the framework of 
negotiations of the congressional passing of the US-Peru Free Trade agreement in 2007, and a 
growing concern from civil society, NGOs, and the international donor community about the 
need for an environmental authority to balance the ecological impacts of economic growth 
(World Bank, 2009). The new ministry was faced with the challenge of building and 
implementing an efficient management model consistent with national development strategies, 
and that is in line with the country’s political and economic decision making processes.  
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Decentralization in Peru  
 The decentralization and governance process in Peru is another new development, and is 
relevant to protected areas and land planning. Understanding the process of decentralization in 
Peru is key to unpacking the complex tale of different agencies in land-use planning and 
governance.  
As a country with a legacy of centralized political decision making and administrative 
management, Peru is a relative latecomer to decentralization that swept Latin America in the late 
twentieth century (Andersson & Ostrom, 2008). It wasn’t until the early 2000s that new 
decentralization schemes were implemented in Peru, which called for a distribution of 
responsibilities among national, regional, and local governments with the goal of increasing 
public participation across the three levels of government. Prior to 2000, the decade long 
presidency of Alberto Fujimori was condemned as authoritarian and centralized; it 
disempowered and stripped regional and municipal governments of local power over decision 
making (Carrion, 2006). 
 The process of decentralization formally started in 2002, during the presidency of 
Alejandro Toledo, who promoted the initial legal frameworks, installation of regional 
governments, and the transfer of responsibilities and duties to these regional governments (Che 
Piu & Menton, 2014). The second stage of decentralization occurred during the government of 
President Alan Garcia (2006-2011), and involved the regions developing their national plans and 
the devolution of powers to regional and local governments. Decentralization processes are slow, 
and in Peru are still considered to be in their early stages (Kovacevic, 2014). 
Power and Decentralized Land Planning in Peru 
Despite the development of the ministry of environment and decentralization, land use 
classification and titling in the country has remained complex and often involves competing 
mandates related to decisions made at the national level. The Ministry of Environment does not 
always have the power necessary to fulfil their environmental conservation agendas, since most 
of the key powers related to land use classification and permitting are held by other ministries, 
such as the ministry of mining and energy (Ministerio de Energia y Minas- MINEM) (Kovacevic, 
2014). Land planning, and the declaration of protected areas in Peru, is controlled by many 
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different ministries, making it challenging for the ministry of environment alone to promote 
conservation agendas.  
When the Peruvian government makes decisions concerning tradeoffs between the 
conservation of natural capital and development of large scale investment projects that would 
increase economic capital, the benefits are often in favor of the economic capital. This was made 
evident by the recent passing of an economic stimulus package passed in July of 2014 by the 
ministry of finance, which aims to set the country on a path of 5% annual growth and weakens 
the power of MINAM over land use decisions (Kovacevic, 2014; Sullivan, 2014). Sullivan (2014) 
argues that the passing of the legislation strips MINAM of authority over environmental 
regulation and land planning, and states that the creation of MINAM as part of the US free trade 
agreement suggests that the desire to form a ministry of environment never really came from the 
Peruvian state, but was rather an obligation in exchange for access to international markets. 
Regardless of the motivation behind the creation of a ministry of environment, public budget for 
protected areas remains low, and as long as protected areas are not perceived as assets the 
budgets are unlikely to increase. 
Conflict between development objectives and environmental discourses come down to 
political negotiation and power, and often who holds the power controls who ultimately makes 
the decision on land use, regardless of who is affected by the outcomes (Dressler & Pulhin, 2009; 
Fairhead et al., 2012; Kovacevic, 2014). Millions of hectares of land in Peru have overlapping 
claims, meaning for example, a piece of land can be identified as a mining concession and a 
peasant farmer’s field at the same time (Kovacevic, 2014). Romero-Wolf (2010) argues that in 
Peru considerations for more basic issues such as property rights are often ignored and is 
evidenced by the superposition of mining concessions on top of land that has been designated 
and titled for other purposes, including protected areas, indigenous reserves, and campesino 
communities (Romero-Wolf, 2010). This points to the complexity of land classification and 
titling in the country (Kovacevic, 2014; Romero-Wolf, 2010). As Kovacevic (2014) explains, 
decentralization has contributed to overlapping claims, since the decentralization process has 
started to distribute land use powers across ministries and different levels of government that 
often have competing obligations and powers related to land uses. This complexity is 
demonstrated below in figure 2. The land map diagram created by CIFOR (2014) shows 
examples of how geographical boundaries of different land use titles often overlap, as do the 
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relationships between the different levels of governance related to specific land uses. The line 
diagram demonstrates which governmental ministry (shown on the left) has jurisdiction over 
which area of responsibility (shown on the right) at what governance level (line width) for each 
land use sector (color from map) (CIFOR, 2014).  
Figure 2. Complexity of Land Governance in Peru  
 
 
Figure Source: (CIFOR, 2014) 
These diagrams highlight the intense complexity faced by land planning actors in Peru when 
overlapping geographical land use definitions combine with multiscaled and intertwined 
governmental responsibilities.  
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In the case of forestry decentralization, a model has been implemented in some parts of 
the country which passed the responsibility of forest control and monitoring actions to regional 
governments. The Amazonas region is one of the eight regional governments to which forest 
duties have already been transferred. Although in theory land planning rights have been 
transferred to regional governments, Che Pi and Menton (2014) argue that they have not been 
given the necessary capacitation and resources to fulfill these responsibilities. Despite the lack of 
capacitation and preparation regional governments have been held responsible for development 
plans to promote economic, social, and environmental development.  
Regional Territorial Planning and Ecological Economic Zoning (ZEE) 
A planning and land classification system being used in the decentralization of land 
planning in Peru is territorial planning (ordenamiento territorial) carried out by MINAM with 
regional governments (Kovacevic, 2014; Che Piu & Menton, 2014). A main component of 
territorial planning is Economic and Ecological Zoning (ZEE). The implementation of ZEE is the 
responsibility of MINAM, while regional governments are in charge of planning and 
enforcement, and political administration of the plans (Che Piu & Menton, 2014). ZEE aims to 
help decision makers determine the suite of suitable land uses for the landscapes across the 
region by collecting and modeling physical, environmental, social, ecological, and cultural data. 
The rational for ZEE land use planning is that if local authorities were to have a clearer 
and strategic view of the alternative forms of local development that they would like to pursue, 
then they would have much greater technical leverage in arguments over how to use different 
geographical areas and how to combine conservation, agriculture, water management, and 
mining in the region (Bebbington, 2011). The combined process of zoning and land use planning 
was deliberate because it drew on the already national debate regarding extractive industry and 
land use planning in response to the US free trade agreements (Romero-Wolf, 2010). A mix of 
civil society organizations, researchers and others had argued that decisions regarding extraction 
of minerals should be taken with the context of larger land use plans (Bebbington, 2011). In 
explaining ZEE, Ashwin Ravikumar, who is publishing a book on decentralization and land use 
power in Peru, provides the following example of land use decision making using ZEE: 
 
 
24 
 
A really simple example is, if the data show an area has large tracts of pristine 
forest, a long history of indigenous community areas, and poor soils, then it may 
be best classified as a protected area. An area of land with good water supply and 
degraded forest might be best considered for agricultural purposes. (Kovacevic, 
2014). 
Once land has been classified and titled, Peru’s 25 regional governments are responsible 
for development plans, including working with other regions to promote economic, social and 
environmental development, preserving and managing protected areas and promoting sustainable 
use of forest resources.  
The transfer of powers to regional and local governments has been slow, and has had a 
major impact on the ability of regions to govern their land. Typically the regional governments 
do not have technical staff with sufficient training to gather the data required for ZEE planning. 
The studies require the collection of scientific data, special analysis, and leading stakeholder 
discussions for large and remote areas (NatureServe, 2010). To fill this gap in needed technical 
skills, many national and international NGOs assisted the regional governments in the creation of 
the plans, providing aid in the gathering of technical data and capacity building. The role of 
NGOs in the ZEE planning is important to note, since NGOs often rely on international funding 
and may have any number of priorities and motivations for their activities. Considering the 
literature on decentralization of land management and private conservation areas, my research of 
the case study ACPs considers to what degree local resource users interests and priorities are 
being met in the decentralized land planning, specifically in the creation of private protected 
areas.  
Regional Land Planning and Protected Areas 
The ZEE planning for the regions provided ecological valuation for different areas in the 
region, and the areas with high-biodiversity and natural forests were selected as areas ideal to 
create protected areas. In the past decade the interest in the conservation of Peru has exploded, in 
terms of the expansion in the number of international institutions that want to take part in it 
(Romero-Wolf, Masters Thesis: Promoting Investments in Ecosystem Services: The Case of The 
Peruvian Amazon, 2010). For many of these institutions, promoting conservation through 
protected area creation is the most important objective. New legal and institutional frameworks, 
including the legal recognition of voluntary protected areas on private land (ACPs), conservation 
concessions, ecotourism concessions, and regional conservation areas, have provided legal tools 
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that have permitted the institutions to build a mosaic of protected areas across the landscape of 
Peru. Many of the international and national NGOs and institutes that helped with the ZEE 
planning have also been involved in the creation of the legal frameworks for the different types 
of conservation and in the establishment of new areas under these frameworks. The following 
table (Table 1) shows the different legal options for protected areas in Peru. 
The type of protected area that can be created depends on the land owner. National 
protected areas on publically owned land currently hold the largest area of land under protected 
area status in Peru, but there are more ACPs in number than any other legally recognized type of 
conservation area. The national protected areas require national government management and are 
expensive to operate. A lack of government funding for public protected areas hinders the ability 
to create new national protected areas on public lands, which has contributed to the expansion of 
the new types of conservation on private and community-owned land.  
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Table 1. Types of Legally Recognized Conservation in Peru 
* Numbers as of 2015, source: SISTEMA NACIONAL DE ÁREAS NATURALES PROTEGIDAS POR EL ESTADO - SINANPE
Types of 
Conservation 
In Peru 
National Parks National and 
Historical 
Sanctuaries 
National and 
Community 
Reserves 
Protected 
Forests 
Regional 
Conservation 
Areas/ 
Conservation 
Concessions 
Private 
Conservation 
Areas (ACPs) 
(usually one 
family) 
Community-Based 
Private 
Conservation 
Areas (ACPs) 
Land Owner Public land, but 
sometimes 
private and 
communal land 
included in area 
Public land, but 
sometimes private 
and communal land 
included in area 
Public land, 
benefiting 
surrounding rural 
communities  
Public land, but 
sometimes 
private and 
communal land 
included in area 
Untitled State land  
(Voluntary and 
Complimentary to 
Protected Area 
System) 
Private land 
(usually one 
family) 
 
(Voluntary and 
Complimentary 
to Protected Area 
System) 
Campesino/ Native 
community titled 
land 
(Voluntary and 
Complimentary to 
Protected Area 
System) 
Administrative 
Authority  
MINAM, under 
MINAM some 
control to 
Regional 
Environmental 
Authorities 
(ARA) 
MINAM, under 
MINAM some 
control to Regional 
Environmental 
Authorities (ARA) 
MINAM, under 
MINAM some 
control to 
Regional 
Environmental 
Authorities 
(ARA) 
MINAM, under 
MINAM some 
control to 
Regional 
Environmental 
Authorities 
(ARA) 
Formally 
Recognized under 
MINAM, with 
Conservation 
agreements made 
by regional 
Government 
Formally 
Recognized 
under MINAM, 
with 
Conservation 
agreements made 
by private land 
owner 
Formally 
Recognized under 
MINAM, with 
Conservation 
agreements made 
by community 
Areas of direct/ 
indirect use 
No direct Use  No direct use in 
National and 
Historic Sanctuaries 
Sustainable use 
of natural 
resources 
permitted 
Sustainable use 
of natural 
resources 
permitted 
Sustainable use of 
natural resources 
permitted 
Sustainable use 
of natural 
resources 
permitted 
Sustainable use of 
natural resources 
permitted 
Duration of 
Conservation 
Title   
Forever unless 
changes in law  
Forever unless 
changes in law 
Forever unless 
changes in law 
Forever unless 
changes in law 
Up to 40 years  Minimum of 10 
years-forever  
Minimum of 10 
years-Forever 
Number of 
Areas in the 
Country  
13 9 National 
Sanctuaries and 4 
Historical 
Sanctuaries   
15 National 
Reserves and  10 
Community 
Reserves  
6 16 83 
Ha. of Land 
included in 
system* 
 
8, 170, 747.54 
National Sanctuary  
317, 366.47. 
Historical Sanctuary  
41, 279.38 
 
National 
Reserve,  
4, 652, 851.63 
Community  
Reserve=  
2, 166, 588.44 
 
 
 389, 986.99 
 
 
 2,407, 966.54  
 
 
280,199.37 
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The Rise of Private Conservation in Peru  
The opportunity for private land protection increased greatly in June of 2001 when the 
government created the new regulation for the Law on National Protected Areas, which 
authorized for the first time the formal creation of private reserves and conservation concessions 
(The Environmental Law Institute, 2003). The law was passed by the National Institute for 
Natural Resources, an agency within the Ministry of Agriculture that was responsible for 
oversight of forests and protected areas before the establishment of the Ministry of Environment. 
The 2001 law authorizes individuals or communities that own land to create Private 
Conservation Areas (ACPs) that form part of the national protected areas system (SIANPE) 
(Monteferri & Coll, 2009). The community-owned ACPs are established on land under the 
collective ownership of campesino or indigenous communities who have voluntarily requested 
that their land be recognized under the legal ACP instrument (The Environmental Law Institute, 
2003). The areas are registered through the Peruvian state by the Ministry of Environment. These 
private conservation areas are restricted to areas identified by regional and national land plans as 
having significant biological resources, and in effect are treated as “mini parks”, with the owners 
required to create and adopt a management plan and report annually to SERNANP (The 
Environmental Law Institute, 2003). 
The extensive regulatory framework developed by the Peruvian government with the 
support of international and national conservation organizations has led to an expansion of 
protected areas, mostly on private lands. Today there are 83 private conservation areas with 
280,199 hectares of private and community-owned land. The proliferation of private protected 
areas has been rapid and continues to increase. Since 2009 seventy new private protected areas 
have been created (Ministerio Del Ambiente: SERNANP, 2015). Recently, some communities 
have also applied to payments for ecosystem services (PES) programs, whereby private or 
communal landowners are paid to maintain or enhance land conditions for areas that provide 
specific services such as hydrological services or biodiversity maintenance (Shanee, 2013). 
Consequently, private conservation areas are expanding also because they are viewed as 
economically beneficial.  
Property owners applying for ACPs can apply for the area to be declared an ACP for 
eternity or for a declared amount of time, for a minimum of 10 years, which can then be renewed 
(MINAM, 2014). In MINAM’s working document for ACPs  it is states that “The contribution 
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of ACPs as strategies in conservation are not only for expansion of protected areas or for the 
specific species that they protect, but also to demonstrate that citizens committed to the 
conservation of species, natural resources, and landscapes can make a grand difference in 
conservation” (MINAM, 2014). The document also draws attention to the economic 
development aspect of the conservation areas explaining, “ACPs can present opportunities and 
benefits for communities or individuals that wish to realize activities such as ecotourism and 
payment for ecosystem services” (MINAM, 2014). 
The management plans include “conservation compromises” that are recognized in the 
registration of the property as an ACP by the state property titling agency SUNARP, and under 
the law the compromises need to be met by the current owner, and future owners in the case of 
transfers in property (MINAM, 2014). In defining activities that can be realized in ACPs the 
MINAM document for ACPs states: 
The idea is that the property owners are who defines the uses that are permitted 
within the area, with the limitation that the uses will not contradict the objective 
of establishing the area for conservation. In ACPs it is possible to program any 
activity that is compatible with the conservation of the area, such as investigations, 
environmental education, ecotourism, management of wildlife, along with other 
activities. The specific spaces for different activities are defined through the 
zoning. (MINAM, 2014). 
 
In order to create an ACP technical studies of the area have to be completed which define limited 
and multiple use zones and activities which can be developed in the defined areas of the ACPs. 
The property owners have the voluntary responsibility to use the property as defined by the 
zoning activities in the technical study. ACPs can cover part of a property or all of a property.  
The Environmental Law Institute (2003) states that community land owners may be 
reluctant to establish the areas for the fear that it will allow the government to monitor their land 
use, but that this may be dispelled once the designation of private conservation areas becomes 
more commonly used. The government will need to find an appropriate balance between the 
need to ensure the objectives as a protected area are complied with, and being overly restrictive. 
Although the working documents for the creation of the ACPs state that their creation is 
voluntary, there has not been research conducted to view the motivations behind campesino 
communities to engage in these “voluntary” efforts which establish their land as conservation 
areas included in the nation’s protected area system (SINANPE) or their outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 3. SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT OF CAMPESINO COMMUNITIES AND 
THE AMAZONAS REGION OF PERU 
 
Introduction 
 In order to understand the setting in which private conservation areas are being developed 
in Peru, this chapter provides background on campesino communities and the socio-political 
history and context of the Amazonas region where Community-Owned Private Conservation 
Areas are being strongly promoted and utilized. Since ACPs are being developed as a result of 
the country’s decentralization policies, it is important to understand the particular power 
relations and history of land management in relevant regions. Attention here is on how 
international and national level laws and forces come to influence regional land planning and 
conservation efforts in combination with regional and local forces. Together they played a multi-
scaled role in shaping motivations for the use of ACPs in the region and their outcomes.  
Campesino Communities 
In Peru the most respected and democratic institution in communal life is the Campesino 
(peasant) community, which legally acts as a corporate body to defend communal interests from 
internal or external threats (Gelles, 2000). The organization of campesino communities is borne 
out of centuries of exploitation and adaptive relationships between the Spanish colonizers and 
later post-colonial powers with Andean indigenous cultures (Armstrong, Baillie, Fourie, & 
Rondon, 2014; Deere, 1990; Gelles, 2000). Peru, along with other Latin American countries 
holds a contradictory position of celebrating its pre-colonial past while concurrently 
marginalizing the large existing native populations (Forte, 2013; Hough & Rau, 2008). Forte 
(2013) states:  
Officially there are no “Indigenous” communities in Peru, but rather comunidades 
campesinos (peasant communities) in the highlands and comunidades nativas 
(native communities) in the Amazonian lowlands (p.73).  
Forte (2013) and Hough and Rau (2008) argue that in Peru the prevailing Andean rural 
organization was based on class, and not race. Cadena (2000) attributes Peru’s lack of indigenous 
movement as a result of state-sponsored culturist projects supporting indigenous identity 
executed by the same elites who disempowered the rural populations. Identity in the campesino 
communities has been grounded in geography and agriculture in the highlands where the native 
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Peruvians prefer to be called “campesinos” over “indigenous”, a term used by outsiders which 
they find offensive due to historical power relations (Hough & Rau, 2008). 
The laws granting land titles to campesinos communities were created in the 1970s as a 
result of agrarian reform and the titling was mostly done in the Peruvian highlands (Minority 
Rights Group International, 2007). Land titles were granted to communities where land had been 
converted for agricultural use, in accord with Peru’s emphasis on economic development 
granting titles only to communities who had converted land for productive purposes. Campesino 
communities are significant to the country’s agriculture and biodiversity. These communities 
control 40% of the country’s agricultural area according to the 1994 census, but many 
researchers argue that the percentage is much higher (Castillo, 2006). Campesino communities 
make up a very significant part of rural population and are considered keepers of the nation’s 
biodiversity (Castillo, 2006). They also played a significant role in the struggle against the 
Shining Path guerilla movement and were most affected by the associated political violence 
(Castillo, 2006; McClintock, 1981).  
The general titling law of campesino land takes the form of settlements recognized with 
the title of communities, with legal person status, and stipulates that each community determines 
the regime of land use, in a communal, family, or joint way (Castillo, 2006). Thus, the titling 
combines collectively held possession with family possession. Castillo (2006) states that the 
current reality in campesinos communities is that almost all communities have their agricultural 
lands distributed in family parcels, and that practically every Peruvian cultivable land is 
individually possessed, even if recognized by titles as communally-owned. Individuals are 
inscribed as comuneros into the Campesino Community. At the national level individual 
properties are not recognized, but inside the campesino communities the methods of 
appropriation and disposition of lands is divided in a family way. The main and most widespread 
mechanism of land division is by inheritance (McClintock, 1981). Recently there has been a 
gradual opening to contracts within the communities to lease and sell the family parcels, even to 
people outside of the community (Castillo, 2006). Alejandro Diez (2012) draws attention to the 
important fact that although the property is communal, the land within is divided into parcels 
under the communities own laws, and inside the communities the access to parcels is not 
egalitarian, because some communards have more parcels than others, or parcels of better quality. 
The communities are also impacted by larger political decisions. Although the campesino 
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communities own the land in their territory, and autonomy over land use decisions, they cannot 
claim ownership of the water resources or minerals therein, because all freshwater, both above 
and below ground, and subterranean resources are property of the Peruvian national government 
(Romero-Wolf, 2010).  
Community Structure of Campesino Communities 
During the period of titling, campesinos were bound by a common heritage and kinship, 
and although most residents work their land individually, the residents typically share many 
community activities and the responsibility over areas of the land that are communal 
(McClintock, 1981). In return for attending communal assemblies and carrying out leadership 
roles and communal work service (faena), the comunero gains access to the common property 
resources of the community. These vary among communities, but can include irrigation water, 
grazing lands, firewood from the forest, walking paths (Castillo, 2006). The communal meetings 
and faenas are obligatory to attend and there is a fine, sometimes very large, when a comunaro 
doesn’t attend. Faenas include working on cleaning the community’s water system, fixing things 
at the school, cleaning common paths that go to farm lands, working on communal pasture land, 
manicuring the cemetery, among other work tasks for the good of the community (Castillo, 
2006). In campesino communities portions of the community-owned land are communally used 
for cattle grazing and communal planting of trees for local use. However, in Amazonas the 
majority of the land within campesino communities is divided into predios, or individualized 
plots, that male and female heads of households may work for their own production as 
posesionarios (Shanee, 2013). When the communities were titled as Campesino Communities the 
land was divided amongst comuneros into predios, with portions of the land left as communal. 
The size of each family’s predio depends on a number of factors, some historical and some based 
on the size of the family and number of children. Posesionarios may carry out land transactions 
between themselves and outsiders, but must get approval from the full community in an 
assembly.  
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Regional Contexts 
 As discussed above, Peru is considered one of the world’s megadiverse countries and the 
region of Amazonas is a central part of the “Tropical Andes Biodiversity Hotspot”, which is 
considered the most biodiverse area on earth and a global conservation priority (Shanee, 2013). 
The region also suffers one of the highest rates of deforestation in the country (IIAP, 2008). 
Several social, political, and economic factors have impacted the rate of deforestation in the 
Amazonas region. These factors have played a role in the regional ZEE planning and in creation 
and outcomes of ACPs in the region. I have divided these influences into three categories: (1) 
demographic change especially population growth through in-migration, (2) mining, and (3) 
market integration.  
Demographic Changes and Population Growth 
Deforestation has increased in the Amazon region due to high rates of in-migration from 
the Andes to the Amazon, and the subsequent agricultural expansion. In Peru, migration to the 
Amazon regions was promoted by the national government to address land scarcity problems 
elsewhere, reduce migration to coastal cities, and stop social conflict over properties and mining 
in the highlands (Che Piu & Menton, 2014). Increased migration to the Amazon and its resultant 
agricultural expansion has been one of the main causes of deforestation in the Amazonas region. 
The opening of roads is a key factor in increasing access to previously inaccessible areas. It is a 
common practice for new migrants to clear and area, use it for a short period (until fertility 
declines) and then abandon the area; the few areas that have a potential for ongoing agriculture 
are handed over to relatives or sold to new migrants (Che Piu & Menton, 2014). It is important to 
recognize that this form of clearing and land abandonment is not the same as forest farming 
known as swidden, a form of integral shifting cultivation which is highly managed based on 
accumulated ecological knowledge, local governance and long-term (including enriched) fallows 
(Siebert & Belsky 2014). The agriculture settlement of the Amazonas region entails a more 
opportunistic and all would agree unsustainable form of forest conversion and campesino 
agriculture. In fact, the migrants themselves view the forest as a barrier to agricultural 
development (MINAM, 2009).  
Migration to the Amazon was promoted by the Peruvian government in 1970s and 1980s 
with subsidies for agriculture and livestock production, focusing on promoting farmer migration 
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to the amazon and border areas, to occupy the national territory, which was becoming too 
concentrated on the coast, and to protect the borders (Che Piu & Menton, 2014). This was 
accompanied by policies to formalize the rural property, where lands deforested for the 
establishment of agricultural activities were granted campesino community land titles, which 
worsened issues including land grabbing, land trafficking, and deforestation (Deere, 1990).  
The majority of the immigrants to the region come from the neighboring region 
Cajamarca, which has Peru’s highest rate of campesino out-migration (Shanee, 2013). Cajamarca 
was the focal point of Spanish colonization, and under colonial rule, Cajamarca became a major 
center for textile and then mining with the discovery of silver in Hualgayoc in 1772 (Deere, 
1990). The region was then developed into a hacienda system which expanded at the expense of 
the land base of Indigenous communities. Deere has described the hacienda system as one of 
‘feudal class relations’ (Deere 1990, p. 24). With the Spanish colonization of Latin America, 
lower classes of Spanish immigrants “could ‘buy’ their way into aristocracy as soon as they had 
accumulated enough money to pay for it”. By 1940 Cajamarca had the highest concentration of 
campesinos living under the hacienda system: 46 haciendas owned 65% of the land (Deere 1990, 
p. 27). After the Colonial period, once the Spaniards were expelled from the Andes, the land did 
not return to the campesino populations but stayed in the hands of creoles who perpetuated the 
hacienda system. A lack of cultivatable land for the indigenous groups, an increasing population, 
and environmental contamination from mining, combined with the subsidies promoting 
migration into the amazon region, have all contributed to the massive migration of campesinos 
from Cajamarca to the region Amazonas.  
The migrants often settle in geographically marginal areas which can also be seen as 
social, political and economically marginal to the dominant Peruvian society. These areas have 
retained communal land laws, which do not provide private land titles recognized by the regional 
government, but titles of position managed by the local governing system (Che Piu & Menton, 
2014). Since titles of position are not registered through the regional government, many of the 
migrants do not register legally within the region or the communities. This causes clashes within 
the communities, and protected areas in some cases are being seen as a way in which 
communities can get help from outside agencies to organize their land use and stop the illegal 
settling of migrants on communal lands (Shanee, 2013).  
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Natural Resource Extraction and Land Rights in Peru  
The Amazon of Peru has been a target of poorly planned, but ambitious natural resource 
extraction projects of public and private investment. Romero Wolf (2010) explains that this rush 
for development is evidenced by the following fact: in 2003 15% of the Amazon region was 
designated as lots for exploration and exploitation of mining, and in 2009 this number rose to 
70%. During past President Alan Garcia’s second term (2006-2011), he was convinced that local 
and foreign private investment was the best way for Peru to rise out of poverty (Levy, 2011). 
During this period land concessions for oil and gas exploration, mining, palm oil plantations, and 
logging were granted by the central government, and many of these concessions were 
superimposed on campesino community agriculture land and indigenous land, which is a formula 
for conflict (The Economist, 2015). In the Amazonas region alone there are 79 lots granted for 
exploitation and exploration of mining, or a total of 52,754 hectares (IIAP, 2008). The granting 
of resource extraction concessions combined with the ambiguity of land titles and land 
ownership in Peru has encouraged land grabs, migration, and deforestation.  
 Mining is not viewed positively in the Amazonas region due to a 2009 violent 
interaction between the government, petroleum mining companies, and a native community in 
the regional province of Bagua. The police staged a violent raid on indigenous people who were 
participating in a peaceful blockade to revoke the “free trade” decrees, issued by former Peruvian 
president Alan Garcia with the United States, allowing private companies’ access to the Amazon 
for resource development. On June 6, 2009 over 600 police attacked several thousand unarmed 
Awajen and Wamba indigenous people using tear gas and live ammunition (Armstrong, Baillie, 
Fourie, & Rondon, 2014). This violent interaction is known as the “Baguazo” and not since the 
Shining Path had so many people been killed or injured in a political clash in Peru. According to 
an official report by the Defensoría del Pueblo, Peru’s national human rights ombudsman, the 
cause of the Bagua conflict is one of public policies on natural resource management, land tenure, 
and the promotion of the investments in the Amazon region that trace back to the free trade 
agreement (Romero-Wolf, 2010).  
 Alan Garcia viewed the free trade agreement signed with American president George 
W. Bush as a way to allow for the establishment of American factories and companies in Peru, 
claiming that by 2009 the country’s economy could grow by 10 percent (Peru This Week, 2007). 
Garcia suggested that there was conflict between the county’s development which would be 
35 
 
accelerated under the free trade agreement and indigenous people’s rights. Garcia made a 
statement that was published in a newspaper in 2007 explaining this contradiction:  
We have been misled into handing over small land lots to poor families that do 
not have a penny to invest…. This happens across Peru, idle land because the 
owner has no training or resources, so your ownership is apparent. This same 
earth sold in great lots would bring technology that could benefit community 
members, or comuneros, but the ideological spider web of the 19
th
 century is still 
a barrier (Che Piu & Menton, 2014). 
 
In campesino communities, if the surface land is under campesino land title, a favorable vote of 
2/3 by all community members is required in order for mining to enter. Despite the law for free 
and prior consent for mining in campesinos communities, several conflicts over mining have 
ensued and there are many cases where mines entered without prior consent (Armstrong, Baillie, 
Fourie, & Rondon, 2014). But, it is important to note that mining activities are restricted in some 
areas such as: national protected areas and their buffer zones, archeological sites, tourism areas, 
and urban areas (Wieland Fernandini & Farfan Sousa, 2015).  
 The regional governments in many cases did not have a say in where the extraction 
concessions were created, rather the plans were created in the capital Lima, without coordination 
with the regions where the land is located (The Economist, 2015). The regional land planning 
efforts, and the declaration of conservation areas, may be tools that empower regional 
governments and local communities to gain control over their land, providing legal barriers to 
the extraction industries.  
Market Integration 
 Another factor in the deforestation of the Amazonas region is that of rapid economic 
growth because of greater market integration. Amazonas was historically economically and 
socially isolated from the rest of the country until a highway was built in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Gobierno Regional Amazonas, IIAP, 2008). The highway improved trade by serving as an 
intermediate market between the coast and the Amazon Basin. Since the highway was created, 
human travel has increased and the region has been integrated into the national market and social 
system.  
 With the opening of the inter-departmental roads connecting Amazonas to the coast and 
the jungle regions, campesino commercial agricultural production has flourished. This trade may 
36 
 
also have had unintended consequences, spurring campesino social differentiation. The more 
wealthy strata increasingly rely on the wage labor of campesinos. The growing monetization of 
the rural economy gradually led to the replacement of traditional forms of labor agreement with 
the payment of cash wages (Deere, 1990). The traditional labor trade was “minga” or trading 
days of work amongst campesinos, but in a communal manner, not for wage. The current levels 
of global market linkages encourages farmers to maximize their investment returns, and the 
growing global demand for soybeans, palm oil, biofuels, and cattle is accelerating the rate of 
deforestation in the region (Shanee, 2013). The profitability of agriculture and livestock in the 
Amazonas region is increasing and encouraging the campesino farmers to convert their forest 
reserves to agriculture plots and pasture lands (MINAM 2009).  
Conservation Area and Land Planning in the Amazonas Region 
The Economic and Ecological Zoning (ZEE) plans in Amazonas identified areas that are 
best for agriculture, livestock, forestry, fishing, mining, and for the protection of biodiversity 
(Gobierno Regional Amazonas, IIAP, 2008). The information from the plan has served as a basis 
to guide decision making in the formulation of policies, land use planning, and economic 
development at the regional and national level (Gobierno Regional Amazonas, IIAP, 2008).  
In 2007 the regional government of Amazonas along with the Peruvian Association for 
the Conservation of Nature (APECO) signed a convention to create a regional strategy for 
biological diversity and a plan for a regional conservation system. The regional conservation 
system (Sistema de Conservación Regional-SICRE) use the regions ZEE plans in order to 
identify areas of major conservation importance in the region that should be included in SICRE. 
The areas were prioritized based on the following conservation values: biodiversity value, key 
watersheds, the presence of endemic or endangered species, history and cultural values, and 
archeology. The goal of the plan was to ensure that at least 10% of all life zones present in the 
region Amazonas are in conservation protection (RENAMA and APECO, 2008). Once the areas 
to include in SICRE were selected, the land tenure of the areas was identified as state land, 
private land, or private communal land, and the available conservation tools for the different 
forms of tenure were identified. In Amazonas, ACPs are one of the instruments used for regional 
conservation. It is important to note that many of the international and national institutes and 
NGOs that aided in the development of the ZEE plan are the same entities that have been 
assisting to create the legal framework for and the creation of ACPs. The use of private 
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conservation areas in the Amazon region has been increasing rapidly, and the region currently 
holds more land under the status of ACP than any other region.  
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH METHODS  
Introduction 
This study examines community- owned private conservation areas, known in Peru as 
Áreas de Conservación Privadas (ACPs) and the motivations for creating an ACP, their 
outcomes, and how both are shaped by socio-economic, political, historical, cultural, and legal 
contexts at multiple (nested) scales. To collect the necessary data to conduct the study, the 
research used a multilevel, mixed-methods approach which included document analysis, in-depth 
interviews with key informants, participant observation, and household surveys. The 
methodology is mostly qualitative with some simple quantitative analysis (e.g., descriptive 
statistics and frequency of survey responses). Data collection took place between August 2012 
and January 2015 in Peru while I served for 25 months as a Peace Corp volunteer (PCV). 
Because of my extended time and status as a PCV I was able to supplement formal data 
collection with ongoing observation and participation in community life, especially in one of the 
case study areas where I lived. 
 This chapter outlines the data collection methods, notably the rationales for a multiscaled 
analysis, sampling procedures, and why and how I used in-depth interviews, household surveys, 
participant observation, and document analysis. See Table 2 below for an overview of the 
methods and the scales of analysis in which they cover. The chapter concludes with a brief 
discussion of the ethical considerations I addressed and the limitations of the research methods 
and data.
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Table 2 Overview of Research Methods and Scales of Analysis 
Scale 
(nested) 
Data Source/ 
Method 
Sample Size (n) Data Analysis 
Global Literature 
Review 
  
National Literature and 
Policy Review 
 
  
Key Informant 
Interviews  
n = 2  
1. National Service for Natural Protected Areas Employee (Lima) 
2. PROFONANPE, The Peruvian Trust Fund for National Parks and 
Protected Areas employee (Lima).  
 
Interviews were recorded and reviewed for key points 
within the interviews and linkages and differences with 
the data collected within and between different scales. 
This involved careful comparison among interviews 
noting similarities and differences in opinion and 
behavior within and across scales. 
Regional 
 
Key Informant 
Interviews 
with NGO and 
Government 
Agency 
employees 
 
n=5  
1. The State Agency Regional Environmental Authorities (ARA) 
2. The Amazonas regional office of the Peruvian Association for the 
Conservation of Nature (APECO) 
3. The Amazonas regional office of Nature and Culture International 
(NCI) 
4. The Amazonas regional office of The Peruvian Amazon Research 
Institute (IIAP)  
5. The Amazonas Regional office of The Peruvian Society for 
Environmental Law (SPDA)   
 
Interviews were recorded and reviewed for key points 
within the interviews and linkages and differences with 
the data collected within and between the different scales. 
This involved careful comparison among interviews 
noting similarities and differences in opinion and 
behavior within and across scales. 
Local Comparative 
Case Study  
n=2 ACPs 
1. Molinopampa  
2. Tilacancha  
 
In depth 
Community 
Leader 
Interviews 
n=14  
Molinopampa n=8 
Tilacancha n=6  
Detailed notes were recorded during interviews and 
reviewed for key points within the interviews and 
linkages and differences with the data collected within 
and between the different scales. 
Household 
surveys  
n=125 of the total, N=342 households, or 36% of total 
households 
 
Molinopampa n=63 of the 173 total households in the area 
Tilacancha n=62 of the 169 total households in the area 
For open and closed ended questions with identifiable 
themes codes were developed that were mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive. Descriptive statistics were used 
to explore connections between respondent characteristics 
and responses. 
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Scales and Units of Analysis 
 In order to assess and understand the interaction between global, national, and regional 
movements towards the creation of local private conservation areas the study focuses on three main 
scales of analysis: (1) Global and national conservation trends, (2) Regional agencies including 
conservation NGOs, and (3) Local campesino communities who have agreed to have their private 
collective land declared as an ACP. 
 The nature of the research question is multi-scaled and complex. It required an understanding 
of both the broad socio-economic, political, historical, cultural, and legal contexts behind the 
movement of the use of ACPs as a conservation tool, as well as in-depth understanding of what has 
been occurring in the actual ACPs. The data required to provide these understandings at different 
scales were different, and are described in detail below. 
Methods of Data Collection: 
Global 
A global level of analysis was necessary to understand the forces leading to the creation of the 
ACP as a new form of protected area as well as the main institutions such as IUCN which helped to 
legitimate and implement them; it also included to some extent attention to the global neoliberal 
economic policy context which has influenced Peru as well. To gather the global perspective I 
conducted a literature review on trends in protected area management with an emphasis on 
decentralization mechanisms especially community-based natural resource management and 
conservation, and on novel instruments within these fields, namely private community-conservation 
areas. In conducting the literature review I included both rationales for and opportunities noted as 
coming from decentralizing conservation and community-based conservation as well as the critiques 
which have arisen over the last few decades.  
National 
To gather data on national-level dynamics I also began with a literature review. This included 
learning about the country’s complex and dynamic property rights and legal system, and specifically 
how it informed conservation in Peru; with the latter focusing on how private conservation fits into the 
nation’s evolving protected area system. As discussed in detail above, Peru’s experience with 
conservation governance and management has shifted greatly in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. 
The governance shift I refer to is the decentralization of decision-making and administration to more 
regional and local-scales and ecologically determined territories, and in the process engaging a wider 
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array of social groups and processes. To gather information about the latter I read widely on Peruvian 
development, agrarian change, and specifically socio-ecological change in the Amazon region where I 
was living and working as a PCV (and where the rate and impacts of these changes are dramatic). 
To further understand the decentralization of environmental decision-making, the legal recognition 
of private conservation areas, and the new laws promoting payment for ecosystem service schemes I 
conducted an in-depth policy analysis. Once I understood the current policies involving ACPs, I 
conducted key informant interviews with two national level officers in Lima. One interview was with 
an employee of SERNANP, the National Service for Natural Protected Areas under the Ministry of 
Environment, and the other with PROFONANPE, The Peruvian Trust Fund for National Parks and 
Protected Areas.  
SERNANP is the agency which grants legal recognition to ACPs and is also in charge of the 
monitoring of the areas. SERNANP holds the power to rescind legal recognition if the ACP does not 
comply with the management plan. At SERNANP I interviewed the coordinator in charge of 
coordination with the regional governments of San Martin, Amazonas, and Lorrento. The officer is in 
charge of monitoring of the ACPS in the regions. He has an understanding of SERNANP’s role in 
ACPs and how the ACPs are contributing to the nation’s protected area system, and also more 
specifically in the three regions.  
PROFANANPE has established a strong reputation as one of the main financial tools for 
conserving Peru’s biological diversity. It plays an important role in the creation of public policies and 
is key in encouraging and executing the participatory management model for Protected Areas. It 
actively fostered new conservation strategies through private, and regional and municipal 
governments’ initiatives. PROFONANPE has provided funding for management and sustainable 
development initiatives in ACPs. At PROFANANPE I interviewed the organization’s specialist in 
funds for regional conservation areas.  
To guide the key informant interviews with the above members, I developed a list of questions 
(Appendix A). Each interview was conducted face to face and lasted about an hour. The interviews 
were conducted in Spanish and were recorded. I listened to the recordings paying particular attention to 
each informant’s explanations for why ACPs were created as a legal form of conservation in Peru, how 
they fit into the nation’s protected area system, and how the ACPs fit in with Peru’s recent 
participatory governance model. I listened for statements in the interviews on opinions regarding how 
the ACPs are currently functioning (or not functioning) as a contribution to the nation’s protected area 
system.  
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Regional  
The first step of my research to learn about regional dynamics involved gaining familiarity with the 
Amazon region, private conservation areas, and building personal relationships with key people. To 
accomplish this I attended regional meetings and workshops involving the agencies and NGOs active 
in creating and managing ACPs. As a Peace Corps volunteer working in an ACP, I interacted with 
regional environmental agencies and NGOs through my work as a volunteer. As the offices got to 
know me and my work, I started to be invited to regional meetings and workshops. I worked with the 
Regional Environmental Authorities (ARA) to identify my research topic and to design the study. 
Once I had completed a research proposal I introduced my topic at the regional meetings and 
scheduled interviews with key informants from the five environmental entities in the region that aid 
communities in the creation and management of ACPs. 
I selected and interviewed 5 key informants from agencies and organizations that, based on my 
prior knowledge, play a key role in the implementation and management of ACPs in the region. I 
developed an interview guide which consisted of a list of questions (Appendix A). The questions I 
asked were designed to understand the following: to understand the agencies, institutions, and personal 
reasons and roles they played in creating ACPs; the procedures they used to create the ACPs and 
especially how they engaged with the communities who own the ACP lands; and what internal and 
external inputs were used to create the ACPs. Interviews were recorded and varied in length from 40 
minutes to 3 hours. They were conducted in Spanish. I carefully listened to the recordings for 
statements in the respondents’ answers that informed my research questions. Analysis involved 
identifying themes that arose within as well as across the interviews; with regard to the latter I was 
careful to note when there were differences as well. 
Local 
To understand the creation, operation and outcomes of ACPs I chose a comparative case study 
approach using two ACPs operating in the Amazon region. Examining two cases in the same regional 
and national context allowed for an in-depth examination of local and historically-specific conditions 
and concerns within each site, and in light of similar broader characteristics, as well as the dynamic 
relationships that exist between the two ACPs. I limited my formal data collection to focusing on these 
two ACPs though as a PCV I had interaction and knowledge of other ACPs in the region, information I 
draw upon as supplemental information. 
With some prior knowledge of ACPs in the region, I chose two ACPs as my case studies that 
provide two different socio-ecological contexts and examples of the way in which ACPs were being 
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created and managed. The two areas differed in their physical environments, demographic situation, 
and in the management structure of the ACP. The two ACPs I chose are the ACP Molinopampa and 
the ACP Tilacancha.  
The ACP in Molinopampa’s boundaries includes three annexes within one district. Although 
the annexes are part of the same district and have the same mayor and community president, they are 
considered “centros poblados”, or population centers, and have their own representatives and schools. 
They largely function as separate communities. The ACP Tilacancha’s boundaries include two 
districts. It is the only community- owned ACP that includes two separate districts. The districts are 
smaller than the district Molinopampa and each district only has one central population with a 
municipality and school. Although there are small annexes, the districts largely function as a single 
community (See Table 3).  
Table 3. Communities within ACPs Molinopampa and Tilacancha 
 
Table 4 below summarizes the main characteristics and differences between the two case study 
ACPs. It highlights their differences in terms of landscapes, land uses, ACP boundaries, and the 
communities who own the areas. The background information is based on their respective ACP 
Management Plans supplanted by information I gained from key informant interviews with NGOs in 
the region.  
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Table 4. Overview of Socio-Environmental Characteristics of the Two ACP Case Studies 
 Molinopampa Tilacancha 
Conservation Value Palm forest of ecological novelty and 
Importance 
Key watershed to the regional capital  
Ecological 
Characteristics 
Palm Forest Pajonal Grasslands/ Wetland 
Land Use Forest that is converted to agriculture 
and pasture land 
Mostly unarable land 
Ownership 3 communities (Annexes) within one 
District 
2 Districts (Maino and Levanto) 
ACP Boundaries 
and Property Rights 
Includes all community property which 
is further divided by individual land 
holders who live in the ACP 
Includes a portion of community property 
which is mostly held as communal land 
with few members owning land within the 
ACP 
Households 173 households  169 households 
Immigration Mix of long-established residents to the 
area and immigrants from the 
neighboring region Cajamarca 
Almost purely long-established to the area 
or spouses of long-established residents to 
the area 
ACP Size (Ha) 10,000 ha. 6,800 ha. (Maino: 3,058 ha. / Levanto 3,741 
ha.)  
Potential incentives 
outlined in 
management Plan 
Highlights the potential for ecotourism  Highlights the potential for a payment for 
ecosystem service scheme for the provision 
of the water of the region’s capital 
 
People and Governance within the Case Study Communities 
 The districts within the case study ACPs are independent campesino communities, and 
although legal documentation of property rights for campesino communities is tenuous in some regions 
of the country, the three case study districts hold full legal recognition. In both areas portions of the 
community owned land are communally used for cattle grazing and for reforestation projects for local 
use. However, the majority of the land is divided into individualized plots owned by households that 
they may work for their own production. Thus the land is communally owned, but individually 
operated. Community members may carry out land transactions, but in theory must get approval from 
the full community in an assembly.  
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 Campesino communities in the Amazonas region are populated with impoverished farmers 
who have a history of being disenfranchised, suffering from land insecurity and deteriorating 
environmental resources. Both case study sites were exploited by state authorized timber concessions 
which provided community members little compensation for their valuable timber during the 1970s 
timber boom in the region. The communities farm for subsistence (mainly tubers, corn, and beans) and 
commercially (mainly cattle, peppers, and potatoes). In both case study ACPs some families sell cattle 
and dairy products for income, but there is variance among families for size of herd. I was unable to 
include in-depth socio-economic data for the surveys because community members are unwilling to 
share information on the amount of livestock they own. It was very evident that information I was 
being provided was false. It was explained to me that people do not want others to know their social 
status for two reasons: because of social conflicts within the community and the fear of the data 
resulting in the loss of governmental aid provided to the family.  
Rapid migration to the region Amazonas from the neighboring region Cajamarca has been 
observed to negatively affect the governance and management of natural resource systems (Shanee, 
2013). The residents in the communities within the ACP Tilicancha, Levanto and Maino, have not 
allowed for the transaction of land to migrant populations, and the communities’ populations identified 
ancestry to the community. This is in opposition to Molinopampa, where nearly half of the population 
identifies as migrants from campesino communities in the region Cajamarca, where an increase in 
population, social differences, and mining operations caused a scarcity in fertile land for campesino 
community members. The campesino community Molinpampa has allowed for the transaction of land 
to outsiders, but often the transactions are done illegally and without community approval.   
Many migrant families appear unlikely to improve newly acquired lands due to lack of capital, 
limited desire to create permanent agricultural systems, or to reside in the region, and because the 
majority of these lands are marginal. The migrants were sold forested land that is high in the mountains, 
in some cases taking six hours of hiking through difficult terrain to reach. This limits opportunities for 
market integration. The male head of households often live in the mountains on the agricultural land, 
leaving the mother and children in their homes on the road system while the children are in school. 
During school breaks the migrant families reside in the mountain, where there is no running water or 
access to health facilities.  
The campesino communities hold regular assemblies at least once every three months if not 
more frequently. These meetings are to discuss concerns, issues, and requests among community 
members and from outside organizations. Attendance of community members at the assemblies is 
obligatory and a fine is typically placed for absent members. Entry into the community as a community 
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member who can take part in decision making and assemblies is not a rapid process. The individual 
must have married a community member or have resided in the community for five years and then be 
formally approved for membership by community members in an assembly.  
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Figure 3. ACPs Tilicancha and Molinopmpa on the Ecological and Economical Zoning Map of the 
Region Amazonas 
 
Reference: (Gobierno Regional de Amazonas; Instituto de Investigaciones de la Amazonía Peruana, 
2008) 
ACP Tilacancha 
ACP Molinopampa 
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Figure 4. Map of ACP Molinopampa 
 
Reference: (Guzman et al., 2011) 
Figure 5. Map of ACP Tilacancha 
 
Reference: (APECO, 2011) 
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Participant observation: 
Participant observation is a research method that enables a researcher to become closely 
acquainted with a community and the day-to-day activities of its members, through engagement as a 
participant (Dewalt & Dewalt, 2002). In the context of this research, I conducted participant 
observation throughout my two years living and working in the ACP Molinopampa as well as during 
my stays in the ACP Tilacancha. I engaged in informal unstructured discussions in every-day casual 
conversations and participated in daily activities allowing me to distinguish the difference between 
what people say they do, and what they actually do (Guber, 2004). This included my attendance of 
formal meetings in both the regional capital and in the communities regarding the ACPs. My 
involvement in the meetings enabled me to learn what community members and NGOs were present, 
who spoke during the meetings and who didn’t, whose opinions were expressed, and how community 
members interact with the NGOs working with the ACPs. This facilitated an understanding of the 
inner-community dynamics of social relationships. 
Beyond the attendance of meetings I also spent many days on farms with community members 
observing their practices in the ACP Molinopampa. Since my time spent in the ACP Tilacancha was 
significantly shorter I did not get the same experience on farms as I did in Molinopampa. However, I 
did conduct some interviews and surveys on the farms of respondents and observed their practices.  
At the scale of ACPs my approach was basically at two levels: community leaders and 
households. I interviewed 14 leaders in the two ACP communities before conducting the household 
surveys to understand the particular issues in each area. I begin below with a description of methods I 
used to learn from community leaders followed by those I used at individual (household) level. 
Community Leaders 
I began my research at the local level with identifying formal community and conservation 
leaders. I identified the governing structures and working groups within the communities and formal 
leadership positions. Since I had been living in Molinopampa for over a year when I started the study, 
and had attended various community meetings, I had a strong knowledge of the leaders within this 
community. Community meetings are led by the formal community leaders who are elected by 
community members and represent the community in the district municipality. The communities also 
had formed associations which worked on different reforestation and agriculture projects. The 
associations were originally formed when projects came from NGOs and state agencies. Since the 
associations work closely with the NGOs and the projects that come for the ACP, I also interviewed 
the associations’ president who is elected as president by association members.  
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In order to identify leaders within the ACP Tilacancha which includes the districts of Levanto 
and Maino, I coordinated with the NGOs that work in the ACP to identify the formal leaders before my 
initial visit. I also participated in a regional workshop that visited the ACP Tilacancha before my first 
solo visit. At the workshop I was introduced to the formal community leaders and I explained the study 
and coordinated for my visit.  
I personally interviewed a total of 14 community leaders: eight in the ACP Molinopampa and 
six in the ACP Tilacancha. Each interview lasted from a half hour to two hours guided by a Semi-
structured questionnaire. (Appendix B). I took detailed notes during and immediately after the 
interviews. I reviewed the notes to understand their explanations and details on their involvement in 
the formation, management, and activities of the ACPs; and their overall sense of what is working and 
not, and for whose benefit.  
Individual (Household)  
After completing interviews with community leaders I moved to methods to understand how 
individuals were involved in the ACPs and their views on how they were working and affecting them 
personally. To do this, I developed a questionnaire drawing on the KAP (Knowledge, Attitude, and 
Practice) format outlined by the World Health Organization (World Health Organization, 2008). KAP 
studies are evaluations that measure human knowledge, attitudes, and practices in response to a 
particular topic, in this case community-based ACPS. KAP studies have been widely used and valued 
around the world for at least 40 years (World Health Organization, 2008). The logic of KAP studies is 
that they provide insight into knowledge subjects have about a certain topic, attitudes about how they 
feel about it, and practices indicating how they actually behave. The questionnaire I developed 
contained both open and close ended questions (Appendix C). I pre-tested the questionnaire with three 
households outside of the two case study ACPs to ensure sure that they fit within the social and 
cultural contexts of the area before the formal research was started. I made minor adjustments to the 
questionnaires after the pretests to use local terms and improve participant understanding. In the 
context of the communities I surveyed a household is typically one nuclear family and sometimes, but 
not often, includes grandparents. 
Sampling 
The two ACPs involve some differences which influenced my sampling design. As explained 
in Table 3 there was a difference in the number of districts in the case study ACPs.  
Because of the differences in number of districts, I divided the sample into central population areas 
within the ACPs. In calculating sample sizes for my household survey I wanted a proportionately equal 
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representation of the different population centers because from my prior knowledge and work in the 
area I knew there was a difference in projects developed by NGOs across the population centers. The 
different population centers also hold meetings separately and have had different experiences with the 
formation and management of the ACPs.  
I obtained a list of households from the community president for each population center, which 
I used to identify the number of households in each central population within the two sample ACPs. 
The presidents hold a current list of households because in campesino communities households are 
fined if they do not attend community meetings and workdays. The lists contained the name of the 
male head of every household in the community.  
I sought the advice of a statistician at the regional university, Universidad Nacional Torbio 
Rodríguez de Mendoza, to assist with the sampling design. Once the sample size for each population 
center within the ACPs was determined with the advice of the statistician, the households were 
numbered and a random number generator was used to select households to be included in the sample. 
If the household could not be contacted the house to its immediate right replaced it. In order to gain 
information on gender differences in the understanding of the ACPs and the participation in ACP 
activities I tried to interview an equal amount of females as males. In order to do this I conducted half 
of the surveys with women during the day while men were typically in the fields, and the other half 
during the evening, when the men return from the field and women were generally busy with the task 
of preparing dinner. The male or female parent of the nuclear family was surveyed.  
The household sampling design is described below in Table 5. The household interviews were 
conducted during the four months of November-February of 2015. In the ACP Molinopampa they 
were conducted during the months of November, December, and January of 2015; while I was still 
living and working in the area as a Peace Corps volunteer. Household surveys in the ACP Tilacancha 
were executed during two four days stays; one in the district of Levanto in December of 2015 and the 
other in the district of Maino in February 2015. November-February is raining season in both of the 
areas. This season was chosen because community members tend to be in their homes more during 
rainy season and it is the off season for the cultivation of the local crops.  
In Molinopampa I was able to contact all households that were selected by the random number 
generator; however, in Tilacancha there were eleven instances where households were not reachable 
because they were in the capital or staying on their farms. In these cases the closest house to the right 
was used in the sample. The eleven households that I could not contact worked and lived in the capital 
Chachapoyas, but had homes and land in the area.  
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Table 5. Household Survey Sample 
 
Methods of Analysis for the Household Interviews: 
I developed codes for the answers to closed ended questions and for open ended questions that 
had identifiable themes. I created a coding book which was used to systematically observe and record 
context from the survey answers. The categories used in coding the answers were mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive. Using the code book the respondent’s answers were entered into a SPSS spreadsheet. 
SPSS was used to run descriptive statistics to explore the connections between characteristics of the 
population and their responses to the questions asked in the questionnaire.  
All of the ACPs have baseline data and a master plan that was created to complete the legal 
documentation of the ACP. The baseline data includes both ecological and socio-economic data 
collected by study teams from the NGOs and state institutions, and is available to the public. The 
master plan includes management and zoning plans created by NGOs with communities. As such, this 
data provided insight into management plans and use zones, as well as conservation objectives. I used 
these documents as a basis for knowing the legal rules and procedures permitted in each ACP and as a 
platform to compare responses of households regarding their knowledge of management plans and 
zoning use rules.  
ACP Molinopampa Tilacancha 
Total Number of Households N=173 N=169 
Number of HHs Surveyed n=63 (36% of total) 62 (37% of total) 
Stratified By 3 communities:  
Pumahermana, Ocol, and 
San Jose 
2 districts (communities): 
Levanto and Maino 
Total Number of Households in Each 
Community: 
Pumahermana: 15 
Ocol: 22 
San Jose: 26 
Levanto: 81 
Maino: 88 
Households Sampled in Each 
Community 
Pumahermana: 42 
Ocol: 60 
San Jose: 71 
Levanto: 30 
Maino: 32 
Non-Responsive Households 0 11 
Number of Men Respondents  31 (49.2%) 30 (51.6%) 
Number of Women Respondents 32 (50.8%) 32 (48.4%) 
Size of HHs Surveyed 1-7 inhabitants 1-7 inhabitants 
Age Range of HHs Surveyed 20-69 18-68 
Immigration Status 31 long established 
residents to the area (49%) 
32 Immigrants (51%) 
62 long established residents to 
the area (100%) 
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For questions that involved more in-depth answers that could not be easily categorized and 
coded, I selected quotations that provide detail and explanations to aid in telling the areas complex 
story. I used respondent’s comments that address the research questions and aid in telling a rich story 
from multiple perspectives within the diverse community. The household surveys were numbered for 
identification and the numerical IDs are found after quotes in the research results.  
Research Ethics 
 Before beginning data collection, I explained the purpose of the study to all informants and 
respondents and asked if they were willing to participate in the study before I conducted the interview 
or survey. At interview appointments, I informed the respondent of their rights to refrain from 
participating and their rights to anonymity and confidentiality. I have followed these rules to the best 
of my ability in reporting research results. The household surveys and interviews did not include 
names. Surveys were assigned numbers, not names, to ensure participants that their name would not be 
attached to the information provided. I also informed survey and interview respondents that they would 
not receive any direct financial or other kind of benefit for their participation.  
Limitations of the Research: 
There are two types of limitations to this research: logistical and methodological. Logistically, 
the limitations to this study were the lack of time and transportation options to coordinate with ACPs 
outside of the district Molinopampa where I was serving as a Peace Corps volunteer. I originally 
proposed to include more ACPs in my case study, but time and logistics led me to focus on two ACPs, 
and the two that I concluded provided a wide range of relevant differences (i.e., characteristics of 
ACPs ecosystems, motivating forces, management plans, and demographics).  
Methodologically, the limitations of this study have to do with the scope and scale of the 
research topic. As one of the first research efforts on this topic, I asked the different subjects in my 
project questions suggested from the literature, but remained open to enable them to introduce new 
topics and concepts of importance to them. This is why my questionnaires always included open-ended 
questions as well as encouragement to talk about any topic they thought relevant to the main subject. 
The interview format facilitated conversations and hence documentation of a wide range of 
experiences, which influenced subsequent phases of the research.  
In many cases the current directors or employees are new, as there is a high turnover rate in the 
region, and may not be person who was in charge of the creation of the ACP. This likely influenced 
their ability to explain fully the story of how the ACP was created. Also, in the region there is a sense 
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of competition between different entities, and this could have skewed answers given, out of fear that I 
will tell other entities how they responded to the questions.  
Participant observation provided rich detail and can be used to validate or refute claims about a 
particular context, adding another type of information to interpret different kinds of data. The 
observations assisted in understanding the way social power is distributed in particular contexts and in 
explaining why people hold different viewpoints. This aided in understanding dynamics of social 
relationships that are not overtly acknowledged. Interactions and deep conversations in daily settings 
allowed for the introduction of topics informants felt were important to them and facilitated the 
exploration of topics that they maybe would not bring up in a more formal survey setting.  
Although valuable, as with interviews, participant observation data has several weaknesses. 
First, it can be difficult to know the extent to which the researcher’s presence has influenced the 
behavior of people being observed. Since I was living in the ACP Molinopampa and had strong 
personal and work relationships with various community members, the information I received from 
households and leaders was more in-depth than responses I obtained in Tilacancha. In Molinopampa I 
was also able to provide thicker and deeper ethnographic information using examples from my 
experience working in the area over two years and informal conversations I had with my neighbors. In 
Molinopampa the community members understood that I was working with the Peace Corps and not 
with the NGOs that created the ACPs. In Tilicancha community members were less aware of my 
position with the ACP. I explained before interviews and surveys the purpose of my study, but my 
position as a foreigner and an outsider to the community may have impacted interview and survey 
responses.  For example, in one instance a community member in Tilicancha mentioned that 
community members thought that I was with the NGO APECO when they saw me in the community. 
Although I explained that I was not with any NGO before conducting the interviews and surveys, my 
position as a foreigner may have influenced responses. For these reasons, my understanding and 
explanations provided for the ACP Molinopampa are significantly more detailed than those of the ACP 
Tilacancha. Another limitation is the scope of the study. A common critique of case studies is that the 
findings are not generalizable beyond the specific case. While this study is a detailed examination of 
two ACPs, it may offer insightful information about ACPs in general. Instead of drawing conclusions 
about ACPs in general from my two cases, readers should be able to form ideas that can be applied to 
different settings. For this reason I have provided in depth descriptions of the two study sites and their 
relationship to community-owned private protected areas in a broader context. I strive to provide 
sufficient contextual information on the two cases to enable the reader to draw parallels between the 
cases and other sites.
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CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 
Introduction  
In this chapter I present the results concerning the factors motivating the creation of 
community-based private conservation areas (ACPs) and their outcomes from the perspectives of 
three main groups: (1) national governmental agencies, which include the Peruvian National 
Service for Natural Protected Areas (SERNANP) and PROFONANPE, The Peruvian Trust Fund 
for National Parks and Protected Areas, (2) regional governmental agencies and NGOs who 
directly work with the ACPs, including the State Agency Regional Environmental Authorities 
(ARA) and the Amazonas regional offices of the Peruvian Association for the Conservation of 
Nature (APECO), Nature and Culture International (NCI), the Peruvian Amazon Research 
Institute (IIAP), and the Peruvian Society for Environmental Law (SPDA), and (3) leaders and 
households in the two case study communities that become ACPs, Molinopampa and Tilacancha.   
I present the results in four sections. The first section discusses the motivations of actors 
at the three different scales for participating in the creation and management of ACPs. The 
second examines the roles of the three sets of actors in the creation of the two case ACPs, 
Molinopampa and Tilacancha. The third reviews the communities’ in each of the two ACPs 
knowledge of ACPs’ management including contested definitions and operationalization of 
“conservation”, the latter involving land use compromises within the ACPs. The fourth section 
focuses on the land management and development outcomes of the ACPs, comparing and 
contrasting the expectations of the various actors to the actual results.  
Section one begins with a brief discussion of SERNANP and PROFANANPE’s views of 
how ACPs strengthen the nation’s protected area system. At the national level I found that the 
motivation for the inclusion of ACPs into the national protected area system is to increase the 
amount of the nation’s biodiversity in designated protected areas and to provide state recognition 
of the voluntary efforts of private land owners towards contributing to the protection of the 
country’s biodiversity. The section then presents the factors motivating the creation of the two 
case study ACPs, Tilacancha and Molinopampa. To do this I first introduce the different regional 
governmental and non-governmental entities involved in the two areas creation and their 
motivations for engaging in the establishment of the ACPs. At the regional level the 
governmental and non-governmental organizations that were involved with the creation and 
management of the ACPs had diverse motivations for the creation of the ACPs, influenced by the 
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organization’s missions and funding. I found that the regional land use plans that were part of 
Peru’s decentralization process are being used by the regional organizations to identify areas to 
create ACPs. I briefly discuss the use of these plans in identifying the areas. Finally, the section 
presents data from the community leader interviews and household surveys to discuss the factors 
motivating them and their communities to create the ACPs of Tilacancha and Molinopampa. I 
first present the household survey results regarding the expected benefits from the creation of the 
ACPs for both Molinopampa and Tilacancha. At the community level, within the ACPs 
Molinopampa and Tilacancha, I identified three themes relating to motivations to create the 
ACPs: local economic development through state and NGO aid, the protection of the integrity of 
the ecological system for current and future use, and the strengthening of community control 
over land and resources. I explain each of the three themes in detail.  
The second section discusses campesino community participation in the planning and 
creation of the ACPs Tilacancha and Molinopampa. I found that in both ACPs the idea to create 
a private conservation area was introduced by outside entities. In order to create the ACPs the 
majority (2/3) of the community has to vote in favor for the creation of the ACP during a 
community assembly. Although both communities eventually reached a 2/3 majority vote in 
favor of the ACP, the community engagement process and the communities understanding and 
perceptions about how the ACP actually got started were very different in the two case study 
sites. I explain the history of the creation of the two case study ACPs, drawing attention to the 
roles of the varying actors involved in the creation, and whose opinions were represented in the 
creation of the management plan, as well as who was left out of the process. I then analyze the 
differences in campesino community participation between the ACP Tilacancha and 
Molinopampa. I found that the ACP Tilacancha took longer to create, but allowed for more 
participation of community members through the creation of a technical group which included 
community members and various meetings in the community. In Molinopampa there was not a 
technical group created that included community members, rather the decisions for the creation 
of the ACP and the management plan were made by technicians from the regional capital. I 
conclude the section with the explanation of two identified constraints to including the 
campesino communities in the process to declare the areas: the requirement of technical studies, 
and conflicting motivations between the various actors involved in the creation of the ACPs.  
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The third section presents the Tilacancha and Molinopampa campesino community 
knowledge of the private conservation areas’ existence, the zoning of the private conservation 
areas, and the land use compromises within the areas. I begin the section with the meaning of the 
term ‘conservation’ to campesino community members within the ACPs Molinopampa and 
Tilacancha. I found that not all households surveyed were familiar with the term conservation. 
Of those surveyed who provided a meaning of the term, the most common definition was to 
‘cuidar’ or take care of the environment. Many of the respondents also associated the term 
‘conservation’ with the taking care of nature as defined by the management rules of the ACP, in 
some cases correlating the term with restricted use. Next, I present the campesino communities 
within the ACPs Molinopampa and Tilacancha’s knowledge of the ACP boundaries and the 
associated use rules, and how this knowledge was influenced by community participation. I 
describe the communities understanding of the restricted and permitted uses as outlined by the 
use plans separately for the ACPs Molinopampa and Tilacancha, and then compare and contrast 
the understanding of the use rules between the two ACPs. I provide explanations for the 
commonalities and differences in the knowledge of the use rules between the two ACPs.  
The final section of the results analyzes the outcomes of and experiences with the 
creation and management of the ACPs from the perspective of households in the campesino 
communities within the ACPs Tilacancha and Molinopampa and the organizations that aided in 
their creation. The section is divided into five parts: (1) Households in the main communities’ 
perceptions of land use and land management changes in the ACPs, (2) The ability of the ACPs 
to prevent outside threats (immigration in Molinopampa and Mining in Tilacancha), (3) 
perceived household and community benefits of declaring the ACP, (4) projects implemented in 
the ACPs and their results, and (5) the comparison of motivations to create the ACPs to the 
actual results, and how the differences between the two, combined with many other factors, has 
increased mistrust and community resistance of the ACP.  
Section 1: Motivation of Participating Organizations to Create Community-based Private 
Conservation Areas:  
 
Motivation of SERNANP and PROFONANPE to Include ACPs in the Nation’s Protected Area 
System:  
At the national level, the respondent at SERNANP emphasized that Private Conservation 
Areas (ACPs) are voluntary and considered complimentary to the Peruvian System of Natural 
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Protected Areas (SINANPE). SERNANP views the areas to supplement SINANPE by helping to 
protect part of an area of biological interest and increases the total coverture and 
representativeness of the nation’s ecosystems that are in protected area status. The respondent 
from SERNANP stated that the ACPs can serve as a biological corridors or buffer zones to state 
run protected areas. 
A SERNANP employee working with regional municipalities to support ACPs explains 
the role of ACPs as biological corridors: 
For example a large national park may conserve an ecosystem that is delicate, and 
maybe for political actions or geographical reasons there are limits to the area, but the 
ecosystem is large and there is a private property owner that wants to conserve a small 
parcel of land within the ecosystem. This parcel complements the national conservation 
system by providing a corridor and helps in the representation of this ecosystem in the 
nation’s protected area system. 
This respondent clarified that SERNANP does not select the areas to be conserved as ACPs, but 
before an ACP is legally recognized SERNANP verifies that the areas proposed by property 
owners are in zones that do not interfere with other land rights or concessions, and that they 
contribute to the representation of biodiversity under protected area status in Peru. The employee 
emphasized that ACPs should not be viewed as a way to prevent resource extraction activities 
from entering the community, but rather as a way to support sustainable resource use and 
conservation:   
The ACPs should not be viewed as a way to prevent mining, what happens is some 
communities think that by establishing a conservation area they are creating an obstacle 
for mining or other activities. It shouldn’t be viewed this way…..ACPs should be 
formed without the idea that they are an obstacle to other activities that are a threat to 
conservation. ACPs should be seen as a way to contribute and benefit the conservation 
of the nation’s biodiversity, and at the same time help the communities or property 
owners use their natural resources sustainably. 
The SERNANP regional employee went on to explain that although the formal recognition of the 
areas is new, the areas themselves have been informally conserved by their owners long before 
the law passed in 2001 allowing for their legal recognition: 
Many of them (land owners) have a portion of forest that they do not want to touch, 
and they never wanted to have productive activities in this area. ACPs through our 
law have become formalized, but the conservation in the ACPs in many cases are 
practices that the owners have been doing for many years, since the area’s settlement. 
 
The person viewed the “conservation” of the areas as in-line with land owner’s current land 
management practices.  
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Furthermore, this interviewee stated that SERNANP views the legal recognition of ACPs 
as a way for communities and private land owners to be recognized for their conservation efforts, 
and at the same time add to the amount of national land that is in formal protection. ACPs 
require little national funding, but contribute to the amount of the countries’ biodiversity that is 
included in the national protected area system. A lack of government funding for creating new 
protected areas and the country’s current decentralization movement have contributed to the 
increase in the creation of ACPs. ACPs are seen by the national government as a tool for regional 
governments to strengthen their regional system of conservation. The representative at 
PROFONANPE explained:  
Regional governments should have a vision of how to manage the biodiversity in their 
region. They need to use different instruments to do this. ACPs are a tool for regional 
governments. SERNANP does not currently have the capacity to have representatives in 
every region.  
As discussed in the literature review, Peru’s decentralization process started 10 years ago with 
the aims of redistributing state power, funds, and administrative duties. Part of the process 
included increasing public participation and improved resource management planning among 
three levels of government, national, regional, and local. The regional land planning efforts in 
many regions, including Amazonas, include conservation goals. The legal documentation of 
ACPs is comprehended by the national government to provide a tool for regions to include the 
local level in land management planning and expand regional conservation.  
Motivations to Create the ACPs Tilacancha and Molinopampa 
 Based on the two case study ACPs, Molinopampa and Tilacancha, I will explain the 
motivation behind their creation according to first, the various regional organizations that aided 
in the legal recognition of the areas as ACPs, and then move to the motivation of the rural 
campesino households within the communities of Molinopampa, Levanto, and Maino to create 
the ACPs. 
Motivation of Regional Non-Governmental and Governmental Organizations in the Creation of 
Molinopampa and Tilacancha ACPs 
 In both of the two case study ACPs, Molinopampa and Tilacancha, the community 
leaders were approached by outside organizations with the idea of creating the private 
conservation areas. Both Tilacancha and Molinopampa were identified in the regional 
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conservation system plan (SICRE) and the region’s economic and ecological zoning plan (ZEE) 
as areas of conservation priority. Tilacancha was identified as an important area to protect its 
watershed and water resources for the Region’s capital, Chachapoyas, and Molinopampa for its 
unique palm forest that contributes to the region’s special biodiversity.  
Tilacancha 
 The organizations that started the ACP Tilacancha are the Chachpoyas provincial 
municipality and APECO, the latter formally contracted by the provincial municipality through 
an open-bid procurement. APECO was contracted to write a technical report to assess the 
ecological and social elements of the Tilacancha watershed territories, and justify the need to 
conserve the territory via the MINAM legislation for legal recognition of ACPs. The 
Chachapoyas municipality was concerned about the provision of water resources from 
Tilacancha for current and future downstream water users in Chachapoyas. Their concern 
stemmed from the growing pressure of community members’ agricultural and livestock practices 
on the area in and immediately surrounding the watershed. The community members mostly 
practiced slash-and-burn field preparation. A livelihood shift from using swidden to produce 
their subsistence is occurring towards cattle production. The historic practice of crop rotation and 
leaving lands fallow for long periods has been abandoned, and burned land is now permanently 
converted to pasture land with no fallow period. Grazing areas were located in the area that was 
identified to create the ACP. Regional scientists identified overgrazing, soil compacting, and 
waterway pollution in the area as a result of livestock grazing. The intentional planting of non-
native tree species (particularly pine and eucalyptus) was also identified by the scientist as a 
negative disturbance to the watershed.  
 As described previously, the region Amazonas has been experiencing rapid economic 
growth and human in-migration in response to highway construction in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
highway connected the region to the coast and the Amazon basin, and increased trade and 
integrated the Chachapoyas region into the regional economy. The need for water in the 
provincial capital Chachapoyas from the Tilacancha watershed is increasing, and there is worry 
in the region over the future of the watershed to provide sufficient water resources for the 
capital’s growing population and economy. This makes the protection of the Tilacancha 
watershed a priority in the region and forming the ACP is a key motivation for the NGO APECO 
as well as the regional and provincial governments.  
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 APECO has aided in the creation of other ACPs in the region to protect private land 
from mining or other potential extractive threats and this could be a concern in Tilacancha in the 
future. As noted by the APECO employee, 
An ACP makes it more complicated for a mine to enter, since a study has been completed 
that is recognized by the government on the ecological, cultural, and archeological 
importance of the area. 
As discussed in the literature review, mining agreements on campesino lands are signed at the 
national level without checking land ownership or consulting landowners. Despite the law for 
prior consent with communities, mining agreements affecting campesino communities are often 
passed without their prior consent. Developing ACPs means campesino titled lands will have 
state recognition as conservation areas and complicates the entrance of a mine. Although 
opposition to potential mining was not brought up by APECO specifically for Tilacancha, the 
technical studies for the ACP Tilacancha acknowledge that there are eight mining concessions 
near the ACP Tilacancha, three in Levanto and five in Maino. The mines were concessioned by 
the national government in 2007 to Votorantim Metais, a Brazilian owned company. Currently 
there is no evidence of mining exploration, activity, or planning. But mining poses an 
unpredictable threat to the Tilacancha area, and was a topic frequently discussed by regional 
conservation agencies. As presented in Chapter 3, the history of mining and land struggles 
concerning mining concessions is highly political and contentious in the region. Mining poses a 
threat to the socio-economic and environmental well-being of Tilacancha and surrounding areas, 
so regional leaders consider it in their decision making.  
 APECO also pursued social outcomes of the ACP, notably increasing education and 
awareness building on the importance of protecting the Tilacancha watershed among the 
Chachapoyas, Levanto, and Maino populations. APECO, the regional government, and the 
provincial government all agreed that there was also a mission towards better sustaining the 
livelihoods of the community members in Levanto and Maino. The provincial municipality and 
APECO expressed the motivation to create a broad awareness of the ecosystem services the ACP 
Tilacancha provides to the regional capital and the significance of its “conservation”. Along with 
the creation of the ACP, APECO and other regional entities began working on preparing a 
payment mechanism to compensate the communities Levanto and Maino for their conservation 
opportunity costs. The planned payments would be used in “sustainable” development projects. 
APECO’s motivation was to work with the communities in a participatory collaboration where 
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community members would participate in developing and implementing the management plan, 
and especially in identifying their respective community needs and goals for the ACP. The funds 
for the payment scheme would be used to help the communities complete their goals and offset 
costs, while ideally increasing their livelihoods and productive activities in areas outside of the 
ACP.  
 In summary, pursuing the ACP Tilacancha was largely a response to the threats raised 
by increased grazing and agricultural on the area by community. These activities were viewed by 
regional conservation agents as key drivers of forest conversion and diminishing water in the 
Tilacancha basin. The possibility for mining in the area also introduces an extreme threat to the 
health of the watershed. Since the watershed provides the water for a growing regional capital, 
the disturbances were seen as a large threat to the future of the region’s water security. The ACP 
management plan is intended to address these concerns, educate the community members in the 
Tilacancha area and water users on the significance of managing the area, and seek development 
opportunities for the communities of Levanto and Maino. Importantly, developing the ACP 
provided an opportunity for collaboration to achieve sustainable development in Levanto and 
Maino and sustainable water access for Chachapoyas.  
Molinopampa 
 The efforts to create an ACP in Molinopampa were initiated by the international non-
profit organization Nature and Culture International (NCI). Their regional office is in 
Chachapoyas and, during the creation of the ACP Molinopampa, they worked in partnership with 
the Peruvian government Institute for the Investigation of the Peruvian Amazon (IIAP). NCI was 
founded in the U.S. with a mission and strategy “that puts local communities at the center of its 
efforts to support the establishment and expansion of protected areas in Latin America” (Butler, 
2015, para.2). NCI currently works in Peru, Ecuador, and Mexico. NCI’s website states that they 
have an “ambitious plan to create 20 million acres of protected areas by 2020.” To accomplish its 
goal, the organization plans to expand to new regions in current countries and establish offices in 
Bolivia, Columbia, and Brazil. The organization’s website states, “we can protect land for as 
little as $5 a hectare” (Nature and Culture International, 2015). The legal recognition of private 
protected areas in Peru is a tool being used by NCI to create new protected areas, and by working 
with private and communally-titled land holders, NCI aims to participate with land holders to 
create private protected areas. NCI seeks ‘win-win’ solutions that embrace economic growth and 
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conservation, and believes the strategy of developing private conservation areas is an effective 
mechanism for realizing this approach to conservation. 
 In line with the organization’s goal for expanding private conservation areas, during 
my interview with an NCI employee they showed me a large map on the wall, demonstrating 
their recent expansion.  They pointed to communities with “large land holdings” where they are 
working to create new ACPs, reciting how many hectares each contained. The respondent at NCI 
described the organization’s motivation for creating ACPs as multifaceted with the most 
important factor being community empowerment.  He views the ACPs as a way to increase 
community capacity in land management, secure their legal rights as land owners, and obtain 
funding to improve their agricultural production, all while conserving the environment. In 
explaining the empowerment of communities through private conservation areas, this respondent 
also emphasized that they are “helping property owners understand the value of their ecosystems” 
and “empowering them to know what they have, so they know how to negotiate”. To explain this 
further, he used mining as an example:   
We are in an area with possibility for mining and gas, the communities need to 
know how to negotiate. If a politician comes and wants to start extraction in the 
contract they have to be responsible in their social responsibility. They can’t just 
give gifts and food. A community leader needs to know how to negotiate, if not the 
extractors will come and give something small and the people will be left poorer, 
without productive land. 
The respondent at NCI explained that communities need to know the value of their land, and 
through this knowledge they are empowered to negotiate and stand up for their land rights. In 
this way ACPs are viewed as a way for communities to control their land against the entrance of 
resource extraction projects introduced by the state in partnership with extraction companies.  
 The regional respondent at NCI also exemplified the organization’s method of 
providing the communities with productive projects. The organization focuses on projects such 
as bee keeping, fruit production, shade grown coffee and chocolate, and ecotourism. The belief is 
that these projects can provide sustainable income and compensate the communities for their 
conservation efforts, which sometimes require reducing timber extraction, or other activities that 
reduce forest cover, such as the expansion of agriculture and grazing land. The respondent at 
NCI stressed the need for human benefits from conservation:  
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 We want to look at each area and look at what eco-negotiations and activities can 
be implemented in each. In all the areas we have to look at what people can do to 
create an income. Otherwise the people will say ‘we can’t cut, so what work can 
we do here? This is the idea, but there is not an exact recipe. 
NCI assisted with the economic and ecological zoning (ZEE) study in the area. When identifying 
areas to implement conservation efforts they use the plan to look at what economic activities 
they think would be best for the different conservation areas and, after the declaration of the 
ACP, work with the communities to capture international and national funds to implement these 
economic generating activities. 
 IIAP, who also one of the leading organizations in the planning and implementation of 
the Amazonas regions ZEE management plan, also helped with the creation of the ACP 
Molinopampa. IIAP identified Molinopampa to be an area of biological importance in the region 
because of the special palm ecosystem, which is “the only one of its kind in the world.” IIAP 
identified the two major threats to Molinopampa as the increasing invasion and selling of lands 
to migrants and the conversion of forested lands to pasture. The declaration of the ACP was seen 
by them as a way for IIAP and NCI to improve pasture management, stop further land trafficking, 
and introduce alternative livelihood activities. The main livelihood activity they promoted for the 
area was ecotourism, and was seen by them as a way to provide the community with an income 
while reducing the need to expand agriculture and grazing. They hoped that the development of 
ecotourism enterprises would reduce current pressures on the forest.  
Seed funding for the Legal Documentation of the ACPs  
 The Peruvian non-profit Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental (SPDA) was 
involved in the creation of the Molinopampa and Tilacancha ACPs, and was especially important 
for developing the legal and institutional frameworks bolstering private land reserves in Peru. 
SPDA has an office in the region Amazonas, and has provided funding and legal help the ACPs 
in the region. SPDA’s motivation for creating the ACPs in the Amazonas region is to help 
advertise the work that communities and private land owners are doing that contributes to the 
conservation of the country. A respondent from SPDA described the recognition as an ACP as an 
incentive for those who own land in important ecosystems to protect their lands:  
Sometimes communities want to create an ACP because they have been 
conserving their land for a long time. The initiative is up to the community 
leaders. The people in the communities themselves realize that it is important to 
protect their forests. They themselves notice changes; that they are lacking water, 
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their soils have problems, and they need to protect their forests so their problem 
isn’t heightened. The ACP is good for the communities in that it provides the 
documentation and recognitions from the state for the work that they are doing as 
a community. 
The SPDA respondent also mentioned that the recognition by the ministry of environment “helps 
the private land owners realize their land is important and can help them to receive funding for 
managing their areas”. As a legal environmental organization, promoting conservation through 
legally protected areas has been an important objective of SPDA. They work with the Peruvian 
government to design and implement guidelines to improve the legality and management of 
protected areas. SPDA created an online platform, Conservamos por Naturaleza, that promotes 
the ACPs, and through the campaign seeks partnerships and donations to contribute to the 
creation and management of the areas.  
The Use of the Regional Conservation Plans in Identifying and Creating the ACPs 
All of those interviewed for insights at the regional level explained their use of the 
Ecological and Economical zoning plan (ZEE) or the regional conservation system plan (SICRE) 
to identify areas for implementing conservation. The organizations then look at the mosaic of 
different types of land ownership and apply legal options for conservation in the areas depending 
on the type of ownership. Promoting conservation through the creation of legal protected areas is 
the main objective of most of the conservation agents in the region. On private and campesino 
community titled land, the option to create protected areas is through the legally documented 
private conservation areas. In the case of the ACPs Tilacancha and Molinopampa, the regional 
plans identified the lands as conservation priorities, and the communities that owned the land 
were approached to talk about the creation of an ACP in the area. A respondent at APECO 
explained how they approach the communities to create ACPs: 
Once the areas were identified by SICRE we viewed if they are on state, or 
private, or communal land. Then we talked to the communities that own the areas 
in a participative manner to view the possible forms of conservation. ACPs are 
voluntary, they have to be born in the community. You can’t just go there and say 
you have to create a conservation area in their land, you have to work together. 
 
The employee at NCI also shared their land ownership maps which display the different types of 
legal protected area statuses they were applying in the different areas targeted by ZEE for 
creating protected areas. The map denoted areas with legally documented mining concessions 
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and the respondent said that you have to work around the areas with concessions, which made 
conserving large areas difficult. The NCI employee explained:  
The idea is the following, (pointing to a map) this is an ACP, and here we can 
implement a conservation concession, and here can be an ecotourism concession, 
and on this land you can create a municipal conservation area. Then we see what 
products they can sell that are produced in the area, like cacao, café, ecotourism, 
and then we create associations or committees in the area, so they can better their 
production and sales.  
 
Sometime the conservation organizations in the region use the ZEE and SICRE plans to 
create management plans for the ACPs, exploring what economic opportunity the ZEE plan 
identified as suitable for the area. For instance, the ZEE plan identified the following economic 
activities for Molinopampa: tourism, conservation, investigation, and reforestation. It also stated 
that there should be use, but with restrictions for the following activities: cattle, non-timber forest 
products, managed timber extractions, agroforestry, fish farming, and silvopasture. These 
restricted uses and suggested uses are mirrored in management plan for the ACP Molinopampa.  
The recent regional planning efforts ZEE and SICRE played a large role for the 
conservation organizations in deciding what areas of the region are being chosen to conserve, 
what they are being conserved from, and what actions and economic activities will be 
implemented in the areas.  
Motivation of Campesino Communities in the Creation of the ACPs Tilacancha and 
Molinopampa   
As previously stated, in both the ACP Tilacancha and Molinopampa, the goal to create an 
ACP was initially introduced by outside, regional organizations. Interviews with community 
leaders revealed that in both of the case study ACPs, community members were not initially 
open to the idea of creating an ACP because they feared losing community and individual 
control over land use decisions. A community leader in Tilacancha who worked with APECO in 
creating the ACP explained the reasoning for the creation of the ACP in this area and the initial 
concern over land control in the following way: 
Because of the goals of APECO, they started the initiative, to protect the water, to 
protect against drought…..At first the people thought that it was going to take away 
their land. At first they (the other community members) insulted me. They didn’t want 
the ACP.  
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Another informant in Tilacancha also noted distrust of outsiders and fear of losing their land: 
 
At first there was distrust, we thought that our land would be taken away after we 
declared it an ACP, but after we participated in more meetings learned more we gained 
trust in them (the NGOs) [R88-Tilacancha] 
This concern was repeated by many in Molinopampa whom I interviewed. A community leader 
in Molinopampa stated: 
At first the community members thought that you weren’t going to be able to touch the 
forests, and they were scared of creating an ACP. 
Eventually the idea to create the ACPs gained enough local support to pass the two-thirds 
majority vote in the communities required for the legal recognition as an ACP.  Below I first 
discuss the expected benefits for Molinopampa and Tilacancha ACPs as reported by households, 
and then I will discuss in detail what I interpret as their key three motivations: (1) to increase 
local economic development through state and NGO aid, (2) to protect the integrity of the areas 
ecological system for current and future use, and (3) to strengthen community control over land 
and resources. Below I further explain each of the three themes. 
Molinopampa 
 In Molinopampa, 89% (n=41) of households surveyed, who knew the ACP existed and 
were present during the creation of the ACP expected to receive benefits, whereas 11% (n=5) 
said that they did not expect to receive any benefits. Table 6 presents the household patterns on 
their expected benefits from creating ACPs. As shown in figure 6, the most common expected 
benefit was that the community would receive help from state entities and non-governmental 
organizations. Many of the households expected that the aid would come to the community in the 
form of direct payments. Other forms of expected help from outside entities included 
reforestation projects, tourism, and projects in improving pasture management. They also listed 
protecting the environment and protecting the water as expected benefits to their household. 
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Table 6. Household Expected Benefits from the Creation of the Molinopampa ACP* 
(in percents).  
 
*The graph refers to the frequency of expected benefits raised by households. Some households listed more than one 
benefit, and for this reason the results do not equal 100%. 
 
Tilacancha: 
In Tilacancha 76% (n=47) of the households surveyed responded that they expected to receive 
benefits from the ACP, and 24% (n=15) said that they did not expect to receive benefits. As in 
Molinopampa, the most common expected benefit was that the community would receive help 
from the state and non-governmental entities, but few households in Tilacancha believed that 
they would receive direct payments for their conservation efforts. The majority of the households 
understood that the aid would come in the form of projects, such as to improve pasture 
management and reforestation projects with paid labor. The respondents in Tilacancha also listed 
protecting the environment and water as expected benefits to their household. Protecting the 
water was a more common response in Tilacancha, likely since the motivation to conserve the 
area was presented to protect the water for Chachapoyas as well as for the community. The 
results are shown below in Table 7. 
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Figure 7. Household Expected Benefits from the Creation of the Tilacancha ACP (in percents) * 
 
* The graph refers to the frequency of expected benefits raised by households. Some households listed more than 
one benefit, and for this reason the results do not equal 100%. 
 
Motivations of Households for Creating the ACP 
The three main reasons for resident households to create ACPs were: (1) to increase local 
economic development through state and NGO aid, (2) to protect the integrity of the areas 
ecological system for current and future use, and (3) to strengthen community control over land 
and resources. I explain each of the three themes below. 
Increasing Local Economic Development through State and NGO Aid: 
The promise of development projects that would improve livelihoods and increase 
household incomes led many community leaders and households in both areas to support the 
creation of an ACP on community land. In Tilacancha the community members were aware that 
the designation of the area would benefit the city of Chachapoyas with the provision of water 
including a payment for ecosystem services being developed for the downstream water users in 
Chachapoyas to pay the upstream communities in Tilacancha. In Tilacancha the households 
understood that this money would come in the form of projects, but they expected projects and 
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capacity building that would increase their livelihoods and improve their farming techniques. 
One household stated:  
We accepted because they said we would receive capacitation in changing our form of 
planting, to learn with engineers, to learn new techniques to our production and better our 
soil. We were never told we would be given money. [R75-Tilacancha] 
Another household in Tilacancha explained 
They (the NGOs) spoke of benefits: economic benefits, cows, pasture 
management, and using better techniques in the lower areas outside of the ACP, 
since we can’t use the area near the water source. [R99-Tilacancha] 
Although some households mentioned reforestation as a benefit, there was the expectation that 
the reforestation projects would provide paid labor, as explained in the following statement: 
They (APECO) always said they are going to raise the price of water in 
Chachapoyas and that the money will benefit us, with projects that pay to reforest, 
and that the work will be paid labor [R104-Tilacancha] 
These example show that in both areas there was a clear expectation that the creation of an ACP 
would bring economic opportunities to the community. 
  In Molinopampa the management plan for the ACP focused on developing alternative 
livelihoods, mainly ecotourism and reforestation projects. The projects were presented as means 
for the community members to increase their household income. One household in Molinopampa 
explained it in the following way: 
The community members said they were in agreement with the ACP because the 
NGOs said that there were other communities with ACPs that benefit alot with 
tourism and activities, with this information we were in favor of the ACP. We 
were told that when we protect the forest and have an ACP we would receive 
more help from the state and from NGOs for projects. We were told that tourists 
would come and we could sell food and our products. They flirted with us, they 
gave us the illusion that we would receive benefits. [R1-Molinopampa]  
In contrast to Tilacancha, where the expectation was to reduce impact on the land within the 
ACP, but improve existing livelihood practices outside of the ACP, in Molinopampa the 
expectation was to halt expansion of local agriculture and pasture land in exchange for more 
“sustainable” income generating activities, such as ecotourism and reforestation with local fruit 
trees. In Molinopampa all of the three included communities' land is within the ACP, so all of the 
households have properties within the ACP, and the land is productive. The alternative 
livelihoods were presented as promising high income generating activities that would allow the 
community members to stop clearing new areas of forest for current productive activities. In 
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Molinopampa many of the households surveyed were under the impression that they would 
receive direct payments for protecting areas of the forest. For example, one household surveyed 
stated: 
They (the outside entities) said that those that have palms on their land were going 
to receive money to conserve. [R53-Molinopampa]   
Another respondent recalled: 
There was talk that money would be given for the conservation area. The engineers 
said with time we would receive money if we keep reforesting, but it is always good 
to reforest. In the future if we aren’t given money, we can sell a part of the wood 
that we planted. [R62-Molinpamapa]  
 
In sum, there was agreement in both of the sample ACPs that community members should be 
assisted with income generating activities.  
Protecting Ecological Systems  
Individuals interviewed in the two case ACPs also expressed the desire to protect their 
local ecological systems for current and future use. They said that environmental protection was 
an expected benefit and identified management activities to limit the degradation of soil, water, 
and plant and animal life. A common theme they raised in the interviews was the need for local 
residents to engage in efforts to offset growing problems resulting from local climate changes 
and soil degradation arising from forest destruction in the area, especially from intensive 
commercial forest extraction earlier. Tilacancha depleted nearly all of their lowland forest for 
timber sales. One individual in Tilacancha explained the historical land changes in the landscape 
and livelihoods in the following way: 
Before everything here was forest, before the community sold lumber, to 
Chachapoyas, it was brought down on horses, after it was changed to agricultural 
land, but before there wasn’t much agriculture here. [R98-Tilacancha] 
 
  Forests were also cleared in Molinopampa during this period. One leader in 
Molinopampa explained that there is no longer valuable timber near the road. Forty years ago 
there were more than 30,000 hectares of palm forest that covered the district of Molinopampa, 
but timber extraction combined with in-migration has led to the forest currently being a third of 
its 1970’s size (Conservamos Por Naturaleza, 2015). Timber companies paid local communities 
very little for this timber, mostly just for workers’ labor and not for the actual timber. One 
community member in Molinopampa explained that initially the outside timber companies 
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exchanged the timber for cans of tuna. The increased traffic into the region and improved road 
systems has led in both districts to be more integrated into the market system, and now when 
they do sell timber they receive wages. In Molinopampa a community leader explained: 
There are other types of work now, there is paid farm labor, construction work, and 
increased transportation allows for the direct sale of more products, cows and 
timber. There is more paid labor now. 
In both Tilacancha and Molinopampa there has been a shift from subsistence agriculture 
towards raising cattle both for home consumption and sale of milk. Some households explained 
that the clearing of forest for timber and pasture land has led to local climate changes, water 
scarcity, and the shortage of wood for local construction and fuel for cooking. They saw the 
creation of the ACP as aiding the community in managing their resources for future use through 
learning new farming techniques. One household in Molinopampa described the resource 
shortage:  
The people are noticing that we are going to run out of resources, or we are 
running out, so there is a need for less cutting of trees [R60-Molinopampa] 
 
Some long-term residents also recognized that the deforestation had impacted their agricultural 
soil: 
 
Before the soil was more fertile, where we destroyed the forest the soil is more 
acidic, with reforestation the soil is becoming better again [R63-Molinopampa] 
Another household in Molinopampa explained the ACP was viewed as important to protect 
water:  
We wanted the ACP to maintain the water, it’s important for the water, for the 
changes in climate, right now climate change is strong, we need to conserve 
because we still have water, which is the most important thing for life [R15 
Molinopampa] 
 
Protecting water sources was also brought up by several migrants to Molinopampa as well.  They 
left the region Cajamarca because it lacked fertile land and water due to environmental 
destruction from mining and land pressure from growing population. One migrant leader in 
Molinopampa stated: 
In Cajamarca we had the problem of drought, we know that it is important to 
conserve. We all remember why we came to live here. We have to protect the 
forest so the same thing doesn’t happen here.  
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In Tilacancha ensuring water provision for future use was a common theme. A household 
exemplified this in the following way: 
The ACP was created to protect the water source, if we do not conserve with time  
we won’t have water, it’s really important that everyone participates to conserve, 
to have water in the future [R81-Tilacancha] 
A leader in Tilacancha reinforced the role of ACP for forest protection: 
We now see it is important to conserve our forests, before we destroyed a lot 
without knowing the damage we were doing, now the little that we have we want 
to conserve. To reforest is not the same to have what used to be there. There are 
no longer the animals and birds there used to be. The Puma, the condor, the bear, 
we used to see them close to the community. Now we know that when we destroy 
we do damage, we made the animals run. 
In sum, there was a strong motivation in both cases for creating the ACP as a way to protect 
ecological systems, and especially to gain assistance to managing their land use to offset growing 
problems resulting from past and current land use.  
Strengthening Local Control Over Community Land and Resources 
The importance of strengthening and formalizing land and resource tenure through 
governmental recognition was also viewed as important by households surveyed in both 
Tilacancha and Molinopampa ACPs. This topic was brought up in interviews with all community 
leaders as well. The communities in Tilacancha are concerned to organize themselves against the 
threat of mining; in Molinopampa they sought to control the large influx of immigration to the 
area which has involved the illegal sale of communal lands. As previously mentioned, there are 
mining concessions in the districts Maino and Levanto within the Tilacancha ACP. The resident 
communities are opposed to the mining and have signed a document stating that they do not want 
mining to enter their area. One leader explained that the ACP was attractive to them as a means 
to protect the community’s land from mining:  
The goal is to conserve the water, and mining would impact the water, which 
impacts Chachapoyas, and us. Mining can be good for income, but our town is 
small, and we live off of agriculture. With mining you cannot have agriculture, and 
in the ACP you cannot have mining. 
As seen in the motivations of the regional entities, ACPs are being presented by external 
supporters as a way for communities to organize themselves and be better prepared to negotiate 
with mining or extraction industries. Some leaders in Levanto saw the ACP as a way to gain 
outside support in legitimizing the community’s decision to not allow mining activity.  
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The household survey in Molinopampa also found strong emphasis that creating the ACP 
was a way to increase control over their communal land. Originally, when migrant families 
entered the community they bought property from long-term residents. Now many migrants 
come and buy land from other migrants, but without documentation and without registering the 
land transaction with the community president. The dividing and selling of land into smaller 
parcels has led to an increased pressure on the forest and local resources as more families enter 
the community and use land for pasture and agriculture. Residents placed considerable blame on 
migrants for local forest destruction. One leader in Molinopampa explained the goal of the ACP 
to:  
Protect the forest, the flora, and the fauna, and the palms. To protect the forest 
from the destruction by the migrants.  
One household also stated that “the migrants are destructive, they keep cutting, there aren’t trout 
in the river anymore, and there isn’t consciousness among them” [R-13-Molinopampa]. Another 
household claimed that “they (migrants) keep cutting and do not plant new when they cut down 
trees” [R-29 Molinopampa].  
In sum, long-term residents as well as community leaders in both sample sites viewed 
creating the ACP as a way to gain legal recognition of their communal land rights, to better 
organize their land use and to stop further undocumented land transactions. Importantly, as part 
of the ACP creation it became illegal to buy and sell land within the forest.  
Section 2: Community Participation in the Planning and Creation of Tilacancha and 
Molinopampa ACPs 
In both the Tilacancha and Molinopampa ACPs, communal assemblies were used as a 
forum for NGOs and government agencies to engage with the resident communities. As 
previously explained, in order to legally recognize an ACP on campesino titled community land 
there has to be a two-thirds majority vote in favor of the creation of the ACP. The community 
voting takes place during community assemblies which are obligatory for residents to attend. 
Community assemblies occur often in these communities, at least once every few months if not 
more frequently. Every household is expected to have at least one member registered as part of 
the communal land holding community, usually a senior male. Households are fined if they do 
not have a household representative at the assemblies. The assemblies are meetings to discuss 
issues, concerns, and requests among community members and others from the outside, and are 
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the main forum for the community members to meet and make decisions on community issues. 
Although in both Molinopampa and Tilacancha community members voted in favor of the ACP, 
the community engagement process and the communities’ understandings and perceptions about 
how the ACPs actually got started were very different between the two case study sites. Below I 
explain the different histories of the creation of Tilacancha and Molinopampa ACPs, and how 
this has led to different patterns of community participation. 
ACP Tilacancha 
 In 2008 a group of regional government agencies and NGOs began meeting to discuss 
potential and real threats to the ecological integrity of the Tilacancha watershed, especially how 
further degradation would impact residents in the Levanto and Maino districts and provision of 
water services to the provincial and regional capital, Chachapoyas. The group became known as 
the Grupo Tecnico Tilcicancha (GTT). Those involved in the GTT include domestic and 
international NGOs, the water utility company that supplies Chachapoyas with water from 
Tilacancha, Levanto and Maino district authorities, and representatives of the Levanto and 
Maino campesino communities. The communities of Maino and Levanto voted for GTT 
community representatives during an assembly. The role of the GTT was to share information, 
coordinate activities, and inform decision-making to protect watershed’s services. After the GTT 
was formed, the provincial government became interested in establishing environmental 
protected status on Tilacancha’s pajonales (high altitude grasslands), remnant forests, and water 
bodies. Citing the shared interest of the local communities of Levanto and Maino, the 
Chachapoyas municipality, the regional Amazonas government, and NGOs to protect the area, 
the Chachapoyas government issued an open procurement request for proposals for an 
organization to conduct a technical study, which is the first data gathering assessment to create 
an ACP. APECO won the contract to investigate the idea with Levanto and Maino, bringing 
them into the process through a series of meetings and workshops. The technical study was 
performed by biologists and mapping specialists, and included socioeconomic data from 
household surveys. Following its completion, APECO played a key organizing and facilitating 
role in the communities’ development of a master plan. The informant at APECO explains the 
importance of community participation in the design of the master plan: 
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The master plans are made by the community members, but sometimes they need 
help in elaborating the plans. In Tilacancha we had six workshops in Maino and six 
workshops in Levanto with all community members. It was an important 
participation for the community to determine their interests in the ACP, the zoning, 
the management plans, their vision for the area, and their compromises of what they 
will and will not do in the ACP. The process of working with the community was 
so important, because it was a participative process.  
The master plan explicitly includes the mission statement, visions, and conservation 
compromises of Maino and Levanto that were agreed upon during the six planning workshops in 
each of the communities. The mayor of Maino remembers the process as follows:  
The master plan was made by APECO with the community during community 
assemblies, with the participation of the community members. A group was also 
made with 20 community members that helped creating the plan. The community 
elected this group and the work was done well. 
One individual also agreed that the community participated in creating the vision for the ACP: 
There were a lot of meetings to form Tilacancha, also assemblies. When the master 
plan was made everyone created the vision. [R65-Tilacancha] 
The master plan clearly delineates different use zones, using local descriptions and landmarks. 
The ACP Tilacancha is in located in the highlands of Maino and Levanto and includes 54% of 
the land in the campesino community Maino and 50% of the land in the campesino community 
Levanto (APECO, 2011). In Levanto the land included in the ACP is mostly communal land 
with the exception of two community members with land holdings within the ACP, and land 
described as not suitable for pasture or agriculture. In Maino the land within the ACP is a mix of 
communal land and land with property owners. A community leader in Maino affirmed that there 
are 43 families that own land within the ACP used for pasture and agriculture. The families who 
own land in the ACP were informed of ACP land use rules and that their land is included in the 
ACP.  
In creating the master plan in Levanto and Maino, community members guided by 
APECO outlined their commitments for things they will “do and not do” in limited use and 
multi-use zones. The ACP’s limited use zone includes areas that have not yet been developed for 
agriculture or pasture. In this zone it is prohibited to graze cattle or create new farm areas. The 
multiple use zone have been developed for agriculture and pasture land. The latter also includes a 
reforestation project involving planting exotic pine trees where no agriculture and pasture land 
can be developed. Both communities committed to not burning the high altitude grass land or 
clearing forests in either the limited or multiple use zones. The commitments also do not extend 
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reforestation of the exotic pine trees into the limited use zone, but encourages reforestation of 
native species. In both communities the “vision” for the ACP includes projects to introduce new 
technologies and improve the pasture land that already exists in the multiple use zone and 
outside of the ACP. The plan also calls for realizing other potential economic activities such as 
creating irrigation canals, tourism, and establishing a reciprocal water agreement to receive 
compensation from water users in Chachpoyas for their protection of the ACP.  
The activities that are allowed and prohibited in each zone are well defined and were 
agreed upon with the elected community members included in the GTT; they were later 
presented in a community assembly for community input. APECO took a major role in 
facilitating the development of the master plan, but comments from leaders and community 
members indicated that APECO’s staff was and is still actively present in various aspects of the 
communities, including school activities, meetings, technical support, and projects.   
ACP Molinopampa 
In Molinopampa the idea to create the ACP was introduced to the community by NCI 
along with the former community president, who works for IIAP. IIAP in collaboration with NCI 
created the technical study of the area, which included a study of the flora and fauna, maps 
created with GIS to determine the zoning and ACP boundaries, and a socio-economic study of 
the area. The respondent at NCI explained the use and role of “specialists” in completing the 
technical studies for ACP as follows: 
 The specialists help in making maps, to help with the location of the ACP. We look at 
where to conserve, where the forests are, where the water sources are, what areas 
have been reforested, and what areas have been burned. We use this data to make a 
good zoning plan. At NCI we have specialist that help with that. We use biologists to 
complete biological inventories and to look for indicator species to tell us if the area 
is in good health or bad health, species that are sensitive to climate change. We (NCI) 
use education and capacitation to include the local population. We do economic 
studies. It is important, for example, to know the value of the forests, the value of the 
sources of water, the value of the crops that the people have. To look at how much 
should be conserved.  
 
In Molinopampa there was not a technical group that included community members in creating 
the technical study or the master plan. I spoke with two families who said they served as guides 
when the specialists went into the forest, but they said very few community members went out 
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with the specialists. Education on creating and managing the conservation area was the main 
form of community inclusion and was infrequent. The current community president recalled:  
When they (IIAP and NCI) were forming the ACP there were not many meetings. 
There were not meetings in the community, in their offices yes, but in the 
community no.  
Another community leader in Molinopampa stated: “only the offices made the documents.” 
Many of the households surveyed were unaware that a management plan existed. The households 
surveyed that knew of the masters plan’s existence were only able to list the past community 
president when asked who from the community played a role in creating the master plan for the 
ACP. The idea to declare the area an ACP was presented at community assemblies and most 
households who attended the assemblies stated there was only one or two assemblies where the 
creation of the ACP was discussed. Importantly, the assemblies took place in the district capital, 
Molinopampa proper, but the ACP spans the land of three annex communities, which involve a 
45 minute drive from the district capital. One community member who is very involved in the 
community, and who had the biologist staying at her house during the technical studies and 
attended the assemblies, does not remember the master plan being presented to the community. 
She had been invited to a meeting to create an ACP in a neighboring district and noted that in the 
other district the community had been made more aware of the master plan: 
In another ACP nearby the NGOs had a reunion and read the management plan to 
the community, in front of all the people. The people gave their opinions. Here 
the management plan was never presented for the community to give their 
opinions….. The people here did not read the management plan. We do not know 
where it was made, likely by IIAP and NCI [R1-Molinopampa] 
There was no indication that the master plan was presented to the Molinopampa community, or 
that there was opportunity for community members to provide opinions or suggest changes to the 
plan. The residents who attended the community assemblies said that the ACP was explained by 
the community president at the time together with representatives from IIAP and NCI, and that 
there was a vote.  
In Molinopampa recent migrants are not invited to the community assemblies that 
introduced the idea to create the ACP and hence were unable to participate in the voting. New 
community members must register with the community president and live in the community for 
five years to become an official community member (comunero). Although all community 
members can attend assemblies and provide input, only official registered ones who have been in 
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the community for five years are allowed to vote. Many migrants bought their land less than five 
years before the creation of the ACP, and therefore were not included in the decision making 
process. One community leader who is a migrant explained: 
When we bought our land the ACP was not created yet. We were confused when 
the ACP was created. During this time there was a lot of discrimination against 
migrants and we were not included in general assemblies.  
The ACP in Molinopampa includes all of the land of three of the communities within the district 
of Molinopampa, and these three communities have had a large amount of immigration in recent 
years. Increasing land invasion and selling of lands and the uncontrolled conversion of forest 
land into pasture land were described as the main threats to the area in the master plan (Guzman 
Castillo, Gil Perleche, & Oliva Valle, 2011). Despite the fact that the ACP included the land that 
the migrants recently bought, they were not allowed to participate in its creation. The current 
president of the community identified this as a major problem stating:  
The migrants were not consulted, and this created problems. The new people were 
not consulted and their land is within the limited use zones.  
The migrants were left out of the process, but were the community members who would be the 
most impacted by the creation of the ACP. The description of the zones in the master plan 
declares the limited use zone as areas where conserved forest is present and the multiple use zone 
as areas where agricultural development has already occurred. Many of the migrants bought land 
from long term residents that had not yet been cleared for agriculture, with the hopes to develop 
the land for pastures and subsistence crops. The conservation compromises for the limited use 
zone states: 
No direct use of resources is permitted: agriculture, ranching, hunting, fishing, 
cutting wood, and collection of forest materials. No other type of activity that 
alters the habitat or the structure of the biological communities in this zone are 
allowed. (Guzman Castillo, Gil Perleche, & Oliva Valle, 2011) 
The uses allowed in the limited use zone are monitoring, basic trails, and tourism activities. The 
master plan declared 70% of the ACP in the limited use zone and 30% in the multiple use zone. 
The multiple use zone was described as areas where there is already pasture land, agriculture, 
and allows for subsistence use of timber extraction only for building homes. The use rules state 
that in this zone it is permitted to use the farm land that has already been developed, but for 
subsistence use only and without any chemical fertilizers. The permitted activities again include 
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scientific investigation and tourism in addition to reforestation and improving pasture and 
agriculture land management to reduce pressure on the forest.  
Differences in Campesino Community Participation between the ACPs Tilacancha and 
Molinopampa 
 In the ACP Tilacancha, the formation of a technical group that includes community 
members voted for in a democratic manner allowed for a more transparent process in the creation 
of the management plan. The creation of the ACP Tilacancha took longer than in the ACP 
Molinopampa, but community members had more opportunity to participate and provide 
opinions on the ACP’s master plan. In Tilacancha, Levanto and Maino each had six communal 
assemblies over a period of time to create the ACP, in contrast to Molinopampa where there was 
only a couple meetings held in the district capital, a 45 minute drive from the communities 
whose land makes up the ACP. 
Although rapid migration into the Amazonas region from the norther sierra region 
Cajamarca has been observed to negatively affect the governance and management of natural 
resource systems in many regional districts, the districts in Tilacancha, Levanto and Maino, have 
not allowed the sale of lands by land holders to migrants from outside the community. Nearly 
100 percent of Levanto and Maino’s population identified maternal ancestry to their districts. It 
was explained that community members who are from other districts married a community 
member in Levanto or Maino. There was not discrimination in Tilacancha, at least not to the 
extent that occurred in Molinopampa.  
All of these factors contribute to the difference in the percentage of the households 
surveyed that participated in the assemblies in which ACPs were created. As shown in Table 8 
below, in Molinopampa only 46% (n=28) of households surveyed participated in the assemblies 
to create the ACP and in Tilacancha 90% (n=56) of households surveyed said they participated 
in the assemblies.  
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Table 8. Household Participation in Assemblies to Create the ACPs Tilicacancha and 
Molinpampa  (in percent) 
 
In Tilacancha the households that did not participate in the assemblies stated that it was because 
they were working in Chachapoyas during that time. It is common for families from Levanto or 
Maino to work in Chachpoyas for extended periods of time. In Molinopampa the majority of the 
non-participating households claimed they were not informed or invited to participate in the 
assemblies.  
Constraints to Collaboration in Creating ACPs 
 The study identified two major constraints to meaningful local community participation 
in the process to create ACPs. The first is the technical studies required to legally recognize the 
area, which are costly and require the use of outside experts. The second is the conflicting 
motivations of creating the ACPs. These conflicts occurred at all levels. Conflicting motivations 
between the outside agencies, the outside agencies and the communities, and within communities 
have impacted collaboration among all of the levels involved in the creation and management of 
the ACP. Each of these constraints is described in detail below.  
Requirement of Costly Technical Studies: 
 The legal recognition of ACPs requires outside funding and technical help from NGOs 
and governmental entities. The required funds are mostly provided by international donations. 
46% (n=28) 
90% (n=56) 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s 
 
Community 
Molinopampa
Tilicancha
82 
 
The Peruvian state presents the ACPs as part of a decentralization process and proudly promotes 
the ACPs as a form of public participation and contribution to the nation’s protected area system. 
However, the process of legally registering the private conservation areas is complicated, 
expensive, and slow. Interviews with regional offices revealed that the average cost of the initial 
registration of the community ACPs was $17,000 US dollars. Although the registration of the 
area opens up some doors for communities to participate in funding opportunities, the 
government currently does not provide any support for the private land owners establishing 
ACPs, on the contrary, they require compliance with the conservation compromises and 
additional annual reports.  
The high cost of the ACP is due to the specialized technical skills and studies required to 
create biological reports, maps, and formal management plans for the areas. The studies require 
GPS equipment, GIS mapping, biological inventories, and the writing of legal documents. The 
process to legally register the ACPs is lengthy and bureaucratic. The technical skills required to 
complete the studies makes the creation of an ACP inaccessible for local communities without 
the aid of NGOs. The process also requires quick turnarounds to complete the studies. An effect 
of the quick turnaround, the level of technical knowledge required, and the cost of the process is 
the exclusion of “non-experts” and dismissal of local knowledge in the area. In the ACPs 
Tilacancha and Molinopampa, none of the community members I surveyed were able to name 
community members who helped with the technical studies involved in the biological surveys of 
the area.  
Conflicting Motivations to Conserve  
Although in regional conservation meetings the topic of inter-institutional cooperation in 
the creation of ACPs is frequently discussed, it is contentious.  A root of the tension is conflict 
among those involved related to the cost and benefits each expects for creating the areas. The 
priorities for designating ACPs varied within and across the different levels involved in the 
creation of the ACPs  
There were differing expectations for ACPs as a conservation tool and this has caused 
tensions among the regional organizations. The respondent at the regional office for the 
organization that played a large role in developing the national legal framework for ACPs, 
Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental (SPDA) explained the differences in this way: 
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We do not use ACPs as an area to prevent other uses. Sometimes the institutions 
that are helping with the ACPs have the single goal of creating the areas. We help 
with the creation of the areas, but not with the vision of having more and more 
hectares. There are institutions that are financed from foreign countries, and their 
funding depends on how many hectares they conserve. Since communities are the 
private owners in the region that hold the largest areas of land, they sometimes 
give the idea to the community that if they conserve the area it will prevent mining, 
for one example. 
This statement suggests that some organization in the region is using ACPs in a way which 
contradicts SERNANP’s view of how ACPs should be used to protect biodiversity, and not to 
prevent extractive activities. It also introduces the idea that some institutions are not taking into 
account community rationales for creating ACPs, revealing the sentiment that in some cases the 
ACP’s are being used as a way for organizations to increase their scale in order to attract funding, 
rather than as a tool to empower and recognize local communities’ conservation efforts. Lastly, it 
supports that land tenure security is a major motivation for communities to engage in creating 
ACPs, and that some conservation organizations in the region are using the ACPs as a way for 
communities to prevent extractive industries from entering.  
SERNANP’s view is that in many cases the areas have been conserved long before they 
were recognized as ACPs through community conservation practices.  However this view was 
also challenged by regional entities, who identified activities of the campesinos as the major 
negative disturbance to conservation of the areas. In the case of the ACP Molinopampa the 
practices of the migrants were viewed by the outside organizations as incompatible with the local 
ecology, and the clearing of forested land to create new pasture land by migrants was recognized 
as incompatible with the conservation of the ACP. Migrants were identified as the main 
destroyers of the area. The activities of long-term residents were not particularly distinguished as 
aiding conservation, but since long-term residents had established productive areas there was less 
need to clear forested areas for new production. The ACPs Tilacancha and Molinopampa were 
viewed by the regional conservation organizations as a way to teach communities new and 
improved land management practices, and dismissing their local knowledge and land 
management practices. For example, when explaining the role of the organization in building 
local community capacity, the respondent at NCI stated:  
We help them understand how their forest is, what is the flora and fauna that 
existed years before and is slowly being lost. They say burning is a custom, 
because their great grandpas taught them. The campesinos say they are unaware 
of various things; the idea is to capacitate them. 
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 The respondent at APECO also expressed an inconsistency among actors’ visions for the 
ACPs exclaiming that “the outside entities need to act more in line with the needs and interests 
of the actual ACP communities”. There was the lack of trust and sense of competition among 
different entities, the state, and the local communities. This was explained by the informant at 
PROFANANPE in the following way: 
Sometimes there is more competition than collaboration even when there is a 
shared goal. This is a problem of confidence between the state and society, we are 
a country where there is a lack of confidence between the government and private 
owners 
Some of the disagreements have been so strong that they led to the end of partnerships 
between regional actors. For example, the creation of the ACP in Molinopampa was a 
collaborative effort between NCI and IIAP. After the ACP was created there were disagreements 
over the management of projects and funding in Molinopampa, and NCI and IIAP ended their 
collaboration, but both still work in the area in varying capacities. These disagreements have 
created confusion within the communities of the Molinopampa ACP, as different messages are 
being delivered and different projects enter by the varying agencies that work in the area.  
At the local level, as seen in Molinopampa, existing discrimination and community 
conflict largely influenced whose ideas were voiced in the creation of the ACP. The exclusion of 
community members by regional entities in creating the management plan for the ACP, and the 
community governing structure which left out around half of the community members in the 
voting to create the ACP, created conflicting views of the ACP when it was initiated.  
Differences in motivation for creating the ACP and the exclusion of groups in the 
decision making also impacted community knowledge of the ACPs and the outcomes of the 
implementation of the ACP in both Molinopampa and Tilacancha. Different community 
understandings of key concepts and issues were also impactful. These are discussed in the 
following sections.  
Section 3: Community Understandings, Knowledge and Practices and the ACPS 
Community Definition of “Conservation” 
 Despite the fact that the Tilacancha private conservation area had been legally recognized 
for four years and the Molinopampa ACP for two years at the time of this study, not all of the 
households surveyed or community leaders were familiar with the term “conservation”. Several 
community members in Tilacancha and Molinopampa explained that although they had heard the 
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word conservation, they are unfamiliar with the meaning of the term. However many others did 
have definitions of the term. Among the community members surveyed who provided a meaning 
of the term, the most recurrent definition is “ cuidar” or to take care of something; here referring 
to the environment which they often applied to a specific resource, most frequently to water and 
forests. As one household in Tilacancha phrased it: “Conservation is to take care of nature, the 
water, when we protect the forests we conserve the water” [R88-Tilacancha]. And, in 
Molinopampa, “Conservation is to take care of nature, the forest, the trees” [R41-Molinopampa].  
 In explaining their understanding of the term conservation several survey respondents 
link the term to subsistence, and to protecting resources now and for future use. They 
emphasized that protecting the environment sustains life and human activities. In most cases this 
was in reference to protecting the local environment in order to protect water and resources for 
their livelihood and human benefit more generally. An informant from Molinopampa gave a 
comprehensive response: 
Conservation is to protect the environment, the plants, to take care of and protect the 
water, which is the most important thing for life. [R41-Molinopampa] 
 
A respondent in Tilacancha stated:  
Conservation is to take care of what exists, to protect the forests and the water, when 
we protect the forest, we conserve the water, which is life. [R88-Tilacancha] 
 
Conserving for health and “pure air” was also another common response exemplified in the 
statement: 
Conservation is the source of health for us, for the animals, if there aren’t heathy 
soils there is not animals, like in Lima, where the birds do not sing. Here we have 
pure air. [R24-Molinopampa]  
 
Many community members also tied the term “conservation” with the importance of protection 
for future generations. For example, a household from Molinopampa explained: 
Conservation is to care for the forest to protect the birds, animals, and trees for future 
generations, so that my great grand kids are able to see it, if we do not protect the 
forest they aren’t going to know how it was here, how we worked. If we destroy our 
forest our great grandchildren won’t see the forest and they won’t have water. I 
learned this in the trainings. [R1-Molinpampa] 
 
Respondents also noted that their definitions were informed by NGO trainings on conservation 
practices in the ACP. They recognized the term as taking care of nature as defined by the ACP 
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management rules. The most common definition of conservation in reference to management and 
restrictions in both Tilacancha and Molinopampa was “no tocar” or “do not touch”. In 
Molinopampa, as seen in the following statement, this was often in reference to the forest: “Do 
not touch the trees, it is prohibited, so the forest doesn’t disappear” [R27-Molinpampa]. In 
Tilacancha conservation was referred to as not using the land in the ACP that surrounds the 
Tilacancha watershed illustrated in the following quotation: “do not destroy, do not do anything 
but guard an area” [R66-Tilacancha].  
Informants specified negative consequences of conservation for them because of ACPs 
approach to conservation based on restricting their resource use. In Molinopampa respondents 
were very concerned about the ACP rules prohibiting them from cutting cu trees to create new 
areas for farming. According to a community member in Molinopampa conservation is: “To take 
care of the environment, for a time when resources aren’t available, but sometimes out of 
necessity we need to use resources, we need to cut the trees to earn money, but we feel bad about 
it”[R29-Molinopampa]. In Tilacancha conservation was associated with restrictions placed on 
entering the land within the ACP, one community member defined conservation as: “a private 
area where people cannot enter, it is to protect the water source of Chachapoyas” [R100-
Tilacancha]. Importantly, respondents in the ACP did not connect the term “conservation” as 
including their traditional uses or activities. Only one informant in Tilacancha made an explicit 
reference to the ACP being new, and that his ancestors used conservation in the same way as the 
ACP. The informant stated, “Before the ACP, in the time of our ancestors they used Andean 
terraces. That is conservation” [R113]. Andean terraces are a practice that is now rarely used in 
Tilacancha, since the shift from subsistence agriculture towards commercial cattle ranching.  
In Molinopampa some community members were also confused over the word “private” 
in understanding the private conservation area. One community member expressed:  
It isn’t private, that means it is private land. Here the land belongs to the 
community. It belongs to the community, not a private owner. 
Community members in both Molinopampa and Tilacancha associate the word private with 
privatization, which as described later in the outcomes is viewed negatively by community 
members. Campesino communities are legally recognized in Peru as autonomous governing 
organizations with historical ties to their land and hold self-governing rights over their land, 
which is considered private land, not public. For this reason conservation areas on campesino 
titled land falls into the category of private conservation areas. This is confusing to community 
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members because communal land with individual access granted through the community 
governing system is not the same as “private”, but does confer partial rights to households to use 
lands and exclude others from their land holdings. The ACP was implemented for the whole 
community, and as seen in the outcomes section the use compromises do not pay particular 
attention to the separation of land amongst community members within the ACP.  
Knowledge of the ACP 
The difference in the communities’ participation creating the ACPs Tilacancha and 
Molinopampa is reflected in the community members’ variable knowledge of the ACP and 
especially in their zoning and resource use compromises. In Tilacancha 100% (n=62) of the 
households surveyed in both Levanto and Maino knew about the ACP. In Molinopampa 84% 
(n=53) of the households surveyed knew that the ACP existed whereas 16% (n=10) had no 
knowledge of the ACP. When taking into account immigration status in Molinopampa, 90% of 
the long-established campesinos knew of the ACP and only 78% of migrants.  
The knowledge of the ACP zoning and land use was also influenced by the amount of 
training and education the community received on managing the ACP. As shown below in Table 
9, in Molinopampa of those surveyed that knew the ACP exists 52% (n=27) said that the 
community received training on the management of natural resources within the ACP and 48% 
(n=25) said that there was no trainings on management of the ACP. In Tilacancha 95% (n=59) of 
the households surveyed said that the community received training on the management of natural 
resources within the ACP and only 5% (n=3) said that there was no training on management of 
the ACP.  In the ACP Tilacancha APECO has been very present at community assemblies and 
during the assemblies they provide education on the management of the ACP. As seen in the 
participation section, in the ACP Tilacancha 6 communal assemblies were held in each 
community to define the multiple and limited use zones and the use compromises for the 
respective zones. The community members in Molinopampa explained that there were no 
assemblies to explain the management of the ACP and that the ACP was only briefly explained 
at the few communal assemblies that presented the idea to create the ACP. As seen in the 
participation section, migrant community members were excluded from these assemblies. 
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Table 9. Perception of Awareness of ACP Training (in percents) 
 
 
This difference in training sessions held is reflected in the communities’ knowledge of the ACP 
boundaries, and land use rules. Below I compare and explain the knowledge of ACP boundaries 
and use rules in the ACPs Tilacancha and Molinopampa.  
Knowledge of ACP Boundaries 
In Molinopampa, where about half knew there were trainings and few training were held 
a similar percent ( 49% (n=26)) of those aware of the ACP also  knew the actual ACPs 
boundaries, in contrast to Tilacancha, where a greater number of trainings were held and 
community members were more involved in the planning, 87% (n=54) knew the ACP 
boundaries. This is shown below in Table 10.  
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Table 10.  Perception of Awareness of ACP Boundaries in Tilicacancha and Molinopampa (in 
percent) 
 
 
 
Not surprising, there was a lot of confusion over the ACP boundaries in Molinopampa. 
Many of the household’s surveyed were not aware if their own land was in the ACP or outside of 
the boundary. Since the ACP encompasses all the land of the three annexes (Ocol, San Jose, and 
Pumahermana) all of the households surveyed actually hold land in the ACP, but many were 
unaware of it. All of the households surveyed in Molinopampa said that they had never seen a 
map of the ACP, and even the community President stated that he does not believe that a map 
exists. During a household survey a community member explained: 
I think the ACP includes all of Ocol and San Jose, in only the forested parts. I think, but 
I have never seen a map, they (the NGOs) never brought the documents to the town, 
they never explained. [R2-Molinpampa] 
 
Another household surveyed stated: 
   
Every part of the community is in the ACP, so I have land in it, but this was very 
unclear, they never did work in the field to explain this. [R25-Molinopampa] 
 
These statements show the confusion over the ACP boundaries in Molinopampa and also relate 
the confusion to the fact that the ACP was created by the NGOs, who did not include or properly 
inform the communities of the process or the outcomes of the ACP’s creation. 
 In Tilacancha the majority of the households surveyed knew the location and boundaries 
of the ACP. All of the households that had properties within the ACP were very aware of what 
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part of their land was within the ACP boundaries. In Tilacancha the ACP is in the highlands of 
the district’s Levanto and Maino. Although the households in Tilacancha were aware of the ACP, 
some mentioned they were unaware of the exact boundaries because they have never been to the 
area. This is distinct from Molinopampa, where more households were confused over the 
boundaries, but all of the households surveyed held properties within the ACP.  
Knowledge of Use rules:  
In Molinopampa, of the households surveyed that knew the ACP exists, only 33% (n=22) felt 
that the use rules were well known amongst community members. In Tilacancha, 87% (n=55) of 
the households surveyed felt that the laws were well known amongst community members. This 
is shown below in Table 11. 
Table 11. Perception of Community Awareness of Land Rules in ACPs Tilacancha and 
Molinopampa (in percent) 
 
Below I compare respondents’ knowledge of use rules in ACP Molinopampa followed by ACP 
Tilacancha, providing an explanation for their commonalities and differences.  
Molinopampa: 
Restricted Uses:  
In Molinopampa 94% (n=59) of the households surveyed were able to list the actual 
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statements neighbors made the cutting the forest was illegal. This was described by one 
household who said, “There weren’t any trainings or meetings here in the community, I’ve heard 
through people talking about not cutting and protecting the forest” [R61-Molinopampa].  
In Molinopampa the most frequent response about land use restrictions within the ACP 
was that “you cannot cut the forest”. “You cannot burn land” was second in response frequency, 
and few respondents also listed that it is prohibited to sell timber and to create new agriculture 
and pasture land. Table 12 below shows the percentage of households in Molinopampa that listed 
the specific land use restrictions. Only the households that were able to list restrictions (94%) are 
represented in the calculations.  
Table 12. Resource Use Restrictions as Reported by Households in Molinopampa  (in percents) 
 
 
*The percentage is the percentage of households that listed the specific use restriction. Since the question was open 
ended, some households listed more than one benefit, for this reason the results do not equal 100%  
Permitted uses 
In Molinopampa 71% (n=45) of the households surveyed were able to list resource uses 
permitted in the ACP. The response with the most frequency (53%) was planting pasture land, 
but leaving large trees. This use is actually only permitted in the multiple use zone where the 
land was already cultivated.  It is prohibited to create new pasture land. Other responses included 
reforestation, using timber and forest products for household needs, tourism, and “only conserve 
the land”.  
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Table 13 below shows the percentage of households in Molinopampa that listed the 
specific permitted land uses. Only the households that were able to list permitted uses (71%) are 
represented in the calculations.  
Table 13. Resource Uses Permitted as Reported by Households in Molinopamapa (in percecnt) 
 
 
*The percentage is the percentage of households that listed the specified permitted land uses. Since the question was 
open ended, some households listed more than one benefit, for this reason the results do not equal 100%.  
 
Importantly, some households listed permitted uses that were not in compliance with the 
use compromises in the ACP master plan. For instance, 53% (n=24) of the households stated that 
it is permitted to plant pasture land and raise cattle in the ACP, but this is a restricted use in the 
master plan. Only 4% (n=2) of the households surveyed listed tourism as a permitted use, while 
the master plan highlights tourism as a permitted use in both the multiple and limited use zones. 
The plan introduces the importance of preserving the landscape and forest in order to attract 
tourists, but the lack of acknowledgement of this use by residents reveals that this is not viewed 
as an important land use at the local level. 
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agricultural areas within the ACP boundaries. Table 14 below shows the percentage of 
households in Tilacancha that noted specific land use restrictions. Only the households that were 
able to list restrictions (97%) are represented in the calculations.  
Table 14. Resource Use Restrictions as Reported by Households in Tilacancha (in percents) 
 
 
*The percentage is the percentage of households that listed the specific use restriction. Since the question was open 
ended, some households listed more than one benefit, for this reason the results do not equal 100%  
                                                             
Permitted Uses 
In Tilacancha 74% (n=46) of the households surveyed could list land uses that are 
permitted in the ACP. In Tilacancha the most common response was that it is not permitted to 
use the land at all. The second most common response was reforestation. There was confusion 
over the type of reforestation permitted in the area, 52% (n=21) of the households that listed 
reforestation specified with pine, while 21% (n=8) stated that the only reforestation permitted 
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government development funds are being channeled away from further pine tree plantings within 
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APECO to stop the planting of pine trees was confusing to community members. Many 
households in both Maino and Levanto referred to the previous efforts of reforestation with pine 
as the communities’ first efforts to “conserve” Tilacancha. This contradicts the “conservation” 
view of the NGOs who aided in creating the ACP, which are working with the community and 
the management plan to restrict the planting of non-native trees within the ACP. Table 15 below 
shows the percentage of households in Tilacancha that listed the specific permitted land uses. 
Only the households that were able to list restrictions (74%) are represented in the calculations.  
Table 15. Resource Uses Permitted as Reported by Households inTilacancha (in percent) 
 
*The percentage is the percentage of households that listed the specified permitted land uses. Since the question was 
open ended, some households listed more than one benefit, for this reason the results do not equal 100% 
Comparison of Household Understanding of ACP Use Rules in Molinopampa and Tilacancha 
 In both Molinopampa and Tilacancha, households understood restricted activities more 
than permitted ones.  In general, households in Tilacancha were more aware of use rules in the 
ACP than Molinopampa, explained by their greater inclusion in the creation of the ACP’s 
management plan and the NGO’s training efforts. 
In the ACP Tilacancha “conservation” in the ACP was understood by many to mean strict 
preservation, where in Molinopampa the rules were less clear, but most viewed the rules to 
include some land uses. In Tilacancha more respondents referred to limitations in livelihood 
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pasture land within the ACP and to have cattle within the ACP boundaries; 15% of the 
households in Tilacancha listed that it was prohibited to use the area at all, stating that “it is 
prohibited to touch the area”.  Illustrative of this view is the statement by a community member 
in Tilacancha:  
We cannot do anything in the ACP, it is untouchable, and you cannot do any 
production. In the rules it says you cannot touch any branch, absolutely nothing. 
You cannot plant pine. [R68-Tilacancha] 
In Molinopampa only 8% (n=5) of those surveyed listed creating new pasture or agricultural land 
as a use restriction and no households stated that it was restricted to use the area. In 
Molinopampa the majority (53%) who could list permitted uses mentioned creating new pasture 
land, but leaving the trees. In Tilacancha only 7% (n=3) of the households that could list 
permitted use rules listed creating pasture land while leaving trees as a permitted use. This 
difference is due to the fact that all of the household’s productive land in Molinopampa is within 
the ACP, so households place their emphasis on land use. In Tilacancha a large portion of the 
land is unproductive, especially in the district Levanto, where there are very few property owners 
within the ACP boundaries. A community member surveyed in Levanto stated “it is only 
allowed to conserve the area, it isn’t productive land, so we can only conserve” [R80-Tilacancha]. 
In Levanto strict regulations on land use in the area within the ACP was not seen as in conflict 
with the household’s livelihoods, in contrast to Maino where many households own land within 
the ACP, and in Molinopampa where the ACP encompasses all of the land owned by households.  
In both Molinopampa and Tilacancha, community leaders and households commented 
that not all of the campesinos understand what the ACP is, what the community members are 
doing to conserve it, and why the use rules exist. In Molinopampa one household described this 
in the following way: 
We do not know the boundaries, they (the NGOs) didn’t explain how to manage 
the area, they didn’t say anything, and they only said it was for the palm trees, the 
river, but we do not know with what outcomes, what’s going to come for us? 
[R23-Molinopampa] 
The communities’ lack of knowledge regarding the logic of planners over use rules and 
reflects also limited information-sharing practices, inter-organizational trust, and opportunities 
for learning and knowledge gathering. The communities’ definitions of conservation and their 
interpretations of the use “compromises” suggest that the outside organizations have differing 
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definition and approach to implementing conservation compared to the communities especially 
with regard to what the ACPs are being conserved for, how they should be conserved, and for 
what result? Conflicts that emerged regarding these differences in the perceptions of 
“conservation” are revealed in the following section on the outcomes of implementing the ACP.  
Section 4: Outcomes of the Creation of ACPs Tilacancha and Molinopampa 
In this section I present the outcomes of the creation of the ACP and the implementation 
of the associated land use compromises.  I have divided the outcomes of the implementation of 
the ACPs into five sections: (1) ACP Communities’ perceptions of land use and land 
management changes in the ACPs, (2) the ability of the ACPs to prevent outside threats 
(especially immigration in Molinopampa and Mining in Tilacancha), (3) perceived household 
and community benefits of declaring the ACP, (4) projects implemented in the ACPs and their 
results, and (5) the comparison of the motivations to create the ACPs to the actual results, and 
how the differences between the two, combined with other factors, in some cases led to mistrust 
and community resistance of the ACP.  
 It is important to note that the trends I present are the perceptions of community leaders 
and households in the two ACPs. There has been very little monitoring for how the ACPs have 
impacted communities’ development or ecological changes in the areas, besides infrequent visits 
by the NGOs and weather stations that were installed by the Institute for the Investigation of the 
Peruvian Amazon (IIAP) in both ACPs. SERNANP supervises the ACPs every two years 
through site visits. If they visit an area and the land owners are not complying with the 
compromises in their management plan, SERNANP can take away the area’s status as an ACP. 
This has not happened in any area. This supervision is a recent action by SERNANP, before this 
action wasn’t possible due to insufficient funding and staff, but now there is a larger staff 
dedicated to visiting and monitoring the ACPs. Currently there are no specific tools for the 
monitoring of the ACPs. The SERNANP representative explained that: 
The visits to the areas involve an evaluation of whether or not the conservation 
compromises are being met, what actions have been applied to complete the 
compromises, if they are receiving help from regional entities, and what projects 
they have implemented in the area. 
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The representative I interviewed at PROFONANPE explained the introduction of ACPs into the 
national protected area system as an “interesting phenomenon in recent years” that is in need of 
evaluation, and stated that: 
Right now there are a lot of forces behind the creation of ACPs, but we do not 
have any reports showing that they are working or advancing the conservation of 
the areas. Right now we can only say they are functioning on paper, we need to 
have a monitoring system to track advances. We need to organize this with the 
regional environmental authorities (ARA). 
The lack of monitoring has also impacted the effectiveness and legitimacy of the ACPs, which I 
argue below is related to the outcomes or operation of the two ACPs. 
Land Management and Compliance with ACP Conservation Goals in Tilacancha and 
Molinopampa 
 The two sites revealed large differences in how households understand the actual impact 
of the creation of the private conservation areas In Molinopampa, only 49% (n=26) of the 
households surveyed that knew the ACP existed perceived there to be changes in land use and 
management in response to the creation of the ACP. In Tilacancha 94% (n=58) perceived that 
there were actual land changes.  
Table 16. Household Perception on Land Management and Use Changes as a Result of the ACP 
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Household Perceived Management and Use Changes  
Molinopampa 
In Molinopampa, of the households surveyed that knew the ACP existed, when asked if 
they noted changes in land use and land use practices in the area since the creation of the ACP 47%  
said no, 49% said yes, and 4% were unsure because they were recent migrants and were not 
present before the ACP was created. Of those who felt there were land management and use 
changes, the most frequent response was that they observe less deforestation. Other responses 
included more reforestation, less selling of timber, less burning, that people no longer cut palm 
trees, a greater understanding of land management, and better pasture management. The migrants 
were largely blamed by those who felt there was no change in land management. Table 17 below 
shows the percentage of the households surveyed in Molinopampa and their perceptions 
regarding the outcome of the ACP on land management and use changes. The data only includes 
the households that responded that they perceive land management and use changes.  
Table 17. Household Perceptions of Land Management and Land Use Changes in the ACP 
Molinopampa (in percents)* 
 
 
*This graph only includes households who reported changes to the land management or use as a result of the ACP. 
The percentage refers to households that listed the specific management or use change. Since the question was open 
ended, some households listed more than one benefit, for this reason the results do not equal 100%  
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Tilacancha 
In Tilacancha, of the households surveyed, when asked if they noted changes in land use 
and land use practices in the area since the creation of the ACP, only 3% said no, 94% said yes, 
and 3% were indifferent. Table 18 below shows the percentage of the households surveyed in 
Tilacancha that listed the specified perceived land management and use changes. The data only 
includes the households that responded that they perceive land management and use changes.  
Of those surveyed that stated they noticed changes in land use, the most frequent 
responses were the observation of less burning in the area and that community members no 
longer put cattle in the high grass lands within the ACP boundaries. Other responses included the 
observation of less deforestation, more reforestation, a greater understanding of land 
management amongst community members, and better pasture management.  
Table 18. Household Perception of Land Management and Land Use Changes in the ACP 
Tilacancha (in percent)* 
 
 
 
*This graph includes only households that reported changes to the land management or use as a result of the ACP. 
The percentage refers to households that listed the specific management or use change. Since the question was open 
ended, some households listed more than one benefit, for this reason the results do not equal 100%  
Several responses from the interviews with community leaders and household surveys in 
Molinopampa indicated that rules or commitments on paper to manage the ACPs have not 
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members are not well aware of their conservation commitments. This holds true for both 
Tilacancha and Molinopampa, but as seen in the previous section on knowledge of the ACP, the 
confusion over the zoning and use rules in was much more prominent in Molinopampa than in 
Tilacancha.  
In both Molinopampa and Tilicancha respondents observed that there was less burning 
and less deforestation as a result of the creation of the ACP. Environmental education by the 
NGOs in both areas as well as regional government radio programs emphasized the impact of 
these activities on the availability of water. This education coupled with the noted climate 
change impacts to a degree catalyzed the rural community members to reduce forest clearance by 
more tightly controlling burning of forests and deforestation. Although burning and deforestation 
did not stop completely in either area many community members in both areas noted a reduction. 
In both areas it was explained that this was to a degree because of the communities’ decision to 
create the ACP and the subsequent social pressure. For example, one community member in 
Molinopampa stated:  
Between neighbors we don’t want to burn the forest, if you burn or cut the 
neighbors will complain, before everyone burned a lot [R17-Molinopampa] 
In Tilicancha a community member explained how the community learned to administer their 
land use through the creation of the ACP and the trainings the community received:  
They (the NGOs) instruct the people, we are learning how to administer our land 
as a community differently, using more management of our products. There is 
social pressure to conserve. Before people didn’t respect the land and burned a lot, 
they would burn all the way to the watershed [R87-Tilicancha] 
At least to some degree social face and community social dynamics aided in reinforcing the ACP 
land use rules in both Molinopampa and Tilicancha.  
 The pressure and enforcement to conserve was stronger in Tilicancha than in 
Molinopampa. Since the ACP Tilacancha plays such an important role on the wellbeing of the 
region’s capital, the management of the ACP Tilacancha has been more enforced than in 
Molinopampa, and the outside organizations have been more present. This explains the 
difference in the observation of land management changes between the two areas. In 
Molinopampa where only 49% of those surveyed noted land use changes as a result of the ACP 
many community members emphasized that there has not been any change. One community 
member said:  
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Everything is the same, everyone continues to create pasture land and cut down 
trees [R12- Molinopampa] 
Another community member stated “people still cut down the forest and sell timber, nothing has 
changed” [R-36-Molinopampa]. As previously mentioned, in Tilacancha the ACP was upland 
grass land. In the district Levanto there were few individual owned properties, and in the district 
Maino there were around 40 individual properties. In Tilacancha, those who owned the 
properties within the ACP were being asked by APECO and the private water company to stop 
using the land for further agricultural activities or in some cases were asked remove their cattle 
from their land within the ACP. As I will explain at the end of the section, although more 
households in Tilacancha perceived management changes, the changes were viewed as causing 
conflict, particularly in Maino where there were more land holders in the area.  
The Ability of the ACPs to prevent outside threats 
Control over the large influx of Immigration and Unregistered Land Transactions in 
Molinopampa 
 At the time of the study the ACPs had not achieved the goal to control further migration 
and undocumented land transactions. The community president, who is in charge of documenting 
individual properties, explained: 
I made it illegal to buy land in the forest, and the people were discontent with me 
over this. It is prohibited to sell land in the forest, but the people keep selling, 
without the legal documents. I explain that you shouldn’t sell land, but they do not 
comply with the laws. There have been a few times when people come to the 
office to complete the documents, and I told them that they cannot sell the land, 
and they didn’t, but often they do not come to the office….. The money is 
exchanged before they come to my office for the documents, or sometimes they 
do not get the documents at all. Since you have to pay a fee for the documents a 
lot of people do not.  
Informal land transactions was a much contested topic because it involved the selling of large 
parcels by long-established landholders, and as previously explained these parcels are further 
divided as migrants further sell and divide the land to family members and other migrants from 
the Cajamarca region. The long-established community members blame forest destruction on the 
actions of the newcomers. The ACP did not implement any new methods for monitoring or 
controlling the sale of lands, despite a main goal of the ACP to prevent further sale of lands in 
the ACP areas.  
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Prevention of Mining in Tilacancha 
Although mining has not entered the area, it is unclear what role the ACP has played in 
preventing it from happening. After the creation of the ACP an agreement for mining in the area 
was signed by the regional government, but under Peruvian law campesino communities receive 
free prior and informed consent on the activity of mining concessions on communal lands. The 
community and many regional actors signed a document stating that they vote against the mine. 
Some community members related the ACP to the efforts to stop the mine from entering. For 
example, a community respondent from Tilacancha during a household survey stated that 
“without the ACP mines could enter, without the ACP the mines would have come, and we do 
not want that.”[R105-Tilacancha]. Legally, the state owns all water and mineral rights in Peru, so 
the ACPs do not formally protect the area from mining, but the ACP gives more state recognition 
to the campesino land and the importance of its conservation. The outside organizations creating 
the ACP also can help community members to organize themselves against the mine. As 
described by NCI, a goal of NCI is to use the ACPs to inform the community members how to 
negotiate when conflicts with extractive industries occur. Despite the clear use in the region of 
ACPs to aid in the prevention of mineral extraction in areas of biological and water resource 
importance, ACPs are too new to assess their ability to prevent the expansion of extractive 
industry in the region.  
Perceived Household Benefits from the ACP  
Molinopampa: 
In the ACP Molinopampa, of the households surveyed that knew the ACP exists, only 51% 
(n=27) reported that their household has benefited from the creation of the ACP.  The most 
frequent benefit reported was that their household gained improved health, followed by 
environmental protection and safeguarding water resources for future use. Other benefits listed 
included reforestation, help from outside entities, and learning new land use practices. Table 19 
below demonstrates the percentage of households that named the listed outcomes as benefits of 
the ACP to their household. The graph only represents the households surveyed that responded 
that their household is benefiting from the ACP.  
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Table 19. Household Perceptions on ACP Benefits in ACP Molinopampa (in percent) 
 
 
*The data represents the responses of the households who claim benefits from the ACP 
Tilacancha: 
 In the ACP Tilacancha, 65% (n=42) of the households surveyed reported that their 
household benefits from the creation of the ACP. The results differed for the two communities 
located within the ACP (Maino and Levanto). In Maino, only 57% feel that their household 
benefits from the ACP, in contrast to Levanto where 83% feel that their household benefits. In 
Tilacancha, the most frequent reason why households report benefits was through the protection 
of water. Other responses included through increased learning and consciousness, environmental 
protection, NGO and state aid, and reforestation. 
 
Table 20. Household Perceptions on ACP Benefits in ACP Tilacancha (in percents)* 
 
*The table includes households that responded that their household is benefitting from the ACP 
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The benefits from the ACPs recognized by households were mostly non-monetary. As 
noted above, health was an important benefit. Many of the households stated that their families 
were benefiting from the ACP through clean air, clean water, and the provision of water and 
forest resources.  The households who mentioned health related the provision of water and clean 
air to the health of their families. Many of the community members have a broad awareness of 
the value of ecosystem services such as: erosion control, clean air and water, drought prevention, 
and trees that improve soil productivity. The importance of these services was mentioned several 
times in interviews with community leaders and by households. The households that perceived 
that they were receiving benefits from the ACP referred to the benefits from their ecosystem – on 
their own personal health and its connection to the physical environment. One community leader 
in Molinopampa explained the community’s understanding of managing now for future use in 
the following way:  
Each community member knows and understands that when you destroy you 
aren’t going to have what you need in the future. They are using their land in an 
organized way. They plant trees. It isn’t only because of the ACP, it is because it 
is a necessity that they see for the future.  
A household in Molinopampa stated:  
The ACP benefits us with wood, with time we are going to still have resources, 
like wood, and when we need it, it will be there. [R54-Molinopampa] 
Basic household resources such as fodder and fuelwood were considered resources in both ACPs 
that households could not live without, and through using the resources sustainably, they realized 
that there would be more for future use.  
In Tilacancha the households responded that the ACP benefited their household through 
having clean water and the promise of water in the future. One household in Tilacancha 
contributed the ACP to the reforestation and to the benefits of the trees:  
In my opinion, thanks to the trees we breathe pure air, we have water, it is pretty 
[R71-Tilacancha] 
A small number of households surveyed in both Molinopampa and Tilacancha also mentioned 
that they benefited through learning new techniques to manage their land and through 
“consciousness”. This was expressed in the following ways.  
We benefited through consciousness, we now know the value of the nature that 
we have, and why to protect it” [R20-Molinpampa] 
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And, 
They (APECO) instruct the people, we are learning how to administer our land 
differently, using more technical management of our products, before people 
didn’t respect the land and burned a lot, they would burn all the way to the 
watershed” [R87-Tilacancha]  
These statements show that although there was the original expectation for state aid and 
economic gain, some campesinos noted the ecosystem services provided by the management of 
the ACP as beneficial to their households.  
 Although around half of the households surveyed in both ACPs felt that their households 
were in some way benefiting from the ACP, a common theme during both household surveys 
and interviews with leader was that the original expectations for benefits had not been realized at 
the time of the study. Several projects were implemented in the area after the creation of the ACP, 
but as seen from the survey results only 3 households in Molinopampa and 4 in Tilacancha listed 
the projects or outside aid as benefiting their households. I will explain the projects that have 
been implemented in each ACP and how they interacted with existing social, economic, and 
views of land management to produce unexpected results. These projects were also planned for 
outside of the community, which led to a lack of trust between the community members and the 
outside agencies. This lack of trust will be further explained at the end of the outcomes section.  
Projects Implemented in the ACPs 
Molinopampa 
 In Molinopampa, of the households surveyed that knew the ACP exists, 66% said that 
projects have been implemented for the ACP, but for reasons explained below the projects were 
viewed negatively by many community members. The majority of the respondents responded 
that tree nurseries for reforestation were implemented and four households mentioned tourism as 
a project in the ACP. I will briefly explain the implementation of both of the projects and then 
discuss community participation and the outcomes of the projects. I begin with tourism because 
tourism is outlined in the ACP management plan as well as the regional ZEE planning as a 
promising land use for the ACP in Molinopampa. The management plan for the ACP 
Molinopampa and the associated land use compromises are largely centered on tourism.  
Tourism  
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 To understand the tourism project implemented with the creation of the ACP, it is 
important to introduce the historical context and prior efforts to establish and promote 
ecotourism in the area. Before the ACP was created, the NGO Caritas worked with the 
community Ocol (one of the three annexes included in the ACP) on reforestation, artisan projects 
and local timber for furniture, and creating tourism facilities including an interpretation center. 
While the papers to create the ACP were still in the legal process, community members 
improved the interpretation center, adding a restaurant, a room for tourists to sleep, and a 
bathrooms with showers and a septic tank. The flush toilets, gas stoves, and refrigerator made the 
tourist center the most developed home in the community. The funding for improving the tourist 
center and implementing the restaurant and dormitory was a joint effort of the organizations IIAP 
and NCI. The construction was done by local residents and the labor was paid for through the 
project’s funding. Following the process to create the ACP, the Association “Las Palmeras de 
Ocol” was created. The group that had previously worked with the NGO Caritas on reforestation 
projects and on the construction of the original tourist center continued as the newly formed and 
legally registered association. All households in the community Ocol were originally invited to 
participate with the prior reforestation projects, but few continued with the project long term, 
because the reforestation was labor intensive and the work was not generating as much 
household income as paid labor on farms or raising cattle.   
The association that was legally registered consisted of men, who were trained as guides, 
and women, who were trained in how to provide local meals and wait on customers. The 
association originally consisted of around 10 families and the men of the association were in the 
leadership positions. The men in the association built a tourist trail that went through the palm 
forest and led to a waterfall.  
As aid came to the association conflicts ensued, both within the association, and between 
the association and other community members. After living in the community and conversing 
with local residents, I learned that two major events occurred in the association before my arrival 
that caused tensions within the association. The first event was the theft of wood working 
machines that had been given to the group by caritas. The machines were locked in the tourism 
center, and only association members had copies of the key. No one in the group would admit to 
taking the machines or giving a copy of the key to anyone outside of the association. Another 
conflict arose when the studies to create the ACP were being conducted. The specialists that 
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were conducting the study stayed at the former president of the association’s home. Since the 
specialists stayed with the family, they built the family a bathroom and paid for food and stay. 
This was viewed as unfair to other association members, who felt his family was receiving 
additional benefits.  
 Since the association has been the main point of contact for the ACP, much of the outside 
help for the ACP has been captured by the association. This has caused conflict between the 
association and other members of the community. The association members felt like they 
devoted years of effort with projects by the time the ACP was created, through their participation 
with Caritas and the building and maintenance of the tourism center. The members did not feel 
that it was fair for other community members to enter the group when help came, after they had 
put in the work of coordinating with offices and building and establishing their group. To keep 
other community members from entering the group they placed an entrance fee of 500 Peruvian 
soles, a price that ensured no one else could afford to enter. In response other community 
members were bitter. The tourist trail went through the properties of community members 
outside of the group, and these community members said that the association could no longer 
bring tourists through their land, leaving the association with no access to bring tourists to the 
waterfall that was being advertised as the main tourist attraction. One community member 
outside of the association explained the association’s capture of the outside aid that comes for the 
ACP:  
There is a tourism center that we build with caritas, after the ACP was established 
we worked to also add a beautiful restaurant, but it isn’t functioning because of 
selfishness, the group doesn’t want to work with tourism, but doesn’t want to give 
the center and restaurant to people who do. It was supposed to be for the 
community, but the group doesn’t want to include others and the authorities do 
not want to create a document to pass it over to the community. The work to 
create the center and restaurant was paid labor, by the community, but the NGO 
paid for the labor [R1-Molinopampa] 
 A conflict also occurred between the directors of the NCI and IIAP soon after the ACP 
was declared over the way funds were being used and how the projects were being executed. 
NCI largely stopped their participation in the area, but IIAP remained present. During my time as 
a volunteer, both organizations would visit the area occasionally, bringing different small 
projects, but without coordination. This confused the community as many of the projects’ goals 
overlapped, but were administratively separate. At one point there was a regional opportunity for 
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ACPs to enter sustainable production projects into a competition to be funded through funds 
from PROFANANPE. Both NCI and IIAP entered the association in the competition to improve 
tourism opportunities for the group. Since both organizations entered the association, but without 
coordinating, the project was disqualified.  
 As time passed few tourists came to the area. Regional tourism was growing, but Ocol 
was not one of the main tourist attractions in the region. The route through the forest in Ocol was 
muddy and a six hour hike. Most visitors want to visit for day trips, and a lack of transportation 
to the area is not compatible to coordinate coming for a 6 hour hike and leaving. Eventually, the 
men left the association. The meetings demanded taking time off during the day, and since there 
are more paid opportunities for men, the association work did not compare to the income 
opportunities of other labor and raising cattle.  
During my time in Ocol the association consisted of six women. Since the women also 
work on the farms, receiving an occasional guest was not seen as being worth the effort needed 
to maintain a trial and the tourist center. In my two years of living in Ocol I only saw the center 
and restaurant open four times, and all four times it was a trip coordinated by the NGOs to 
promote tourism to the area. One association member described the need for other benefits, since 
tourism was not bringing in income: 
We need to do something that provides income, we hope in the future there will 
be an income, not many tourists come….in a year we have 2 or 3 visitors [R7-
Molinopampa] 
Despite the fact that the association only includes 6 community members in one of the three 
annexes included in the ACP, the majority of the aid for the ACP continues to go to the 
association. The 6 association members do not feel that tourism is providing them benefits, but 
the outside agencies continue to seek support to better ecotourism in the area. A website by 
SPDA titled “Conservamos por Naturaleza” that promotes the ACPs says the following of 
Molinopampa: 
A group of 6 women stood up and are working to protect the palm forest. 
Sustainability plans have been initiated in the areas, which is a complicated task 
when you have to involve 100s of people in three communities. The men of the 
community who started the initiative passed the baton over to their wives, who 
now are in charge of the management of the area. The women began to see 
different forms to make their dream of conservation feasible. They developed a 
restaurant next to the interpretation center and rooms for adventurous tourists to 
stay overnight. These strong women are responsible for the protection of the 
whole forest. (Conservamos Por Naturaleza, 2015). 
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The NGOs fail to recognize that the ACP encompasses three communities, and the properties of 
hundreds of other families whose livelihoods also depend on the land within the ACP.  The 
outcomes of tourism in the area suggest that perhaps tourism is not the best economic solution 
for the area and that there is a need for a reassessment of the management plan, which is largely 
strategized around having tourism in the area.  
Reforestation:  
 Here too there is a historical context which needs to be discussed which influenced the 
reforestation efforts of the more recently established ACP. NCI and IIAP received funding from 
the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), which was created under the auspices of 
the United Nations in 1986 in response to the increasing international concern over tropical 
forest depletion in tropical countries. ITTO promotes sustainable forest management, research on 
the production trade of tropical timber, and funds projects aimed at developing timber industries 
and forest management (International Tropical Timber Organization, 2011). NCI and IIAP 
applied for the project funds while still in partnership and received $149,958.00 US dollars from 
ITTO, with the objective of using a participatory approach to implement an ACP wide project in 
reforestation and the creation of a community-owned enterprise for the marketing of certified 
seeds, seedlings, and timber products from 5 native tree species. The project plan contributed to 
strengthening regional forest policies based on the use of native timber species, involving the 
community in scientific research, and working to improve community living standards while 
addressing the management and reforestation of the palm forest. The plan also included the 
development of research activities related to natural regeneration, propagation and germplasm 
conservation of native species, restoration of degraded areas through the establishment of forest 
plantations, and permanent plots. Three tree nurseries were implemented, one in each of the 
annexes included in the ACP: Ocol, San Jose, and Pumahermana.  
 The project promoted participatory-action research and before the tree nurseries were 
started a survey was conducted with households to determine what native species they were most 
interested in planting. Two engineers from IAAP lived and worked with the community on the 
construction of the nursery, the identification of mature trees for seed propagation, seed 
collection, and reforestation. The reforestation project included the establishment of permanent 
plots that would serve as seed propagators. The permanent plots were of a single species.  
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 The project trained 20 local promoters for the project that were capacitated in the 
production, management, and commercialization forest species seeds and plants. The promoters, 
the engineers, and staff from IIAP met monthly to discuss progress and share their experiences 
and any complications that they faced. The community promoter also went on two informational 
trainings in other regions where to visit communities who sold certified seeds, in order to see 
how the work was implemented in other regions. The project was funded for two years, with the 
goal that by the end of the second year the seeds would be certified and the community would 
have a business selling the seeds to reforestation projects in the region, promoting regional 
reforestation with native species.  
At the end of the second year the seeds were still not certified, the community members 
that participated in the project were disorganized, and was no income from the seeds. Some of 
the work in the tree nursery was paid labor, so some members did earn an income through the 
labor in the tree nursery. Participation in all three communities was low, again due to conflicts 
within the community. In Ocol and San Jose the tree nurseries were on the properties of 
individual community members, and due to past conflicts most community members did not feel 
welcome to participate. One community member in San Jose explained: 
The tree nursery is the only project that has come here, and the project ended. We 
were not invited. They (the NGOs) made it for one family. They should have 
made it on a piece of land that belongs to the community, not to a family. [R29-
Molinopampa] 
Another household in San Jose claimed that the project divided the community: 
When the tree nursery was created it separated the community, not everyone 
could go there, it’s for a group, and this made people mad. The group wants 
people to pay to enter the group. There used to be a tree nursery behind the 
community center, and there the people would participate, everyone planted, aji, 
fruit trees, alder, in 2012 it changed for the house of a group member, who was 
the town authority, now it only benefits him and his group, people got mad at him 
and voted for a new authority, but the tree nursery stayed there. [R56-
Molinopampa] 
In Ocol the tree nursery was on the property of one of the women in the association, so the 
community felt that this project was for the Association “Las Palmeras de Ocol”. The meetings 
for the project in Ocol were held in the tourist center, which community members that did not 
participate in the association felt uncomfortable entering. 
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 In Pumahermana the tree nursery was on communal land, but the community members 
were not interested in the native tree species and did not feel that the project met their needs. 
Pumahermana is the most recently settled of the three communities with the ACP Molinopampa 
and the population is 90% migrants. The planting of these native trees did not interest the 
migrants, who were less familiar with the species and their utilities. In Pumaheramana one 
household contributed the community’s lack of interest in the reforestation project to the fact that 
the original project goal of earning money for the household was not met: 
We were told we were going to get paid to work in the tree nursery and plant, the 
engineers got paid, but we did not, because of this the people were no longer 
interested. We were told we were going to be paid, and in the end weren’t [R35-
Molinopampa] 
During a meeting that I attended for the project the community members also expressed this 
concern. The community members were presented the amount of funds, and they were 
questioning the project managers from IIAP and NCI where these funds went. The organizations 
explained that the money went to materials and to paying the engineers and field technicians, and 
also for the training trips that the promoters attended. The community members who participated 
did not feel that the help was reaching the community.  
The certification and sale of seeds had not been implemented yet, and there was a lot of 
confusion of how the transactions would work, and how the profits would be divided. The 
permanent plots and the marked trees that propagated seeds were on individual’s properties. The 
group was unsure how the money would be divided. Those who did not have enough land to 
dedicate the amount of land needed for a permanent plot did not feel that they would benefit 
from the sale of seeds. When the project ended 15 hectares of land were reforested and the 
project participants expressed that they benefited through receiving trees to plant in their pastures 
and on their property, but the unmet promise of the projects ability to reduce household poverty 
and earn money left the participants feeling they had been lied to by the outside organizations. 
The tree nurseries did not continue after the funding support seized at the end of the two years.  
The employee at NCI recognized that the ACP Molinopampa had not achieved all of its 
motivations and attributed this to the following:  
People want benefits immediately. We put a lot of money into Molinopampa and 
we are very sad about it not working out, we are going to pick up working there 
again. The community didn’t put in the work, they didn’t organize themselves. 
SERNANP is concerned about the problem of buying and selling of land. If it is a 
campesino community there shouldn’t be selling of lands. In the multiple use 
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zone there can be the cutting of trees, but in the limited use zone they can only 
protect the palm trees, but sometimes they do not understand” 
The NGO largely placed the blame for the failures of the ACP on the community, rather than the 
lack of community participation in the creation of the ACP or the ACP’s management plan.  
Tilacancha 
In Tilacancha 50% of the households surveyed said that projects have been implemented 
for the ACP. The projects listed were tree nurseries, a field school teaching new farming 
techniques and pasture management, and a project for improved pasture land and improving 
cattle genetics.  
Tree Nursery 
 The most common project mentioned by the household’s surveyed when asked about 
projects implemented in the ACP was pine tree reforestation, which was a project that was 
introduced by the regional government long before the creation of the ACP. The campesinos in 
Levanto and Maino had planted pine trees in the area as a reforestation and income generating 
project with donor organizations and the regional government. When I visited the area I was 
surprised by the trees that were prim and trimmed and were already at a height above my head. 
This sight made it clear that humans had been making their mark on the landscape far before 
APECO started the study to declare the ACP. One household in Maino stated with pride that the 
district Maino reforested “750 ha of Maino with pine starting in the 1995.”[R103-Tilacancha].  
The non-native trees were intended to be cultivated for household use and timber sales. The trees 
were promoted for “conservation” of the area by the regional government and international 
NGOs who provided the funding for the pine reforestation project.  
 APECO and other scientist I spoke with in the region that were involved with the creation 
of the ACP Tilacancha acknowledged the perceived economic security that the trees provided, 
but express concern that the chemical composition of the trees could impact the soil and water of 
the high altitude grassland, and the watershed if reforestation with pine is further expanded. 
APECO considered the pine trees and their cultivation ambiguously, because planting pine could 
be a driver of undesired and unnecessary ecological change to the Tilacancha ecosystem.  
 The households associated the pine trees with conservation and the ACP, despite the fact 
that the master plan called for no further planting of non-native trees. When speaking with 
campesinos about conservation many of them start the story of how the community got involved 
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with conserving Tilacancha by describing the first pine tree reforestation project in the 
community. Many of the community members who knew the use rule prohibiting further pine 
tree plantations indicated displeasure in learning that they could no longer plant pine trees in the 
area declared as the ACP. The master plan also decided that the existing pine trees would not be 
harvested beyond sustainable use and trimming. The campesinos were upset that the time and 
resources they had put into planting and caring for the pine trees would not result in the intended 
outcome of income generation. A leader in Maino explained that the community wants help in 
expanding pine reforestation and managing and selling the wood from the existing pine trees: 
We have 800 ht. reforested, we want help in maintaining, managing, and selling 
and using the wood. It’s all pine, the site is good for pine, not much else grows 
there, and the pine has the fastest growth rate. 
The topic of pine trees was one that was frequently brought up with mixed feelings, first pride in 
the work the community had contributed to reforesting the area, and then anger and confusion 
that they could no longer continue this work. One household stated:  
We reforested with 600 ha of pine trees, and we want more, but we cannot now, 
we wanted to plant them for the whole corilledera (watershed) [R105-Tilacancha] 
Some households also mentioned that after learning from APECO that the pine trees can dry the 
water, they feel like the engineers from the previous pine project gave them false information. 
One household stated: 
It is prohibited to burn the grassland, this is what captures the water, the grassland 
and first we were told that pine trees helped with water, to conserve it, but now 
we are noticing it dries the water [R111-Tilacancha] 
 
Another household observed that the pines had caused her land to become drier:  
 
Pine dries up the water, I planted them and it dried up my pond that I had, the 
engineers lied they said it would help the water” [R107-Tilichancha] 
The situation and confusion that emerged when the experts that came to help create the 
ACP determined that the pre-2008 reforestation projects were not desirable for the Tilacancha 
ACP raises questions as to whether the organizations responsible for creating the ACP identified 
social, economic, and ecological tradeoffs to refraining from the further planting of pine trees. 
There is still some production of pine trees in a tree nursery, but now there is a switch towards 
native trees and funding has been channeled away from increasing pine tree production.  
 
114 
 
Field School 
 APECO in coordination with the University implemented a technical field school for both 
the communities Maino and Levanto where community members learned new farming technique 
to improve their pasture land through silvopasture and other management techniques. The project 
was in the beginning stages when I conducted my research. The participating households were 
selected through a lottery system. All households would eventually have the opportunity to 
participate, but in cycles. The first cycle of households were in the field school during my study. 
Of those who knew that the project was implemented, but didn’t participate, the main reason 
given was that the project was in its first stages and in its first round of families, and that they 
plan to participate in the following round.  
Section Summary 
In both Tilacancha and Molinopampa the project planning largely consisted of the 
transfer of information and technology to the communities, rather than building on existing 
customs and institutions. Many of the efforts to implement economic generating activities reflect 
the understandings and interests of the state or NGOs that started the initiatives and introduce 
new practices and livelihoods, such as ecotourism, seed sales, and native tree reforestation. In 
Tilacancha there was a lot of discontent with the discontinuation of the pine tree reforestation, 
which many residents associated with conservation, as was taught by previous aid to the area. 
While the projects in Tilacancha also included agriculture and pasture management, the 
programs focused on having the farmers intensify commodity production on land that has 
already been worked and avoid creating new productive areas through the traditional practice of 
crop rotation and burning. 
No attention was directed at developing an understanding how property rights and social 
institutions in the communities had been organized or the conflicts within the communities that 
may impact the project outcomes. Intra-community conflicts were very visible in Molinopampa. 
There were a couple of statements in Tilacancha regarding the Grupo Tecnico Tilacancha (GTT) 
group capturing the projects and not disseminating the information to the community, but it was 
not as evident as in Molinopampa. If I had spent more time in Tilacancha it is possible that I 
would have noticed more conflict among the community members that participated in the 
projects, but as seen in the participation section the use of a technical group in Tilacancha that 
involved community members, and the constant presence of APECO in the area provided a 
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forum for the community members to be more informed and express opinions on project 
planning. 
Social conflict within communities of the ACP Molinopampa largely impacted the 
outcomes of the projects, and the aid also deepened the existing community conflicts. In the 
communities within Molinopampa there are differences in economic standing, land holding, 
family ties, and migration status. Community members within the communities often have 
conflicting interests. Different types of assets (e.g., land and cattle holdings, social networks, 
extended family ties, and migrant remittances) vary from family to family. As seen in the 
outcomes of the projects implemented, the influx of aid to the community increased competition, 
factionalism, and envy amongst households in the community. A common word in interviews 
when speaking of benefits in Molinopampa was “egoistas”- meaning selfish. Many times in 
Molinopampa when people are voted into community authority roles they refuse. The 
community votes for leaders based on their competence, and those selected are compelled to take 
office by community consensus and pressure. Conscientious authorities are often hindered in 
their attempt to better the town. One past community authority in Molinopampa explained “you 
want to help the community progress, and do what is good for the community, but people say 
you are just out for yourself.”  In a town meeting I attended a group wanted to denounce a 
current community authority because they aren’t working to bring help to the ACP. The 
authority responded that this isn’t fair because their role is unpaid and no one is contributing for 
them to travel to the regional offices asking for help. When the community wanted to vote for a 
new authority no one wanted to step into the role.  
Consequences of the difference in Expected Outcomes Compared to Actual Outcomes 
 As seen in the expected results section, the communities in Tilacancha and Molinopampa 
had high expectations for the creation of the ACP to provide economic benefits and livelihood 
improvement. In both areas the majority felt that the objectives to improve livelihoods from the 
ACP had been unmet at the time of the study. The unmet promises, combined with the lack of 
community inclusion in project planning and decision making, had a large impact on how the 
community members perceived the implementation of the ACP. I identified three consequences 
of the unmet promises: a strengthened mistrust of outside organizations, a resistance in 
“conservation” as defined by the ACP management plan, and that land management is now 
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“controlled” by the outside organizations. Although I separate the themes, these consequences 
are intertwined and are not mutually exclusive. 
Mistrust of outside organizations 
As mentioned in the section on the motivation of the campesino communities to 
participate in the creation of the ACP Tilacancha and Molinopampa, there was an initial mistrust 
among the community members in both communities for the organizations that introduced the 
concept to create the ACPs. I found that for many this lack of trust remains, or potentially was 
heightened by the creation of the ACP and the subsequent implementation of land use rules and 
the introduction of development aid.  
Molinopampa 
As mentioned in the explanation of the projects implemented in the areas, the projects in 
Molinopampa created a lot of conflicts between community members. The projects also created 
conflict between the community members and the organizations that implemented the projects 
when the community members felt that the projects were not being implemented transparently.  
One leader in Molinopampa described this in the following way: 
We aren’t against conservation, in Cajamarca we had the problem of dry periods, 
we know it is important to conserve. What we do not like is that the people in the 
offices are managing the projects, help comes, but it doesn’t reach here. It only 
reaches the workers for the NGOs. We work for the projects and give up days, but 
do not benefit. We won’t sign other projects with NGOs. Here is the water that 
feeds the watershed to Mendoza. Water is life, we are in agreement to protect it, 
but are not in agreement with the management of the NGOs. 
 
There was an overall sentiment that “projects come to the community, but the people in the 
campo receive little” [R41-Molinopampa]. The lack of trust was also revealed through 
statements that even when benefits were offered the campesinos did not want to accept, because 
they did not know what the motives were:  
An institution came, I cannot remember who, and they said we were going to get 
money to protect the forest, but the people didn’t accept. They were scared, they 
didn’t know with what motives [R20-Molinopampa] 
 
The lack of trust for the outside organizations in Molinopampa largely had to do with the fact 
that the ACP was created and imposed new rules on land use of individual properties, but the 
community was largely left out of the planning process. In many cases community members 
were informed after the ACP was already established that they could no longer cut forest to 
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create new pasture and agriculture land. Although compliance with the rules is not being 
monitored, there is fear by some that it will be with time. Pumahermana made a proposal to 
create a road for better access to their farmland, and this construction was denied by district 
authorities because it was not in compliance with the use zoning of the ACP.  It is unclear if the 
ACP was responsible for the proposals denial, or if the ACP only gave leverage to the authorities 
in Molinopampa to stop further development by migrants, whom they viewed as destroyers of 
the areas resources. The ACP was being used as a way to prevent the development of livelihood 
activities by the already disadvantaged migrant families.  
Tilacancha 
In the districts Levanto and Maino there was an overwhelming response that the objective 
of the ACP to increase economic development for the rural communities had not been 
accomplished at the time of the study. The community leaders and household surveys indicated 
that the community is still waiting for the promised ecosystem service payments from the 
Chachapoyas water users to compensate the communities for their conservation opportunity 
costs. The community leaders stated that Chachapoya’s residents needed to be held accountable 
for compensating them for using less land for agricultural and livestock production and 
recognize their work to protect the Tilacancha watershed. The provincial municipality and 
APECO are working to achieve broader education and awareness among the Chachapoyas, 
Levanto, and Maino populations of the ecosystem services Tilacancha watershed provides and 
the significance of the protection of the watershed through the ACP. APECO received 
international funding to carry out a series of public awareness campaigns in support of the ACP 
Tilacancha. Two slogans from the campaign illustrate the role of the community members in 
protecting the water for Chachapoyas. One slogan reads: “Let us [community members in the 
ACP Tilacancha] care for the grasslands, and you [Chachapoyas] will have water.”  A survey has 
been conducted in Chachapoyas which confirmed the willingness of the water users to pay an 
ecosystem service fee on top of the utility fee to compensate community members in Tilacancha 
for their conservation efforts. 
The compensation measures have not yet been implemented, and a sentiment repeated by 
many community members was that the ACP is only benefiting Chachapoyas and that the 
community has yet to receive the benefits that were promised in exchange for leaving their land. 
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This led to community members feeling that they had been “tricked” into creating the ACP. A 
community leader in Levanto expressed this in the following way: 
APECO and Chachapoyas benefit from the ACP more than the community, they 
come and trick us. The help and money needs to come if people are going to leave 
their land, it wasn’t good land, that’s why it wasn’t difficult to leave it, but in 
Maino it is more difficult  
A household expressed a similar feeling, stating:  
Our neighbors who have land in the area were lied to, now APECO says that we 
cannot have cows there (in the ACP). They lied to us. Recently they came taking 
away land. We got mad. Before the area was free land, everybody put their cows 
there. Now we cannot because of ACPECO. [R113-Tilacancha] 
In Levanto the area did not have to give up land, but the community still acknowledged that 
Chachapoyas was benefiting more from the area than the communities. Levanto authorities noted 
that the compromise to conserve Tilacancha was larger for the district of Maino, where the land 
was productive and individuals have property within the ACP. There was also mistrust of 
whether or not funds generated from a payment for ecosystem services scheme would reach the 
community, as stated by a household: 
They (NGOs) always say they are going to raise the price of water in 
Chachapoyas and that the money will benefit us with projects that pay to reforest. 
They say that the work will be paid labor. There isn’t direct help yet, APECO 
absorbs funds, but doesn’t bring them, or give anything [R104-Tilacancha] 
This raises concern that income generation from a payment scheme to introduce projects in a 
community will likely increase the perception of NGO capture of funds, unless the projects are 
implemented and managed at the community level.   
It angered community members that Chachapoyas was receiving water from the area that 
they are making land management changes to conserve, yet their water is untreated and is not in 
the limited use zone of the ACP. As stated by one comunero:  
We are conserving, but we do not have help, the water is for Chachapoyas, we do 
not benefit from this water, I had cows in the land and they got mad at me, but 
what can I do? They do not give me an alternative [R110-Tilacancha] 
 
The community members have been working to meet the “conservation compromises” of the 
ACP management plan, but do not feel that the agreement to compensate them for these 
conservation efforts has been met.  
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Resistance to “conservation” as defined by the ACP Management Plan 
In light of both interviews conducted for this study and understanding of the historical 
context which is influencing the operation of the ACPs, there is a pattern of local resistance to 
the “conservation” efforts of the ACPs. The key issues involved the impact of the ACP in 
fostering loss of local income without compensation or providing new income generation 
opportunities, and displacement. In both the district Maino (Tilacancha) and in the ACP 
Molinopampa a common topic was the need for alternative incomes, since they had to leave land 
that they would otherwise use for production. The district Levanto (Tilacancha) has only a few 
property owners within the ACP boundaries and the land within the ACP is less productive, so 
the community members do not feel that they had to change productive activities in order to 
conserve the area. In the district Maino there were several families (around 40) that hold land 
within the ACP and as part of the ACP’s management plan they can longer clear new areas to 
cultivate. Many were also asked to take their cows off of their land. In Molinopampa the ACP 
includes all the land in the three communities within the forest (Ocol, San Jose, and 
Pumahermana). The management plan states that all forested areas that have not been cultivated 
need to be left for activities such as tourism and non-timber forest products. A common theme in 
district of Maino in Tilacancha and in Molinopampa was that if they could no longer produce in 
these areas they needed another form of income. I provide more detailed analysis below on the 
two ACPs. 
Molinopampa 
In Molinopampa, the current president of the community stated that “Molinopampa is a 
productive area, while other ACPs like in Levanto are unproductive grassland” and that he found 
it rare that SERNANP would declare an ACP where there are property owners and productive 
land. Another leader in Molinopampa expressed this concern in the following way: 
We hope for income. Since the land is now illegal to use, we are limited in our 
cultivations. So, now we need help to live. We cannot cut down the trees. We 
have to manage our land manipulated by those that made the ACP. 
  
The sentiment that there needed to be an alternative income if further agriculture land could not 
be developed was repeated by many community members, but was the strongest among the 
migrant population. One community leader of Molinopampa who was a migrant believed that 
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“there are benefits to conservation, but the community needs help, we have needs that are larger 
and more urgent”. This idea was also conveyed in the following assertion by a household:  
Once we were told we were going to receive money to not cut down trees, but the 
majority of the community members were not in agreement because they want to 
make their farms. What are we going to live off of if we do not create farms? In 
part it is important to protect the forest… for our children and the future, so they 
do not suffer of not having water. But, when you live off of agriculture it is 
difficult to comply. [R29-Molinopampa] 
This statement shows that even when presented with the opportunity to receive payments, some 
campesinos do not want to leave their farming activities. This is possibly in part because they do 
not trust the outside organizations that would implement the payment programs.  
The expression of being in support of the protection of forests and the resources, but also 
needed to use the land for agriculture was very common when speaking with campesinos. 
Despite the conflicting views of “conservation” under the context of the regulation of the ACP, 
many community members in Molinopampa stated that they saw the importance of managing 
their land in a way that is in line with the desired results of the outside organizations, but 
individually and not under the rules that were placed by outsiders. Community members stated 
that some people in the area conserve, while other choose not to, but recognized this as an 
individual decision. One community member explained that “Each community member protects 
their own area of forest, some chose to protect, others chose to destroy” [R43-Molinopampa]. 
One community member clarified that although the offices made the documents and the plans, it 
is the community members that protect the area and that they organized themselves to protect 
their own farm land. Another community member expressed a similar view of conservation 
being an individual effort and separate from the outside organizations:  
A lot of the mountain here belongs to my family, I have the forests on my land 
conserved, I plant trees, I didn’t participate in the meetings to create the ACP 
because I didn’t know about them, but I plant trees and conserve my forest for 
myself. I didn’t go to the trainings, the engineers come here to make money, I 
conserve for myself. [R22-Molinpampa] 
The mistrust for the NGOs and the lack of inclusion of community members in the management 
planning led some campesinos who were in agreement with forest protection to be against the 
ACP.  
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Tilacancha 
In Tilacancha landowners within the ACP resist giving up their ongoing livelihood 
activities because some community members were removed from their land and the community 
doesn’t have other land to give them. It generates for example a huge loss for cattle producers. 
To reduce grazing land for the same amount of cattle requires new technology that is expensive 
and unaffordable to local households, such as stables and machines for concentrated feed. 
Without this technology there is not enough pasture land close enough to homes to completely 
move cattle from the ACP. No help has been given to attain and implement these technologies. 
The mayor of Maino expressed that with the ACP there are not areas to expand agriculture or to 
provide productive land for the community members that had to leave their land as a result of the 
ACP:  
Fifty four percent of Maino’s land is in the ACP and as an authority I am worried 
about where we can do agricultural activities. Most of the community is in 
agreement with the ACP, but some are not because they (Chachapoyas) haven’t 
carried through with what was in the master plan.  
One community member who had land in the area stated:  
I have land in the ACP and I had the land a long time before the ACP was created. 
40 community members have land in the ACP. Sometimes there isn’t enough 
other land to put our cows. We have pasture land there and we cannot just leave it. 
They say if we move our cows from the area they can help with a benefit, but it is 
not defined what benefits yet. It costs a lot to use sustainable techniques in pasture 
management. [R98-Tilacancha] 
In Tilacancha the land management rules were being enforced to a greater extent than in 
Molinopampa and many community members in Maino were already asked to leave their pasture 
land and remove their cattle from their land within the ACP: 
It is the law to follow the land use rules, but when there isn’t enough land in the 
lower area that is outside of the ACP we have to cultivate it. If not what will we 
live off of? There are times when it is too dry in the land below and the pasture 
land is too dry, and we have to put cows in the ACP. Now there are less there, my 
grandpa had cows there and he had to remove them [R101-Tilacancha] 
 
A landowner in the ACP told the story of how he and other landowners were given land in the 
ACP before the creation of the ACP and expressed the following concern:  
We were given that land, and now they want to remove us from our land, but how 
are we going to live? We were reported for burning shrubs to create pasture for our 
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horse there and the water company reported us. We had to pay a lawyer. We do not 
have other land. We were given this land 20 years ago, before the ACP, and now 
we cannot put our animals there. I do not have land to produce and there is no 
other land left in the community. This land was supposed to be for our kids. 
[R119-Tilacancha] 
Another household that was displaced from living on and using their land said that when APECO 
came they explained that after the declaration of the ACP little by little they would remove the 
people from the land within the ACP. The household expressed the same worry as the 
community president that there is not enough free land in the community to displace all the 
people who will need to be removed. The story of the household that was fined for burning 
shrubs in the area was told often during carrying out the household surveys. The enforcement of 
the rules and the lack of compensation instilled fear in the community members who had land in 
the area with cattle and plans to expand their production.  
Outside Control of Land Management  
The ACP efforts by the NGOs and state entities left some community members fearful regarding 
the loss of community control over community land.  
Molinopampa 
In Molinopampa, even though community members have not been personally displaced 
from their land there are some community members that associate “conservation” with a loss of 
land. Many of the campesinos and leaders stated that when the ACP was first being created the 
community felt they would lose their land. Some of the campesinos still felt this way when 
discussing the ACP. One community member believed: 
The candidates do not talk about conservation because they know that people 
won’t vote for them if they do. There are a lot of people that are not in agreement. 
They do not understand well. They think that that state will take away their land. 
Alot of people think this [R54-Molinpampa] 
The community member felt that many community members believed that their land would be 
taken away by the project to implement “conservation” and this became an issue during 
municipal elections. The community members took note that the candidates that were running for 
mayor of the district Molinopampa did not mention the ACP, and believed it was because he 
realized community members are against conservation. Another household stated that:  
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Right now the NGOs are monitoring the area. They are preventing our activities, 
but we know what we need. The Ronda cannot monitor because the Ronda is to 
help the community, not to contradict the community. [R40-Molinopampa] 
Ronda campesinos are the community watch system in campesino communities, where there is 
no police enforcement, throughout history they have been viewed as the protectors of the rights 
of campesino communities. The community member felt that the ACP was being enforced and 
monitored by NGOs. He stated that the Ronda would not participate in the ACP, because the 
ACP is contradictory to what community members want.  
The view of conservation as not supporting or even in opposition to local community 
development and needs and the mistrust for the outside organizations in Molinpampa contradicts 
the idea of ACPs as a locally beneficial activity; it counters the idea that it was a voluntary effort 
when households neither directly participated nor agreed with its foundational terms. Many 
campesinos viewed the ACP as another form of state control over their land rights. Two 
examples express this idea. 
In Tilacancha, particularly in the district Maino, some campesinos felt that their land had 
become “privatized” by the implementation of the ACP. For example, one household explained: 
We didn’t participate and it was obligatory to enter the agreement (for the ACP). I 
still do not want the conservation area. Since it was made private we no longer 
have enough land. The ACP is for the water for Chachapoyas and we didn’t know 
that it was going to be made private. We cannot cultivate that land now, we 
cannot reforest. It is all prohibited. We didn’t know with what expected results the 
ACP was made. We didn’t understand well. After it was made we understood that 
it is private. They (APECO) are suggesting that the people who have land in the 
area will receive help to leave the area and do other activities. We are waiting for 
an economic help. The area has been declared and we cannot do anything. In 
Levanto it is different, it is all grassland, but here in Maino the land is productive. 
[R104-Tilacancha] 
Another community member explained that they agreed with conservation, but not with 
“privatizing” the water: 
In my opinion the conservation of water is good, but after they help they can 
privatize the water. This doesn’t convince me, the water is ours, and it is part of 
nature. 
 
The enforcement to halt the use of the land within the ACP and the current lack of benefits has 
left community members in Maino and Levanto feeling that their land has become controlled by 
outside organizations.  
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Chapter Summary  
 In this Chapter I have presented the motivations and experiences of the multiple actors 
involved with the application of the legal and institutional framework of private conservation 
areas (ACPs) in Peru, particularly in campesino communities. Community-owned ACPs are 
being endorsed in Peru at the national level to recognize the voluntary and community driven 
efforts of peasant and indigenous landowning communities in biodiversity conservation. The 
Peruvian protected area service SERNANP views the areas as an opportunity to supplement the 
Peruvian System of Natural Protected Areas (SINANPE) by increasing the total coverture and 
representativeness of the countries biodiversity under legal protected area status. The ACPs are 
seen as particularly useful as biological corridors or buffer zones to state run protected areas. At 
the national level it was emphasized by SERNANAP that the areas should not be viewed as a 
way to prevent resource extraction activities from entering a community, but as a way to 
contribute to the country’s conservation. It was expressed by SERNANP that the conservation 
efforts are practices that the communities have been implementing for many generations and the 
legally documented ACP provides the community with formal recognition for their efforts. The 
legal recognition of ACPs provides a biodiversity conservation tool for regional governments 
that are in charge of their resource management planning under the country’s recent 
decentralization process.  
 At the regional level I found that ACPs are being used by conservation NGOs and the 
regional governmental entities to implement their ecological and economical zoning plans (ZEE). 
These plans were created by the regional government along with both national and international 
conservation NGOs. The ACPs Tilacancha and Molinopampa were identified by the regional 
ZEE plan as areas to create protected areas, and since the lands are on campesino community-
owned land the option for legal protected area status was to create an ACP. In both 
Molinopampa and Tilacancha the initiative to create the ACP came from the outside 
conservation NGOs that were working in partnerships with state entities. The regional entities 
and national and international NGOs who aided in the creation of the ACPs had differing 
motivations for engaging with ACPs including the expansion of biodiversity conservation, 
community development and empowerment, and to provide the land with protected area status to 
prevent mining and resource extraction projects from entering the areas.  
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 The private conservation areas are justified by environmental agents inspired by 
incentive-based conservation and payment for ecosystem service schemes, as such ACPs are 
presented to communities as an opportunity for raising income and mitigating poverty. This 
largely impacted the communities’ decisions to engage with outside agencies and to declare their 
community land as an ACP. Other motivations of communities to create ACPs included 
protecting the integrity of their ecosystems for their current and future use and strengthening 
community control over their land and resources. The latter involved the desire for the 
communities in Tilicanacha to prevent mining companies from entering and in Molinopampa to 
prevent further land sales to migrants, who community members viewed as destructive to their 
local environment.  
 Although the communities in both Molinopampa and Tilacancha eventually voted in 
favor of the creation of the ACPs, it is important to note the methods used by the outside 
agencies to involve the communities in the planning for the areas management plans and who 
was left out of the process. In Tilacancha there was more community inclusion in the creation of 
the management plan than in Molinopampa and the community members were aware of the use 
compromises and zoning. In Molinopampa the management plan was made by outside agencies 
and community members were never presented the plan or given an opportunity to provide input. 
In Molinopampa the migrant community members were not consulted and were excluded from 
planning processes, yet they were the most impacted by the use compromises imposed by the 
ACP since they recently bought land with hopes to develop their properties for pastures and 
subsistence crops. Two constraints emerged in the legal structure of ACPs that prevent 
community collaboration in creating ACPs: the requirement of costly technical studies and 
conflicting motivations between and within the levels necessary to complete the legal recognition 
of the ACPs. The differences in the motivations for creating the ACPs and the exclusion of 
groups in decision making have had a large impact on the community knowledge of ACPs and 
the outcomes of the implementation of the ACP.  
In the formal process to create the ACP the conservation discourse of outside agencies 
predominated in the decision making regarding land zoning and appropriate land uses for the 
ACP. This was revealed in the communities understanding of conservation, which they related to 
land use restrictions as outlined by the ACP land use compromises. There was also confusion 
among community members over the word private in the term “private conservation area”. 
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Community members in both Molinopampa and Tilacancha associate the word private with 
privatization, which is viewed negatively by community members. 
Reflective of the lack of community inclusion in the creation of the ACPs, in both 
Molinopampa and Tilacancha, community leaders and households commented that not all of the 
campesinos understand what the ACP is, what the community members are doing to conserve it, 
and why the use rules exist. The communities’ definitions of conservation and their 
interpretations and knowledge of the use compromises suggest that the outside organizations 
have differing definition and approach to implementing conservation compared to the 
communities especially with regard to what the ACPs are being conserved for, how they should 
be conserved, and for what results. 
The lack of community participation in creating the ACPs, the communities’ expectation 
for economic benefits, and the implementation of land use restrictions within the ACPs had 
several outcomes. In both the ACPs Molinopampa and Tilacancha community members and 
leaders indicated that the rules or commitments on paper to manage the ACP were not fully 
translated into action at the time of the study. This perception was strongest in the ACP 
Molinopampa were the rules were not being enforced and community members were confused 
over the creation of the ACP and the associated use rules. In the ACP Tilacancha 40 families 
from the community Maino with land inside the ACP were asked to remove their cattle from the 
area and halt productive activities on these lands. This was a large concern to these families as 
well as to the community as a whole, as more than half of the communities land is in the ACP 
and there is no other land to provide the families for their production.  
The ACPs provided limited protection from external threats. In the ACP Molinopampa 
the ACP was not succeeding in its mission to prevent the further sale of land to migrant families. 
Although there was no proof that the ACP plays a role in preventing mining activity in 
Tilacancha, some community leaders and members mentioned the ACP as aiding in the 
prevention of mining companies entering the community.  
The high expectations of economic activities from the ACP were not being met in either 
Molinopampa or Tilacancha at the time of the study. In Molinopampa only 51% of the 
households surveyed felt they were benefiting from the creation of the ACP and in Tilacancha 
65%. The perceived household benefits were mostly non-monetary and largely included the 
services that the local ecosystem provides to the families’ health and livelihood activities. Few 
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families mentioned projects as benefiting their household, but projects had been implemented in 
both Molinopampa and Tilacancha. Many of the efforts to implement economic generating 
activities reflect the understandings and interests of the state or NGOs that started the initiatives 
and introduce new practices and livelihoods, such as ecotourism, seed sales, and native tree 
reforestation. No attention was directed at developing an understanding of how property rights 
and social institutions in the communities had been organized or the conflicts within the 
communities that may impact the project outcomes. In Molinopampa the projects outcomes were 
negatively impacted by existing social conflicts, which were exacerbated as a result of funds 
entering the community. The consequences of the difference in expected outcomes compared to 
actual outcomes included deepening community mistrust of outside organizations, a resistance to 
“conservation” as defined by the ACP management plans, and the feeling of a loss of community 
autonomy over land use decisions.  
There is a lack of monitoring of the ecological change and community development in 
the ACPs by both the community and the outside organizations. As a representative at the 
Peruvian Trust Fund for National Parks and Protected Areas explained, there is a recent rise in 
the use of ACPs in protected area creation in Peru, but currently there has been no monitoring of 
the areas. The lack of monitoring has impacted the effectiveness and legitimacy of the areas.  
 In the following chapter I further discuss these results, connecting them back to the 
current literature and the national history and political-economic discourses discussed in the 
literature review. I use the results to draw a conclusion and provide recommendations for the use 
of legally recognized community-owned conservation areas in Peru and globally.  
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CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Introduction 
  
 Voluntary privately owned protected areas have arisen around the world as a new option 
for state recognized community conserved areas. These private reserves are emerging as an 
alternative to government-run resource management as a way to more directly involve citizens as 
stewards of their local natural resources. Indigenous and Community Conserved Areas (ICCAs) 
are being promoted by mainstream conservation and the IUCN as a type of community 
conserved area which enables conflict resolution and improves social relations among 
stakeholders while enhancing natural resource management (Berkes F. , Community Conserved 
Areas: Policy Issues in Historic and Contemporary Context, 2009). Despite their recent 
proliferation, voluntary community-based private protected areas and the motivations behind 
their legal recognition remain largely unknown (Langholz & Lassoie, 2001). This study 
examines community-based private conservation areas in Northern Peru known in Peru as 
Private Conservation Areas (ACPs-Spanish Acronym). Specifically, I investigated the creation 
and management of two case study campesino (peasant) community-owned ACPs in the 
Amazonas region of Peru. The implementation and outcomes of ACPs in Peru are shaped by 
interests, policies and discourses at national and international levels, and their interactions with 
local communities. In Peru it also directly involves the national government’s ministry of 
environment (MINAM) which grants their legal recognition, and non-governmental 
organizations that aid the communities in gaining recognition and managing the community 
conservation areas.  
The purpose of this final chapter is to take a step back and examine the two ACPs which 
were the focal point of this study, and to place them in the context of wider national and 
international forces at play. It highlights the challenges and obstacles across these scales of 
interests in ACPs, as well as opportunities. I return to the main questions posed at the beginning 
of the study and use the results to try and answer them. The chapter is presented in four sections.  
Each begins with a summary of key findings, and then moves to a discussion of them in terms of 
the literature, and where appropriate, offers recommendations.  The topics of the four sections 
are the following:  (1) the motivations and justifications behind the movement for the creation of 
ACPs on campesino community titled lands, (2) the participation of  community members in the 
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establishment and planning processes of the state-recognized ACPs in campesinos communities, 
(3) what has been achieved, or not in the creation of these ACPs, and finally (4) my concluding 
thoughts on the use of legally recognized community-owned private protected areas in Peru, and 
how these results may be useful to the inclusion of ICCAs in protected area legislation elsewhere. 
Motivations and Justifications to Create ACPs 
 Community-Based Private Conservation Areas (ACPs) are endorsed in Peru at the 
national level to recognize the voluntary efforts of peasant and indigenous landowning 
communities in biodiversity conservation. At the national level this involves both state agencies 
as well as non-governmental organizations, some of which originate outside Peru. The private 
protected areas are legally recognized by the government and supplement the national protected 
area network. Despite the seemingly straightforward motivation of national interests for the 
creation of the ACPs, the results of this study show that examining the motivations of the 
multiple actors involved in their creation and management reveals complexities embedded with 
historic power relations.  
The two case study ACPs were identified to be designated as ACPs through the regional 
ecological and economic zoning plans drawn up as part of the country’s decentralization process. 
The areas were identified as important for expanding the regional biodiversity under protected 
area status and for the provision of water sources to downstream urban areas. Importantly, 
although ACPs are considered community initiated and voluntary the initiation to create ACPs in 
these two areas did not come from the local communities, rather the idea was introduced to them 
by outside entities. Another important finding was that the process to create the ACPs involved 
expensive ecological studies that required experts and that participants claimed largely dismissed 
their local knowledge. The process to create state recognized ACPs may risk the exclusion 
communities who want to create areas, but whose resources are not valued by conservation 
NGOs who provide funding.  
As described in the literature review, land tenure of campesino communities was 
reformed in the 1970s to facilitate the change in rural dwellers status from land “squatters” to 
land “stewards”.  It did so by provided communal land titles to communities that had been 
developing land for agriculture. These land titles in practice have had varying effects depending 
on federal policies and local socioeconomic, political, and ecological conditions. As reported in 
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the literature, in several cases throughout the country, community autonomy over titled land does 
not always hold up against the central government’s desire to pursue economic growth through 
increased resource extraction (Che Piu & Menton, 2014). As part of the 2007 free-trade 
agreement with the US, economic policies were modified to attract foreign investment in Peru. 
Collective rights to indigenous and community territories, trying to increase autonomy through 
communal land titles, appear to offer no line of defense against external threats, such as from 
mining and large-scale development projects. In the Amazonas region ACPs are being used, in 
part, by communities and conservation NGOs to provide additional state recognition to 
campesino and indigenous community land rights and hence a legally recognized voice in how 
these lands are utilized.  
As mentioned in the literature review, migration to the Amazonas region from the 
neighboring region Cajamarca has been identified by regional conservation agencies and NGOs 
as a major threat to the region’s biodiversity and natural resources. Migrant populations typically 
settle in campesino communities, which do not provide individual private land titles recognized 
by the state but “titles of position” awarded by the local communal governing system. Thus, the 
state can’t control the sale of land to the migrants. In light of their resource use, the migrants are 
viewed by the regional government and regional conservation NGOs as destroyers of the 
region’s environment. My view is that the outside entities promoting ACPs are in part using the 
creation of the community conservation areas to monitor and control the sale of land to migrants 
which have been putting pressure on the region’s limited resources.  
Creating ACPs to limit migrants’ resource access is not the official reason for creating 
ACPs as declared by the ministry of environment (MINAM).  The latter stressed that the areas 
should not be used to prevent extractive development and outside threats. Also in contradiction 
to MINAM’s view, and the promotion of ICCAs internationally, is the use of the areas to control 
environmental degradation as perpetuated by local populations as well. This research found that 
conservation organizations were viewing the campesino population’s land uses as a major threat 
to the conservation of biodiversity in the areas. This mirrors Igoe and Brockington’s (2007) 
argument that mainstream conservation discourses continue to present local populations as the 
primary threat to conservation, and under this model, existing local concerns including their own 
sense of environmental threats are frequently ignored. The reputation of campesino communities 
as destroyers of the environment is deeply embedded in dominant environmental discourses at 
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play in the Amazonas region of Peru, and both state and non-governmental conservation agents 
continue to blame local communities for the failure of conservation initiatives to achieve their 
goals.  
Li (2002) notes that despite new global environmental discourses which suggest a 
willingness of national governments to recognize peasant needs, this does not mean that the 
historic asymmetrical power relations have reversed. She observes that in both the Philippines 
and Indonesia the timing of the recognition of community-based natural resource control was 
after the economically valuable timber had been extracted and there were no new investments to 
be made (Li, 2002). This situation can be observed in the case study sites in this study as well, 
where all of the accessible valuable timber had already been extracted and sold to state-backed 
timber companies in the 1970s. In Tilacancha the opportunity of mining exists, but extraction 
would destroy the water source for the region’s growing capital creating powerful outside 
interest that the land is under protected area status and protected from resource extraction and 
exploitation. The natural resources in the areas studied in this research are geographically (as 
well as political-economically) negligible to the national economy and elite interests. As reported 
by Li (2002) the opportunity for peasant communities to have greater land recognition through 
the creation of ACPs came not only after their main timber resources were exploited, but under 
the conditions that they take on the conservation of the forest that remains and that they “limit 
their economic aspirations accordingly” (p.270). As described above, historic livelihood and land 
use practices are changing around the world in response to agricultural reforms, government laws 
and policies, market integration and economic opportunities, and demographic transitions. These 
changes hold true for the region in which this research was conducted.  As discussed in the 
literature review the communities in the region have been integrated into the regional and 
national market and traditional subsistence agricultural land practices are being replaced by 
production of cattle. The meat and milk products are sold in regional and national markets. These 
activities provide the main source of household income. The framework for the ACPs 
acknowledged subsistence agriculture for household use in the area and small scale cattle 
production, but increasing cattle production, although the most economically important 
livelihood practice in the area, was deemed as “unsustainable” and inappropriate to the area’s 
ecology. Although from an ecological and biodiversity standpoint this could be true, from a 
justice standpoint it follows what Dove deemed as “rainforest crunch”. Dove points out that 
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when rural people stumble upon economically beneficial development opportunities they are 
quickly removed from them; it is usually the least economically valuable activities that they are 
permitted to continue (1993, p.18). The shift to cattle production in my two case study ACPs 
actually came after the local forests had already been cleared and sold by outsiders, and was one 
of the few opportunities for local communities to find income generating activities. The solutions 
provided by the outside agencies did not provide lucrative opportunities as promised, especially 
not at the level provided through cattle production. 
Local Community Participation  
 The initiatives to develop ACPs in my two case study sites eventually gained sufficient 
local support to pass the majority vote and become declared as ACPs, but the initiatives were not 
built on locally relevant practices. The efforts largely reflected the understandings and interests 
of the outside organizations that introduced the idea to create the ACP. In both areas the leaders 
and households reported that the conservation area was introduced by outside entities, listing off 
the names the institutions, NGOs, and consultants that visited their communities. Often the 
community members were confused by who these organizations were. The “community-based” 
ACP initiatives conformed to the biodiversity conservation paradigm that emphasizes restricted 
use and access to resources. The results show that in the case study sites the main form of 
community involvement was the transfer of information from outside agencies to the 
communities through communal assemblies. In the ACP Tilacancha the boundaries and use 
compromises were made in collaboration with community members during several communal 
assemblies allowing for community input in the ACP management plan. The research revealed 
that in the ACP Molinopampa community members were presented the idea to create the ACP 
during a communal assembly, but the management plan was never presented to the community 
for input before the ACP was declared. To create an ACP on community titled land a 2/3 
majority vote is needed during a community assembly. Despite the community involvement in 
the ACP Tilacancha, I found that local leaders in both areas refer to the ACP as initiatives of 
outside organizations and in the communities where there were individual land owners within the 
ACP land the leaders and community members complained of the new outside governance over 
their land use. Both communities voted in favor of the creation of the ACPs, but as my results 
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show and as discussed below not everyone was included in the voting and those that were did not 
fully understand the land use agreements they were approving.  
Berkes (2009) argues that although IUCN makes a distinction between “co-managed” 
and “community-owned and managed conserved areas” under the protected area category ICCA, 
the ICCAs will require co-management when guided and recognized by government legislation. 
He states that for many communities this “co-management” may imply a threat of government 
intervention in local land uses. The argument that the legal recognition of community-owned and 
managed conservation areas would lead to undesired government intervention was supported by 
my research. In both of the case study areas, the communities were not initially open to the idea 
of developing an ACP, or to “conservation” itself; they feared losing control over their land.  
There was an initial distrust by community members for the outside organizations and a fear that 
the community would lose control over land use decisions. As seen in the results, for some this 
lack of trust and fear remained and possibly heightened after the creation of the ACP.  
In Molinopampa which was composed of a campesinos migrant population from the 
neighboring region Cajamarca as well as long-established community members, the migrants 
were completely left out of the decision making process to create the ACP. The migrant 
populations are discriminated against in the region and are viewed by long-established 
community members, NGOs and governmental agencies as a threat to the region’s natural 
environment. As discussed above, in-migration to the region was largely caused by agricultural 
reforms and the loss of land by mining activity. The migrants came to the area and bought land 
from the long-established community members in Molinopampa for agricultural livelihoods. The 
migrant populations were not consulted whether to create the ACP on their land, because they 
were not viewed as legitimate land owners; yet the designation of the area as an ACP, and the 
resource rules that came along with it, largely restricted their resources and livelihoods. They 
learned after the ACP was created that their land was included in the conservation area, and were 
only explained the rules when the desire to create a road came up in a meeting. They were denied 
a road they wanted which would have increased access to their farm land and market transport; 
ironically they were denied the road because their land was legally in the conservation area – an 
area they neither wanted nor had any say in designating.   
  Community land tenure in Peru is incredibly complex and imprecise. As Castillo (2006) 
states, the current reality in campesino communities is that almost all communities have their 
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agricultural lands distributed in family parcels, and that practically every Peruvian cultivable 
land is individually possessed, even if recognized by titles as communally-owned. In areas where 
the land is divided into individual parcels it could be more valuable to sign individual 
conservation agreements with each land holder, reducing the conflict that has been created by the 
“majority vote”, which clearly left many community members out of the decision making 
process. This could help to reduce the social conflicts that the ACPs have created. This concept 
was presented by community members in Molinopampa who view conservation as an individual 
household effort with each household making land use decisions on their own land. In 
Tilacancha those with land holdings in the area were the most impacted by the majority vote to 
create the conservation area. In the district Maino this created conflict, as the estimated 40 
families who held productive land within the ACP were pressured to remove their cattle and halt 
further expansion of agriculture on their land as required in the ACP land use compromises. The 
pressure became strong when one land holder was sued by the private water company for 
burning an area of their property within the ACP for creating pasture. This worried the Mayor of 
Maino who was concerned that since the ACP covers more than half of the communities land 
there was no land to provide a productive space for displaced families.  
Whose Valuation Of Nature Was Involved In Creating The ACPs? 
 The term “conservation” in the area was highly contested. The term was not always 
recognized by the community members involved in the study’s survey. Those who recognized 
the term associated it with “taking care” of nature as defined by the use compromises for the 
ACP. As Garcia et al. (2012) found in ICCAs in Mexico, the communities’ understanding of 
conservation largely reflects the prevalent conservation discourse  (often reflecting global trends) 
and contrasts with the local narratives of what they value in nature (especially the nature in their 
area). Very few community members interviewed in both case study sites in this research related 
the term conservation to local land practices. Rather they recognized that conservation was a new 
term. 
Despite the framing of ACPs as voluntary community-driven efforts providing state-
recognition to expand the legitimate social actors involved in conservation, the outside 
imposition of the mission of “conservation” in the ACPs in Peru’s mirrors experience with so-
called community-based conservation efforts elsewhere. Key critiques of community-based 
natural resource management are that dominant models ignore local understanding and stories of 
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their environmental histories including drivers of resource change (Brosius, 1998; Brockington et 
al., 2008; Dove, 1993; Fairhead & Leach, 2003). In the ACP Tilacancha, where land owners 
were being displaced from their land within the ACP, a strict preservation view of conservation 
that human use and habitation is environmentally degrading was dominant. Households 
understood here that conservation means leaving an area untouched by humans (despite a prior 
history of use). In both areas the term conservation was used to describe and defend the ACP 
initiatives. As such, community members understood conservation as a restriction on their 
livelihood activities, and that the latter were inappropriate uses for the area. 
The commodification of nature and the idea of payment for ecosystem services had 
reached both ACP case study sites by the time of my research. These were both largely treated 
and viewed as potential income sources. In both areas there were high expectations that the 
ACPs would provide economic benefits to the community and households in exchange for 
community compliance with the ACP land use compromises. These expectations were promoted 
with the concept that if the communities met their “conservation agreements” they would benefit 
because of new income generating projects that would increase their livelihood while conserving 
their environment (according to the criteria set by the outside agencies). Not surprisingly, the 
conservation agreements largely dismissed historical and current land practices, mostly based on 
agriculture, and instead encouraged new practices that the outside agencies deemed “sustainable”.  
This occurred despite the fact that the latter activities were new to the area and evaluations of 
what is “sustainable” were largely advocated rather than based on empirical study and research 
over the time scales necessary to conclude something is sustainable. 
As such the private conservation areas in Peru reflect much of mainstream conservation 
despite the label of recognizing voluntary community initiated conservation projects. Importantly 
ACPs are promoted as being created by and for local communities, but in practice, the new 
institutional arrangement of ACP is far from representing a new form of local and indigenous 
communities contribution to the project of “conservation” through recognizing ICCAs as 
imagined by IUCN. Rather than facilitating the emergence of resource management and use 
based on local knowledge and in harmony with local environmental realities and landscape 
management strategies, the legal declaration of ACPs in Peru promoted the expansion of the 
mainstream conservation approaches; and ones not in accordance with local concerns. Although 
labeled as “community-owned” the ACPs were being used to increase the amount of land in 
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conservation according to the dominant paradigm involving strict protection and restricted use in 
designated areas; it even involved displacement in some cases. The opportunity to identify ways 
to harness the practical contributions of local communities in the protection of biodiversity has 
not been realized.  
Outcomes of ACPs 
My research identified many challenges to creating and maintaining community 
conservation areas. One issue has been a lack of follow up by those seeking to initiate the ACPs.  
The majority of the outside actors who initially promoted the conservation areas rarely interacted 
with the communities or provide supporting services. They did not provide information or seek 
to assist the communities with ACP operations and processes.  A second issue is the competition 
among the regional conservation agencies involved in creating the ACPs. This competition has 
created confusion within the communities due to different messages and numerous projects. A 
third issue relates to the competition and socio-political problems within the communities, and as 
shown in Molinopampa regarding the exclusion of migrants in the creation of the ACPs; and in 
general regarding the effectiveness and limited benefits accruing to the communities. All of the 
above has led to tensions and distrust between ACP members and the outside agencies, which 
has increased with the introduction of ecotourism and payment for ecosystem services projects. 
The unrealized expectations of income generation from the ACPs exacerbate these problems.   
That forests can produce economic value is a concept promoted by most NGOs and 
governmental agencies in the region and is understood by the local communities. Many 
community members in the campesinos communities suffer from limited income exacerbated by 
resource restrictions associated with new conservation efforts; they welcome the opportunities 
identified by NGOs to protect local resources and simultaneously raise incomes. In this view, it 
is a win-win conservation concept promoted by global and local conservation agents. However in 
reality it has not happened. The presentation of the areas as a means for development and income 
generation that has been left unmet has led community members to distrust the government 
agencies and partnering organizations. It is creating cynicism about “conservation” and likely to 
dissuade communities from initiating or participating in other conservation efforts; it may even 
lead to the abandonment of projects. As seen in the results the new land use restrictions 
combined with unmet promises for improved livelihoods caused some community members to 
view conservation with hostility.  
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The projects that were introduced to the communities did not take into account the 
existing social structures and conflicts within the communities and worked within the existing 
structures to increase conflict within the communities, especially evident in the ACP 
Molinopampa. The dependence on outside funds to create the ACPs and to implement 
development projects created conflict between the two outside organizations that initiated the 
creation of the ACP Molinopampa. Disagreements over what organization was capturing the 
funds for the ACP and how the funds were being used caused the two organizations to stop their 
collaboration. Both organizations continued to work in the area, but with different small projects 
and passing differing messages to community members regarding the management of the ACP. 
These disagreements trickled down to the community level, where community members were 
confused and angry over how the projects funds were being managed. The existing conflicts 
within community groups caused project benefits that reached the community to be captured by 
particular groups and families, despite the fact that the ACP and the associated use restrictions 
included the land of all community members. 
Plans for an ecosystem services scheme that provides funding from downstream water 
users in the city of Chachapoyas to the upstream communities in Tilacancha for the provision of 
water through their conservation efforts had been initiated at the time of my research and the 
recent passing of a law in Peru to allow such schemes ensured that the project will be executed. 
My research showed that the community members were waiting for these funds to arrive and 
were well aware that their new land use restrictions were benefiting the city of Chachapoyas and 
expected compensation. Some community members even mentioned with anger that their 
community’s water was untreated and came from a different watershed.  
The promised economic benefits of the ACPs were not realized at the time of my 
research, but the land management rules and restrictions were being promoted and in some cases 
enforced. As seen in the results, strict enforcement was being used in the ACP Tilacancha, where 
community members with land holding in the area were forcibly displaced from their land. This 
led community members to feel a loss of power in decision making and control over their land, 
and increased distrust for the state and outside agencies.  
The projects that were introduced to improve livelihoods reflect the understandings and 
interests of the state or NGOs that started the initiatives and introduce new, untested practices 
and livelihoods with high risk (i.e.,ecotourism, artisan work, and fruit preserves). While the plans 
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also mentioned improving agriculture and pasture management, these efforts did not build on 
their ongoing farming but sought, again, to introduce new activities focused on intensifying 
commodity production; and on land that has already been worked and not particularly productive.  
While this met the concerns of conservationists to limit opening of new farming areas and 
continuity of crop rotation and burning, it leaves farmers to cultivate less productive areas with 
no assistance on new and so called improved methods. These findings are in line with recent 
research that has begun to show that rather than replacing coercive forms of conservation, 
emerging forms of devolved incentive-based conservation have rearticulated older modes of top-
down governance and market-oriented development, seeking to incorporate farmers into 
livelihood programs to promote commodity production with fewer resources (Dressler & Roth, 
2011). Dressler and Roth (2011) argue that the political economic processes that drive the so 
called incentive-based conservation programs seek to increase commodity production as a way to 
generate incentives and abandon extensive forest land uses;  however, this situation leaves the 
farmers with many unknowns and new risks. 
Strengthening Land Tenure 
The alliances between conservation NGOs and rural and indigenous communities at 
national and international level, as envisioned in the ACPs in Peru, are not new and represent a 
double- edged sword (Ulloa, 2005). The areas may provide communities recognition for their 
conservation efforts and in-turn strengthen land tenure and provide outside aid in economic 
development, but only under the agreement that the community will abide to newly introduced 
land use constraints. My research shows that the legal recognition of the ACPs required 
communities to create land use agreements. Simarly, in an assessment of ICCAs and co-
governance of protected areas in Columbia, Premauer and Berkes (2015) found that in pursuing 
multiple objectives, such as biodiversity conservation and land rights, these efforts inevitably 
involve tradeoffs. They found that local groups in Columbia compromised full recognition of 
self-governance rights when agreeing to the creation of an ICCA. An important finding in my 
research was that communities engaging with the outside organizations to create ACPs were 
expected to comply with the terms and conditions, or ‘conservation’ agreements established by 
the government and conservation NGOs. “Agreements” that they had little or no say in 
determining.  Unless they reduce the threat of mining or other large-scale industrial development 
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in the area that the local populations are resisting, the establishment of use zones, including 
limited-use and multiple-use zones, dramatically alter their current livelihoods and future options. 
This study revealed that the creation of an ACP and the implementation of land use rules 
created fears of land “privizitation”. Fairhead et al. (2012) explain that privizitation can include 
the transfer of public or privately owned assets from the state to private companies, and that this 
can happen through dispossing of current owneers, delegitimizing claims through legislation, or 
“disposition through the market” (p.243). Payment for Ecosystem Service Schemes and REDD+ 
are in the preliminary stages in Peru and many communities are led to believe that there is a lot 
of money to be made from them; but the mechanisms of how these will be implemented and who 
will benefit from them are extremely unclear. Land grabbing and disposition associated with 
these schemes is a growing phenomenom around the world including Peru.  Many claim these 
land grabs are increasingly occuring in Northeastern Peru, facilitated by environmental NGOs 
and corporations  (Dooley et al. 2011; Fairhead et al, 2012;  Shanee 2014). Shanee (2014) 
explains that these land grabs are taking three forms: 1) conservation concessions granted to 
organizations where no formal land titles exist, 2) land bought from local people who have 
privately titled lands, and 3) organizations secure participation in local conservation projects on 
communally titled land. My research illustrates the example of the last form of land grabbing  on 
communal lands described by Shanee (2014). The use of protected areas as a means to promote 
increased economic activity in rural areas and as a means to control local land uses has been 
reported in other countries (Langholz & Krug, 2004, Igoe & Brockington, 2007). The concern 
over the privizitation of land as a result of the ACP was legitimized and heightened in Tilacancha 
when a community member was sued by the private water utility company that services 
Chachpoyas city with water sourced from Tilacancha for burning an area of his land within the 
ACP for cultivation. The increasing concern of community members over “privizitation” raises 
the question of how payment for ecosystem service schemes would play out if applied in 
community-owned ACPs. A third party seems to always be involved and, as this research found, 
this is very problematic as mistrust has already been built by the involvement of outside 
conservation agencies. The well known cases of community land rights being disregarded in 
order to promote the country’s economic development, especially the violent case in the region’s 
province of Bagua also plays an undeniable role in campesino community fear over a loss in land 
control when private companies and outside organizations enter with project proposals. 
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Community Member Awareness of Ecosystem Services 
Despite the expectation for economic benefits with payment for ecosystem services 
programs, I found that the community members in both Molinopampa and Tilacancha valued the 
ACPs role in protecting ecosystem services, such as clean air and water; indeed some said these 
are the most important benefits they receive through the ACP. They reported that they practice 
land management because a healthy landscape produces quality ecosystem services that improve 
both their health and livelihoods. Community members also identified the need to practice good 
land management currently, in order to have resources in the future.  This is similar to findings 
by Berkes (2009) that the people in ICCAs may not speak the formal biodiversity conservation 
discourse, but nevertheless have their own understanding and concepts for maintaining 
productive landscapes that link livelihoods with fostering ecological benefits that 
conservationists can interpret as ecosystem services. As my analysis of motivations for and the 
perceived benefits of the ACPs revealed, local members recognize the importance of maintaining 
a healthy ecological system, although they may prefer to continue to use resources in a way that 
may alter the current landscape in ways undesired by the “conservation discourse”. As a result, 
Berkes (2006, 21) suggests that conservation programs foster alienation among local users who 
feel “conservation without use makes no sense”; this is a similar process happening in the two 
ACPs I studied for this project. As explained above, community members in both case study 
sites continually raised problems with the land use rules they were supposed to follow, especially 
the prohibition of creating new farms from existing forests. 
Conclusions 
In the 1980s, many Latin American governments confronted with economic crisis and 
pressure by transnational institutions enacted neoliberal strutural adjustment programs that 
required the privatization of public entreprises and goods, market deregulation, and free trade 
(Hough & Rau, 2008). This restructuring is being used by Latin American states to make 
environmental resources available to global capital (Castree, 2008).These processes result in the 
restructuring of and changes to surface and subsurface land rights, the role and management of 
protected areas and conservation efforts, and native and campesino community land rights 
(Premauer & Berkes, 2015). In Peru, a recent threat that campesino and native community face is 
the assignment of mining and resource extraction titles within their community-owned territories. 
Acknowledging historical community forests or creating new ones has become an important 
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mechanism for communities to wield control over their lands and resources (Belsky, 2008). 
Today communities around the world are able to gain legal protection of native land claims, 
culture, and natural resource regimes through a variety of legally-recognized arrangements. 
Peru is still in the beginning stages of a national decentralization agenda which started in 
2002, and aims to devolve land management planning to the regional and local level. 
Concurrently, the central government signed a Free Trade agreement with the United States in 
2007 which led to the imposition of mining concessions and resource extraction plans on top of 
land that had been previously designated and titled for other purposes, including protected areas, 
indigenous lands, and campesino community agricultural land. The extraction development plans 
were agreed to by the central government in the national capital Lima without the consultation of 
regional governments or local communities. In the past decade, interest in conservation of Peru 
has exploded. The decentralization policy for regional Economic and Ecological Zoning Plans 
(ZEE-Spanish acronym), together with legislation for new legal and institutional frameworks that 
include the recognition of voluntary protected areas and conservation concessions on private and 
communal lands, has allowed international and national conservation institutions to create a 
mosaic of protected areas across the Peruvian landscape. This study revealed that the use of 
private protected areas on campesino and native community titled lands within the ZEE plans in 
part is being used by regional planners and conservation NGOs to prevent extractive industries 
from entering areas of ecological importance. The ZEE plans, and the studies necessary for the 
legal recognition of ACPs, required technical expertise and funds which led to national and 
international NGOs and agencies to aid in their development; providing them space to enact their 
priorities and motivations. This study revealed that some of the conservation NGOs in the region 
tend to increase the scale of their planning and operations to attract funding, focusing on the 
increase in hectares under protected area status rather than the local outcomes for people and 
ecosystems. This is in line with what Vidal (2008) termed “green grabbing”, defined as “the 
appropriation of land and resources for environmental ends (Fairhead et al., 2012, p. 238). 
Fairhead et al. (2012) explains that in the process of “green grabbing” the notions of ‘green’ are 
defined in particular ways, and while not necessarily involving the alienation of land from 
existing owners, it involves the restructuring of rules, authority over access, and the use of 
resources. In this form of land grabbing environmental agendas are the core drivers (Fairhead, et 
al., 2012). 
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This case study demonstrated that the local communities examined were excluded from 
making decisions regarding what constitutes appropriate land uses for their land, both in the ZEE 
land planning and in the creation of the ACPs. The alignment of community land rights 
recognition with conservation initiatives as determined by the outside entities led to many 
negative outcomes for the communities, including less control over their lands, distrust for 
outside entities, and a growing resistance to conservation as defined by the ACP management 
plan. This was largely due to the fact that local institutions and traditional management practices 
were ignored in the creation of the ACPs and actions taken worked against what local 
communities viewed as crucial to their well-being.  
Rural communities in the Amazonas region are comprised of peasant farmers who have 
endured land insecurity and degradation of environmental resources through land exploitation 
and livelihood loss by government backed resource extraction projects for timber and mining. As 
reported by Li (2002) in the Philippines and Indonesia, the efforts to create community-based 
conservation areas occur after the most valuable resources are extracted and with the expectation 
that the community members would leave current livelihood practices in exchange for more 
sustainable economic development plans. The development plans may even be managed by 
engineers paid for through project funds and expect the voluntary work of community members 
for projects that have uncertainties in their ability to foster economic growth, as seen in the 
reforestation and tourism efforts in Molinopampa. Whereas earlier reports on negative 
implications of conservation on farmers focus on how new income streams excludes historic 
livelihoods (Dove 1993), here my work joins with recent scholars (Dressler and Ross) to 
emphasize how the designation of new incomes under incentive-based conservation agendas are 
also exploitative and risky. In this research I found that the current livelihood practices of 
campesino community members were viewed by the conservation organizations as maladaptive 
and contradictory to the biodiversity conservation of the areas, despite the provision of food and 
income to the producers. The presentation of a new valuation of nature through ecotourism and 
payment schemes was the economic development solution presented by the outside agencies, 
although the model comes from elsewhere and has not been proven to work under the conditions 
found in my areas. In this way the decentralized ZEE planning and the use of legally recognized 
community conservation areas can be viewed as a new way for extending state control over land 
use by peasant communities, replicating old patterns of discrimination disguised by what is 
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termed by Li (2002) as “environmental garb” (p.278). This study revealed it is important, as 
described by Fairhead et al. (2012), to understand how these new political and economic 
discourses and actions surrounding nature play into regionally or locally specific histories of 
environments, land use, and governance and agrarian relations.  
As the race to declare protected areas continues, in July of 2014 the Peruvian Ministry of 
Finance passed a stimulus package which striped the recently created Ministry of Environment 
of many of its decision making powers and favors economic development over environmental 
protection (Kovacevic, 2014; Sullivan, 2014). Increasing financial capital is being privileged 
over raising natural capital. The recent legislation also brings into question the legitimacy of the 
regional economic and ecological zoning plans (Kovacevic, 2014). Given the current context of 
social-environmental conflicts initiated by the central Peruvian government’s desire for 
development in the Amazon, there is a dire need for a national and international policy debate on 
the overlapping powers and land claims. This includes the need to reevaluate the way that 
environmental and social impacts from development and resource extraction projects are 
assessed as well as how the territories will be organized and zoned to guarantee the provision of 
ecosystem services. It will be necessary to address the need for land use planning that uses 
integrated and cross-cultural information systems that aggregate information across all sectors 
and governing levels and which addresses property rights. The lack of reliable data restricts 
sound planning. Furthermore, environmental management policies must include mechanisms to 
guarantee that decision-making processes are transparent and take into account native and 
campesino community land rights and valuation of nature – in real ways rather than symbolic 
ones.  
Part of the argument by ICCA advocates is that by making the areas visible and officially 
recognized as areas of conservation priority, acknowledgement of indigenous rights and 
protection against external threats can be achieved (IUCN, 2008; Premauer & Berkes, 2015). 
ICCAs and the establishment of private protected areas in Peru may put campesino communities 
on national conservation planning maps, but should not be the solution for achieving the 
recognition of indigenous and peasant community rights. This study demonstrates that the 
recognition of rights are critically important and should come from the constitutional and policy 
level, but that they should not be tied to conservation objectives or particular schemes. 
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Local communities seek protection of forest resources and water, so as to ensure future 
use and to mitigate local climate changes. Community members perceive their environment as 
the source of their life, both materially and culturally.  Historically the inhabitants have both 
protected and transformed the areas to safeguard their livelihoods. They understand that when 
the integrity of the ecosystem is significantly compromised, so is their capacity to survive 
economically. As described by Richard Peterson et al. (2010), despite the interconnection 
between the desires for local users to protect the integrity of their land for their livelihoods and 
the government agencies and conservation NGOs desire to protect for biodiversity, their different 
ways of perceiving, valuing, and using the natural world conflict. Viewing conservation through 
a cultural lens can help to illuminate the historical and cultural context within which groups 
disagree and why those with power, both political and economic, are able to translate their views 
into policy and practice. Trying to resolve conflicts with economic or material compensation 
may provide short-term results, but long term solutions will only come through carefully and 
respectfully negotiating different perspectives, despite the otherwise disparate social and 
economic inequalities among actors.   
The ACPs in Northeastern Peru are an example of a widespread international 
conservation movement occurring since the IUNC incorporated Indigenous and Community 
Conserved Areas (ICCAs) as a distinct governance category in its protected area matrix in 2003, 
calling for their inclusion in state protected area systems. International agents of conservation, 
including multilateral organizations and non-governmental organizations have promoted legal 
and financial mechanisms to support the expansion of land under protected area status and the 
range of legitimate social actors involved in the constituency of conservation (Alcorn, 2005; 
Berkes, 2009; Reyes-Garcia, et al., 2012). The recognition of ICCAs aims to legitimize local 
conservation initiatives that differ from formal systems of state-managed or externally driven 
protected areas. This study shows that, despite the emphasis on voluntary and community 
ownership in the terminology and legal status of ICCA, the case studies reflect the ongoing 
challenges with NGO and state initiated community-based conservation more broadly. Similar to 
critiques on state introduced community based conservation efforts, the new instrument in Peru, 
ACPs, were not based on authentic community-led governance, livlihoods, and land uses. Instead 
the ACPs studied  involved externally initiated governance, livlihoods, and land uses that were 
not based on historical land uses or locally relevant practices (Dressler & Pulhin, 2009; Siebert & 
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Belsky, 2014). In this context it is important to understand how the institutionalization of  ICCAs 
may impact local populations perceptions of and interactions with their local environment. The 
ACPs in both case-study sites were introduced and enforced from the top down, and not locally 
driven despite their promotion as a way to recognize voluntary efforts by local communities. The 
case studies illuminate the complexity of the interactions between the nested levels that 
influenced the creation  and outcomes of the ACPs. The movement to create ACPs on campesino 
community lands and the outcomes of their implementation were largely influenced by the 
complex relationships between local land rights, development policies, environmental 
governance, and processes of decentralization, privatization, and neoliberal trade policies. 
Instead of promoting campesino community self-autonomy and land rights, in many ways the 
ACPs represent state resistance towards increasing individual land ownership and control in 
campesino communities. Ultimately, the future of the campesino communities and the land 
management therein will depend on how the neoliberal policies continue to play out in Peru and 
the resulting intersections between the resistance to these policies by regional and local 
populations, political discourses, and the demands of economic interests and capital. 
This research and the new development of laws to permit payment for ecosystem service 
schemes in Peru that allow for the commodification of nature within native and campesino titled 
communities raise many questions. First, the majority of lands within campesino communities 
are viewed by the communities’ governance systems as individually owned by households, and 
people are buying and selling the land as individual parcels in some communities, so is it viable 
and sensible to approach these area as community conservation efforts rather than as individual? 
As shown in the case studies not everyone was included in the community decision making 
process to create the ACPs, and the creation of the ACP had an unequal impact to members 
within the communities based on land holding distribution and migrant status. Second, as the 
legal declaration of ACPs on community titled lands in Peru continues to spread across the 
country it is important to further evaluate the outcomes of their application in the existing areas. 
For example, how will local disturst and resistance impact further implementation and 
management of the areas, especially with the passing of the new laws promoting payment 
schemes? The communities in the case studies were disillusioned by the ACPs. The promotion of 
incentive based conservation and payment for ecosytem service schemes are accelerating the 
local communities fear of “privatization” and what they see as a potential transition to a state 
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monitiored protected area with park guards and a real loss of self-governing rights over their 
lands. Currently there has been little monitoring of the areas and no research regarding the social 
and environmental impact of the areas. The areas are considered voluntary, but there is no 
discussion by the NGOs or state agencies regarding what would happen if the communities 
decided that they no longer want the area and resist the outside organizations and state agencies 
that aided in their legal recognition. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Interview Guide for State Agency and NGO Respondents 
Introducción:  
1. ¿Cuál es su posición con ___ (nombre de la organización) ____? (What is your position 
with __________organization?) 
2. ¿Cuánto tiempo ha estado trabajando con _ (nombre de la organización) __? (How long 
have you been working with _______?) 
3. ¿Puede usted explicar la misión de ___ (nombre de la organización) ___? (Can you explain 
the mission of _________?) 
 
4. ¿Cuál es el papel de ___ (nombre de la organización) ____ en conservación de la región? 
(What is the role of _______________in the conservation of the region?) 
5. ¿Cómo  apoya___ (nombre de la organización) ____ en la formación de los ACPs? (How 
does _________________help in the formation of ACPs?) 
 
6. ¿Qué espera lograr con los ACPs y cuáles son sus metas para los ACPs? (What does ______ 
hope to achieve with ACPs, and what are your goals for ACPs?) 
 
7. ¿Cómo conseguir esos objetivos? (esto se pone en métodos / enfoques / gestión) (How 
do you hope to meet these objectives?) 
 
8. ¿Cree que están logrando esos objetivos? (do you think you are achieving these goals?) 
 
¿Por qué? (why?) 
 
En su opinión, ¿cuál considera usted que son las barreras para el éxito de los ACPs? (In 
your opinión what do you consider the barriers to the success of the ACPs?) 
 
9. ¿Cómo sabe cuándo ha logrado sus metas? (How do you know when you have met 
your goals?) 
 
¿Qué herramientas se utilizan para monitorear el éxito de los impactos ecológicas, 
sociales y desarrollo de los ACPs? (What  tools are used to monitor the ecological and 
social impacts of the ACPs? 
 
10. ¿Quién decide sobre los objetivos? (who decides the objectives for the ACPs?) 
 
11.  ¿Quién evalúa los resultados de los ACPs? (who evaluates the results of the ACPs?) 
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12. Cómo se identifica y selecciona las áreas para crear ACPs? (How are areas selected to 
create ACPs?) 
 
13. ¿Cuáles son los costos para las comunidades, cuando quiere formar un ACP? (what 
are the costs for the communities when they want to create an ACP?) 
 
14. Cuando _____ (nombre de la organización) ______da asistencia financiera a las 
comunidades para formar los ACPs, en promedio, cuánto dinero se invierte en el 
desarrollo de cada ACP? (When ____________________ provides financial assistance to 
communities to form ACPs, on average, how much money is spent on the development of 
each ACP?) 
 
15. ¿En qué forma colaboras con otras entidades de la región para crear y en el manejo 
los ACPs? (In what form does _________collaborate with other entities in the region in 
the creation and management of ACPs?) 
 
16. ¿Hay algo más que quisiera añadir acerca de los ACPs? (Is there anything else you 
would like to add about ACPs?) 
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Appendix B: Interview Guide for Community Leaders 
 
1. ¿A qué comunidad pertenece su ACP?  (In what community is your ACP located?) 
 
2. ¿Cuál es su cargo dentro de la comunidad? (What is your position in the community?) 
 
3. ¿Cuánto tiempo ha estado en este cargo?, ¿Cuánto tiempo está viviendo en la comunidad? 
(How long have you been in this position?, How long have you been living in the community?) 
 
4. ¿Por qué decidieron establecer un área de conservación privada? (Why did you decide to 
create a private protected area?) 
 
5. ¿Pensaron en recibir algún beneficio? ¿Cuál? (When you created the ACP did you think you 
would receive any benefits?)  
 
6.  ¿Qué espera su comunidad de lograr con la formación de un ACP, cuáles son sus metas 
para el ACP? (What does your community hope to achieve with the formation of ACPs, What 
are your goals for the ACP?) 
 
7.     ¿Cómo conseguir esos objetivos? (O si es nuevo, como planificar a conseguir esos objetivos) 
(How do you hope to meet these goals?) 
 
8.    ¿Cree que están logrando esos objetivos? (Do you think you are achieving these goals?) 
 
¿Por qué? (why?) 
 
En su opinión, ¿cuál considera usted las barreras para el éxito de los ACPs? (In your 
opinion what are the barriers to meeting the objectives of the ACP?) 
 
9. ¿Cómo sabes si has logrado tus metas? (How do you know when you have met your goals?) 
 
 
¿Qué herramientas se utilizan para monitorear el éxito de los impactos ecológicas, 
sociales y desarrollo del ACP? (What tools does the community use to monitor the 
ecological and social impacts of the ACP?) 
 
¿Existe un grupo o comité encargado del monitoreo del ACP? (Is there a group or 
committee in the community in charge of monitoring the ACP?) 
 
 
161 
 
10. ¿En qué forma colabora con otras entidades de la región para su ACP? (In what form have 
you collaborated with other entities in the region for your ACP?) 
 
11. ¿Quién decide sobre los objetivos del ACP? (Who decided the objectives of the ACP?) 
 
12. ¿Cómo se incluyan los miembros de la comunidad en la formación del ACP? (How were 
community members included in the formation of the ACP?) 
 
13.  ¿Quién evalúa los resultados de su ACP? (who evaluates the results of your ACP?) 
 
14. ¿Cuál fue los costos para su comunidad  en formar su ACP? (What were the costs to the 
community in forming the ACP?) 
 
15. ¿Qué tipo de entrenamiento recibió su comunidad a cerca del manejo de recursos naturales 
dentro el ACP? (what type of training has the community received on the management of natural 
resources within the ACP?) 
 
16.  ¿Según su opinión que significa conservación? (In your opinion what does conservation 
mean?) 
 
17. ¿Hay algo más que quisiera añadir acerca de su experiencia con su ACP? (Is there anything 
else you would like to add about your experience with your ACP?) 
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Appendix C: Household Survey Guide 
 
ACP: 
Annex: 
Interview #: 
General Data:  
Gender: 
Age: 
How many people live in the household/ages/ and gender of each member: 
How long have you been living in the community? 
Where are you from (if not born in the community)? 
Socioeconomic Data: 
What is the major way your household obtains income? 
 Probe: What other livelihood activities does the household receive income from? 
Of these, which activity provides the most income? 
What is your household’s main source of food? 
 Probe: What produce and livestock does your household produce for consumption? 
Knowledge/ Perceptions of the ACP/ Conservation: 
1. Can you tell me about your involvement in creating the ACP? 
 
2. Did you participate in the meetings to establish the ACP? 
a. Did another member of your household participate in the meetings to establish 
the ACP? 
If no, why not? 
3. When the ACP was created did you think your household would receive any benefits? 
a. What benefits? 
 
4. What areas of the community are included in the ACP? 
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5. Do you own land that lies within the ACP? 
 
6. What activities are allowed in the ACP? 
7. What activities are not allowed in the ACP? 
 
a. Why are these activities not allowed 
 
8. What training has the community received on the management of natural resources 
within the ACP? 
 
a. Did you participate in the trainings?, if no skip to b 
What did you learn? 
 
b. Did any member of your household participate in the trainings? 
If not, why not? 
 
9. What activities have been implemented in the ACP? 
 
a. Does your household participate in any of these activities? 
 
Which activities?  
 
b.  Why? 
 
c. Who in your household participates in the activities? 
 
d. How often? 
Please respond to the following statements 
 
1. The ACP benefits me and my family 
1- No            2- Indifferent             3- Yes              0 -no opinion 
a. How has the ACP benefited your family? 
 
2. Many community members were involved in creating the management plan for the 
ACP 
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1- No            2- Indifferent             3- Yes              0- no opinion 
a. Can you give an example of who did what in creating the management plan? 
 
 
3. The Zoning within the ACP and use laws are well known amongst community 
members  
 
1- No            2- Indifferent             3- Yes              0- no opinion 
 
4. Since the implementation of the ACP I have noticed a change in land use and 
practices in the area 
1- No            2- Indifferent             3- Yes              0- no opinion 
a. Can you give an example of a change in land use or practices  
 
Practices of Conservation: 
1. What do you do to keep your agricultural land healthy? 
 
2. What do you do to protect your water source? 
 
 
3. What do you do to keep your forested areas healthy? 
 
4. What does conservation mean to you?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
